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Information gaps and uncertainties lie at the heart of many persistent pollution and
natural resource management problems. This article develops a taxonomy of these
gaps and argues that the emerging technologies of the Information Age will create
new gap-filling options and thus expand the range of environmental protection
strategies. Remote sensing technologies, modern telecommunications systems, the
Internet, and computers all promise to make it much easier to identify harms, track
pollution flows and resource consumption, and measure the resulting impacts.
These developments will make possible a new structure of institutional responses to
environmental problems including a more robust market in environmental prop-
erty rights, expanded use of economic incentives and market-based regulatory strat-
egies, improved command-and-control regulation, and redefined social norms of
environmental stewardship. Likewise, the degree to which policies are designed to
promote information generation will determine whether and how quickly new insti-
tutional approaches emerge. While some potential downsides to Information Age
environmental protection remain, the promise of a more refined, individually tai-
lored, and precise approach to pollution control and natural resource management
looks to be significant.
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INTRODUCTION
Information issues are central to the challenge of environmental
protection. Inadequate information and related transaction costs
make Coasean contractual exchanges of environmental rights infea-
sible in many circumstances.1 Information issues are also at the heart
of the debate over whether entitlements, including environmental
rights, are best protected by property rules or liability rules. 2 Even as
a generation of legal scholars debated the optimal form of tort law
over the last fifty years, mounting frustration with the information
demands of a tort-based environmental regime3 precipitated a shift
toward a structure based on statutes and regulations, which incorpo-
rated various techniques to "short circuit" the information require-
ments for environmental decisionmaking. 4 In recent years, however,
1 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1960) (arguing
that, in absence of transaction costs, efficient level of emissions can be negotiated). See
generally COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto:
Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) (discussing how transaction costs com-
plicate bargaining); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism", 99
YALE L.J. 611 (1989) (noting that Coase recognized effect of transaction costs on
exchanges).
2 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (exploring when
entitlements should be granted and under what circumstances property, liability, or ina-
lienability rules should be applied). For an overview of the broader Cathedral literature,
see infra note 55.
3 See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 453-57 (1995) (noting that
problems in obtaining and processing information may impede efficient damage calcula-
tions by courts).
4 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 85-95 (4th ed. 2003) (providing comprehensive structural overview of emer-
gence and eventual dominance of statutory environmental law); Richard B. Stewart, A
New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001) (chronicling
and criticizing rise of environmental regulation model). The logic for "short circuiting"
information requirements is provided by Diver and others who have contributed to the
"optimal specificity" of regulation literature. See infra note 49.
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disappointment has arisen over regulatory failures-often traceable to
information gaps-that remain pervasive despite numerous regulatory
reform initiatives. 5
Uncertainty seems to be the hallmark of the environmental
domain. Disagreements over how best to cope with information defi-
cits have translated into bitterly partisan and divisive environmental
politics and limited progress in recent years in pollution control and
natural resource stewardship. Perhaps this picture represents the ines-
capable reality of the environmental realm.
But imagine instead another world, one where pollution or nat-
ural resource use6 easily could be traced at low cost. What if each
increment of SO, or NOx emitted from a smokestack could be tracked
to where it landed downwind? And what if the "fate and transport"
(as an ecological scientist would put it) of nitrogen and phosphorus in
runoff from farm fields or suburban lawns easily could be deter-
mined? Would things not be different if automobile emissions of vola-
tile organic compounds (VOCs), particulates, and other pollutants
could be "tagged" and traced as they flowed from tailpipes to the
"receptors" that absorb them? And what if the impacts on the recep-
tors (including people, crops, lakes, and forests) were better under-
stood as a result of advances in epidemiology, risk analysis, and
various ecological sciences? Better data on the scope, spread, and
effects of environmental harms would not eliminate all of the informa-
tion gaps that plague environmental policymaking, but such informa-
tion would open significant new policy options and would alter the
framework within which we think about environmental problems.
Such a vision is not so farfetched. Computers, wireless communi-
cations, remote sensing, and other technological breakthroughs are
reshaping every facet of modern life by vastly increasing our capacity
to collect, disseminate, and utilize information. The emergence of
these powerful new digital technologies is now broadly evident, and
their spread across the economy and society appears inexorable.7
5 Criticism of statutory environmental law is legion. For a representative sampling, see
generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998); ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING
REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (1990).
6 The environmental realm encompasses a broad array of pollution and natural
resource management issues. This Article primarily focuses on pollution control, but its
arguments are applicable to the full range of environmental challenges.
7 See Peter Schwartz et al., The Long Boom 26 (1999) (discussing "inevitable" eco-
nomic and social developments being driven by spread of computers and other Informa-
tion Age technologies). For additional perspectives, see generally THOMAS H.
DAVENPORT, INFORMATION ECOLOGY: MASTERING THE INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE
ENVIRONMENT (1997); DIGITAL FUTURES: LIVING IN A DOT-COM WORLD (James Wilsdon
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 79:115
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 118 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Because information gaps and uncertainties lie at the heart of many
persistent pollution and natural resource management problems, tech-
nological breakthroughs offer special promise in the environmental
domain. As data become easier to analyze and disseminate, and dra-
matically less costly to acquire and use,8 our capacity to identify and
solve environmental problems will increase substantially.
While information issues long have played a part in the academic
debate over how to refine environmental law, recent scholarship has
focused on other matters such as the need for economic incentive-
based regulation, public choice failures, cognitive limitations that
affect decisionmaking, and questions of federalism and the realign-
ment of environmental regulatory responsibility. 9
In this Article, I seek to refocus scholarly attention on informa-
tion failures as a central concern for environmental law and policy.
My effort is both descriptive and normative. As a positive matter,
environmental decisionmaking critically depends on data and analysis.
How we respond to information gaps, in turn, shapes our choices of
institutional design for environmental protection. I argue that, as the
Information Age changes the context of these choices, important
opportunities for improved environmental results are emerging.
Indeed, we stand on the verge of an environmental revolution
perhaps as important as that which launched the modern environ-
mental movement four decades ago. 10 The technological advances of
the Information Age provide an opportunity to make environmental
protection more data-driven, empirical, and analytically rigorous. The
core argument of this Article is that as information gaps become less
pervasive, institutional design options for addressing environmental
ed., 2001); THE ECOLOGY OF THE NEW ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE TRANSFORMATION OF
GLOBAL INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES (Jacob Park &
Nigel Roome eds., 2002) [hereinafter ECOLOGY OF THE NEW ECONOMY]; Nigel Roome &
Jacob Park, Global Sustainability and Information Economy: Old Challenges, New Per-
spectives, 32 GRENNER MGMT. INT'L 24, 25-27 (2000).
8 Cf WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, E-ToPIA: "URBAN LIFE, JIM-BUT NOT AS WE KNOW
IT" 13 (1999) ("Information has become dematerialized and disembodied; it is now whiz-
zing round the world at warp speed, and in cortex-crackling quantities .... "); Ira S.
Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta
Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 43-54 (1998) (describing explosion of information acces-
sible through free online search engines).
9 See infra notes 17-22.
10 On the rise of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, see generally
RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE
GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993). For a perspective on
the movement's accomplishments and future challenges, see generally JAMES GUSTAVE
SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
(2004).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 2004]
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 119 2004
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
problems will expand and we will be able to rethink our regulatory
choices. While refined regulatory strategies and structures likely will
improve environmental protection broadly, it is important to note that
institutional design choices themselves also affect the incentives for
data generation. Thus, policies should be constructed to optimize
information generation and to ensure that new technologies are
deployed and harnessed quickly in the environmental realm.
I unfold the logic and implications of this coming revolution in
several stages. Part I surveys the existing "information and environ-
ment" literature and concludes that it consistently has underap-
preciated the wide range of ways that data gaps and knowledge
deficiencies affect our strategies for addressing environmental harms.
In mapping this terrain, I develop a taxonomy of information needs
for environmental decisionmaking. I further suggest that addressing
information gaps represents a key-if not the key-to environmental
progress.
In Part II, I trace out how pervasive information gaps determine
the structure and functioning of the institutions that support pollution
control and natural resource management. I argue that the need for
gap filling defines the ends as well as the means of environmental law.
In particular, I try to explain why corrective justice has disappeared as
a central goal in the environmental realm. I also note that the current
legal framework, which focuses on internalizing externalities in a
least-social-cost fashion, tends to mishandle environmental problems
that arise from ignorance or mistake rather than externalities.
In Part III, I explore how improved data collection, analysis, and
dissemination are poised to fill critical information gaps and thus
change the context of environmental decisionmaking. Problems will
become easier to spot, and trends will become more visible. Policy-
makers will be better positioned to model the flow of harms, predict
impacts, and measure effects. A more data-intensive world will facili-
tate quantitative performance measurement, comparative analysis,
and the benchmarking of results. Easier data access and broader dis-
semination of critical facts and figures will make for a more trans-
parent policy process, engage new actors, and democratize
decisionmaking. Alongside the opportunities created by the Informa-
tion Age, I highlight a set of new challenges-some a function of the
changed information context and others that reflect longstanding
pathologies that plague environmental decisionmaking today.
In Part IV, I survey our current approaches to environmental
protection and analyze how a more information-intensive world could
affect our institutional design and regulatory strategies. I suggest that
information technologies will improve the functioning of all our pre-
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sent approaches to pollution control and natural resource manage-
ment-and make inaction appropriate in a shrinking number of
circumstances. Most importantly, I argue that the optimal mix of
environmental policies and strategies is likely to evolve as more com-
plete information changes the relative costs and benefits of various
institutional approaches to solving environmental problems.
Although the gains from a more information-rich world will pen-
etrate the environmental regime on their own over time, Part V
explores how this process might be accelerated. I note that not only
does our capacity to fill information gaps affect our choice of institu-
tional structures and regulatory tools, but also that our institutional
choices simultaneously affect the flow of data and information that is
available to support environmental decisionmaking. I thus identify a
set of options to restructure the incentives for data production and
analysis with a focus on the "least-cost information providers" in
order to bring information more effectively into the environmental
policy space.1
While the coming era of information-based environmental pro-
tection holds tremendous opportunities for progress and more refined
institutional design, it is important to note that the precise pace and
path of policy reform is hard to predict. The revolution in environ-
mental protection that this Article envisions will emerge not in a
linear fashion but rather in a more uneven two-steps-forward-one-
step-back way. Harnessing the power of information technology will
require a nuanced understanding of the relationship between environ-
mental information and institutional design. This Article represents a
first step.
I
DEFINING THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL REALM
The importance of good data and reliable information for sound
environmental decisionmaking seems obvious: Without basic data,
externalities cannot be identified and internalized, 12 and those who
11 An emphasis on identifying the least-cost information provider can be traced to
pathbreaking work in the 1970s, applying economic analysis to nuisance law. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 719-61 (1973); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law:
Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1335-41 (1977); see also Jeff
L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV.
775, 809-10 (1986) (highlighting fact-finding costs as critical variable).
12 The "economics of information" and "search costs" have been a critical point of
analysis in the economic realm. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics
of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441 (2000) (discussing
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bear the costs of pollution cannot be made whole.1 3 It thus has long
been understood that information gaps lead to market failures,14 legal
system breakdowns, 15 and regulatory difficulties. 16
But much of the academic literature on how to improve environ-
mental outcomes has touched on information issues only indirectly or
in passing. Significant scholarly work in the environmental field has
addressed particular sources of regulatory failure, including public-
choice distortions in policymaking, 17 federalism and questions con-
information asymmetries and costs and their implications for markets); see also George A.
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining how asymmetric information prevents market efficiency
and leads to undercreation of social goods); Steve Salop, Information and Monopolistic
Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (1976) (discussing how information costs may rein-
force monopolistic competition); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.
POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (identifying information and search costs as key determinants of
prices and price dispersion); John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the
Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970, in LONG TERM FACTORS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 95 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds.,
1986) (proposing framework for quantifying transaction costs).
13 Making victims whole has been a goal of law in this context for centuries. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (stating that damages in tort liability are
allocated to "give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms"); see also Aldred's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (articulating principle that one should use his own property
in such manner as not to injure that of another). This goal, however, is frequently elusive.
See PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
438-40 (2000) (arguing that court system is overwhelmed by need to synthesize multiple
sources of information).
14 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 18 (1988) (explaining role of information in environmental externalities).
15 For example, nuisance proves to be an awkward way to address environmental
problems as harms become more complex, diverse, and diffuse, and as the numbers of
harm causers and victims grow. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes:
The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075,
1100-09 (1980) (discussing difficulties courts face in resolving nuisance cases when infor-
mation is incomplete or multiple parties are involved); see also SCHUCK, supra note 13,
438-40 (identifying information overload in court system); Krier & Schwab, supra note 3,
at 479-80 (highlighting failures in tort regime). Indeed, the information challenges
inherent in the tort system hastened the rise of state and federal regulatory solutions. See
supra note 3.
16 See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 5, at 269 (concluding that "the fragmented
[regulatory] system is seriously broken"); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 102-03, 117-21 (1994)
(arguing that high information costs deter public participation and enable control by rent-
seeking minorities); LANDY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6-7 ("The history of environmental
policy abounds with examples of the price to be paid for ignoring the [feasibility, effective-
ness, and efficiency of proposed remedies]"); ANTHONY I. Onus, REGULATION: LEGAL
FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 204-10 (1994) (explaining how information gaps imperil
effective environmental regulation).
17 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) (rejecting public choice arguments as basis
for federalizing environmental law). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997) (examining
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cerning which level of government should undertake environmental
responsibilities,' 8  and risk-perception problems. 19  Additional
emphasis has been placed on regulatory inefficiency and strategies for
addressing bureaucratic shortcomings-such as economic incentives, 20
"regulatory competition,"'2 1 and improved cost-benefit analysis. 22
public choice interpretations of legislative and administrative agency behavior); Matthew
D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987) (advocating use of administrative procedures as tool for control-
ling regulatory process).
18 See generally Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 23 (1996) (arguing that jurisdiction for pollution control should correspond to
size of area affected by particular pollution source); Richard B. Stewart, Madison's
Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (1990) (discussing problems of interest group influence
and command-and-control rigidity in federal regulatory approaches); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (evaluating appropriateness of
federal government compelling state action on environmental issues).
19 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEC-
TIVE RISK REGULATION 33-39 (1993); PAUL SLOVic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Ragnar
E. Lofstedt, ed., 2000); John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, Confronting Risk Trade-
offs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995) (explaining how countervailing risks
undercut risk reduction strategies); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades
and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 705-12 (1999) (arguing that heuristic devices
and social pressures distort risk perceptions, generating inappropriate regulatory out-
comes); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Gov-
ernment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002) (surveying cognitive sources of regulatory
failure); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and the Law, 112
YALE L.J. 61, 61-63 (2002) (explaining human inability to comprehend probability
differentials).
20 See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988)
(explaining administrative and institutional advantages of market-based systems); Robert
W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era
from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (identifying factors that have contributed to
and inhibited use of market-based mechanisms); Project 88-Harnessing Market Forces to
Protect The Environment: Initiatives for the New President, A Public Policy Study Spon-
sored by Sen. Timothy E. Wirth and Sen. John Heinz (Robert N. Stavins ed., 1988), avail-
able at http://www.heinz.org/files/Project88.PDF.
21 Compare Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570 (1996) (arguing that centralized programs of environmental regulation will yield better
outcomes than decentralized systems of "regulatory competition"), with Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Ratio-
nale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that
competition among states may yield innovative regulatory policies). See generally REGU-
LATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
22 See BREYER, supra note 19, at 59-68 (advocating science-based regulatory body to
improve risk/benefit calculations); ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 5 (high-
lighting potential regulatory applications of, and gains to be had from, better cost-benefit
analysis); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK (1992) (proposing ways for risk analyses to reflect costs and societal tradeoffs);
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While data gaps sometimes are mentioned as an issue, pervasive
uncertainties are simply assumed by most scholars to be part of the
framework within which environmental law must operate.23 This Part,
after surveying the existing literature, identifies and categorizes the
relevant information gaps. The resulting taxonomy serves as the foun-
dation for later analysis.
A. Information Issues in the Environmental Literature
Perhaps the most theoretically significant examination of the role
of information in environmental law is the work of James Krier in the
1970s. Building on the economic analyses of Demsetz and Coase and
the "law and economics" work of Calabresi and others, Krier dissects
the information-cost implications of various institutional approaches
to environmental protection. 24 Krier and coauthor W. David
Montgomery argue that a regime of private property rights may
reduce transaction costs in information, 25 but they note that a private
property system entails administrative costs that may not be justified
when the externalities are small.26 Describing regulation as the polar
opposite of a private property rights regime, Krier and Montgomery
observe that, in some cases, government intervention will minimize
information burdens and thus the cost of achieving a more efficient
resource allocation. Specifically, where the costs of understanding a
problem, communicating knowledge about the problem, or policing
are high, a regulatory approach may be superior to a regime of private
property rights.27 In such cases, regulation rather than negotiation
Graham & Wiener, supra note 19, at 29-41 (advocating risk balancing formula to make
policy determinations).
23 See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 343-45 (discussing prevalence of high
level of uncertainty in regulation of toxics); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving
Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145,
148-52 (2003) (reviewing uncertainties in environmental law); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Information As Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Pre-
cursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 283-86 (2001) (emphasizing that environ-
mental regulation is characterized by uncertainty and data gaps).
24 See James E. Krier & W. David Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost
and the Form of Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (1973) (arguing that
pricing system of pollution regulation will economize on information costs while achieving
greater allocative efficiency than traditional standard-based regulations); see also JAMES E.
KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON AIR
POLLUTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS 293-468 (1971); JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND
URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERI-
ENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975 (1977) (evaluating institutional
approaches to combating motor vehicle air pollution); Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at
453-57 (highlighting burden of transaction and "assessment" costs).
25 Krier & Montgomery, supra note 24, at 93-94.
26 Id. at 94-95.
27 Id. at 94-95, 96.
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economizes on the particularized information required for an efficient
outcome.
Krier and Montgomery identify two intermediate institutional
options that lie between a private property approach and full-scale
government regulation: subsidization and pricing. 28  These
approaches tend to lower administrative costs, overcome the inherent
inefficiency of uniform standards, and permit emission limitations to
vary with the marginal cost of control for each source.29 In particular,
pricing, which we now call "market-based" regulation, creates incen-
tives that draw out decentralized information from market partici-
pants in ways that lower costs and improve efficiency. Krier's work,
identifying the incentives for information generation as the crux of the
institutional environmental protection design challenge, provides an
important starting point for this Article.
A small number of legal scholars recently have begun to look at
the fundamental role of information in environmental problem-
solving.30 In a thoughtful article analyzing the shift in the U.S.
economy from manufacturing to services, James Salzman briefly
explores the potential impacts of the information revolution on the
environment. 31
Most of the recent "information" scholarship that has emerged in
the environmental law arena, however, has had a rather narrow focus.
Considerable attention has been paid to the potential for "information
regulation. ' 32 Much of this analysis focuses on the EPA's Toxics
28 Id. at 97.
29 J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES 81-84 (1968) (spelling out eco-
nomic logic of marginal costs emissions pricing), reprinted in KRIER, supra note 24, at
294-97.
30 E.g., Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliot, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law
and Public Health Protection, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,363 (2002) (discussing primacy of
quantitative risk assessment in regulatory decisionmaking and arguing that effective risk
policy must change as new information emerges); Dennis D. Hirsch, Globalization, Infor-
mation Technology, and Environmental Regulation: An Initial Inquiry, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
57 (2001) (predicting that globalization and advances in information technology will
improve environmental regulation).
31 Although he finds positive environmental feedback loops among key recent trends-
deindustrialization, information technology gains, economic consolidation, and globaliza-
tion-Salzman concludes that the decline in manufacturing has been overstated and that
the potential for environmental improvements from the "New Economy" still lie in the
future. James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service
Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411, 415-18 (1999); see also Bruce Guile & Jared Cohon,
Sorting Out a Service-Based Economy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERA-
TION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 76 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997)
[hereinafter THINKING ECOLOGICALLY] (highlighting need to restructure environmental
policy and law to address shift in economy from manufacturing to services).
32 See, e.g., OGus, supra note 16, at 121-49 (explaining concept and providing exam-
ples of information regulation); David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental
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Release Inventory (TRI) Program 33 and the disclosure of environ-
mental information as a means for changing corporate behavior-
through "regulation by revelation, ' 34 public outcry,35 or better-
informed consumer choice.36 Whether aiming to encourage polluters
to behave better, to inspire regulators, or to engage consumers, those
writing in this vein all seek to improve policy outcomes through
revised information flows. A related line of scholarship focuses on the
possibility that more information, systematic analysis of data, and
better environmental management systems will make corporations
more "reflexive" and thus more attentive to the demands of environ-
mental stewardship.37
Information as Regulation, 31 ENvTh. L. REP. 10,773, 10,776-81 (2001) (summarizing eco-
nomic analyses of information regulation); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informa-
tional Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 613, 626 (1999) (proposing information disclosure as regulatory tool that triggers
political rather than market safeguards).
33 See James T. Hamilton, Pollution Is News: Media and Stockmarket Reactions to the
Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98 (1995) (examining connec-
tion between TRI data and corporate stock prices); Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 286-360
(evaluating effectiveness of TRI program); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Informa-
tion: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243 (1998)
(examining investor reactions to disclosures through TRI); Shameek Konar & Mark
Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic
Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997) (providing further examination of
relationship between TRI releases and stock prices); Tom Tietenberg, Disclosure Strategies
for Pollution Control, 11 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 587 (1998) (evaluating effectiveness
of various information disclosure programs). But see Mark A. Cohen, Information as a
Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment: What Have We Learned?, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,425, 10,425-26 (2001) (success of TRI may not justify information regulation more
broadly); Jan Mazurek, How Fabulous Fableness? Environmental Challenges of Economic
Restructuring in the Semiconductor Industry, 32 GREENER MGMT. INT'L 57 (2000) (arguing
that TRI fails to account for environmental effects of globalization in U.S. semiconductor
industry).
34 See ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW
WORLD 188-90 (2003) (discussing disclosure and transparency as emerging centerpiece for
regulation); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Dis-
closure Policies Sustainable? 23 (2002), at http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/research/
papers/FGW.pdf.
35 See William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes
and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 160-61 (2001) (arguing that disclosure pro-
grams may deliberately provoke public outcry that will result in new regulation).
36 See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 556 (1979) (noting that competitive mar-
kets require well-informed consumers); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented
Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1437-42 (1995) (evaluating eco-
labels and other programs aimed at informing consumers); James Salzman, Informing the
Green Consumer: The Debate Over the Use and Abuse of Environmental Labels, 1 J. IND.
ECOL. 11 (1997) (discussing eco-labels).
37 Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1252-67 (1995)
(developing theory of reflexive environmental law); Stewart, supra note 4, at 127-51 (dis-
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Others have looked at the role of information in specific regu-
lated communities. Mary Lyndon, for instance, argues that laws
addressing chemical exposures should be recrafted to encourage pro-
duction and dissemination of toxicity information. 38 Wagner sees sim-
ilar gains in restructuring the incentives for information generation
related to toxic products.39 McGarity and Shapiro suggest that public
disclosure of test results involving pesticides could enhance environ-
mental safety.40
Those who seek to reorient environmental protection around
property rights and a common law legal strategy for protecting those
rights sometimes have examined the role of information. 41 Bruce
Yandle, for instance, talks about the need for technologies and institu-
tions to generate information that can help to make property rights
definable, defendable, and divestible. 42 But again, writing in the prop-
erty rights vein often has been rather narrow.43
Some attention to information questions has emerged in the envi-
ronmental policy literature, especially under the rubric of "industrial
ecology. '44 Closed loop production processes, "dematerialization,"
and more careful "design for the environment"-central concepts in
cussing information regulation as way to drive more reflexive approach to environmental
law).
38 Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to
Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1797-98 (1989).
39 Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 833-41 (1997).
40 Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837,
839-40 (1980).
41 See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRON-
MENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES (1997).
42 Bruce Yandle, Legal Foundations for Evolving Property Rights Technologies, in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 1-3 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 2001).
43 In their zeal to promote environmental protection through property rights, many
advocates for "common law" environmentalism do not sufficiently acknowledge the causes
of market failures. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson, Viewing Wildlife Through Coase-Colored
Glasses, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 259 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds.,
1998) (advancing call for contract-based protection of wildlife with limited focus on risk of
market failure); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities:
The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845,
868-73 (1999) (explaining persistence of current environmental regulatory regime by
public choice model, and suggesting that new view of political dynamics implies new ave-
nues for reform).
44 See, e.g., Robert J. Klee, Note, Enabling Environmental Sustainability in the United
States: The Case for Material Flow Inventory, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2004)
(arguing that compiling comprehensive information on society's use of materials and
energy is key first step towards ultimate environmental sustainability). For an introduction
to the industrial ecology literature, see generally T.E. Graedel, On the Concept of Indus-
trial Ecology, 21 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T. 69 (1996).
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industrial ecology-all rely on information production as a way to
help reduce emissions and improve efficiency. 45 Industrial ecologists
also have started to explore the implications of improved data man-
agement for achieving efficiency up and down the chain of produc-
tion, 46 and have engaged in some broader analysis of the "ecology" of
the Information Age economy.47
Information gaps have been a major focus of attention in eco-
nomics-indeed, Joseph Stiglitz recently won the Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics for his work on information asymmetries. 48  But, in
environmental economics, information problems have often been
addressed only in passing.49 Chichilnisky asserts, for instance, that
environmental knowledge is a privately-produced public good that is
45 See Braden R. Allenby, The Information Revolution and Sustainability: Mutually
Reinforcing Dimensions of the Human Future, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 15, 19 (Deanna J. Richards et al. eds., 2001) (demonstrating "fundamental
coevolution of the Information Revolution and sustainability"); Thomas E. Graedel &
Robert J. Klee, Industrial and Anthroposystem Metabolism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 73 (T. Munn ed., 2001) (discussing how industrial
metabolism studies of flow of materials and energy are important diagnostic tools for envi-
ronmental improvement).
46 See Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Industrial Ecology and Competitiveness, 2 J.
IND. ECOL. 35, 37-40 (1998) (discussing how improved information flows may translate
into greater resource productivity); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eli M. Snir, Environmental
Information in Supply-Chain Design and Coordination, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 45, at 115, 127-30 (demonstrating how better information
can improve environmental performance through minimization of use of raw materials,
transportation optimization, reduced emissions, better logistics, and other means).
47 See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN, Eco-ECONOMY: BUILDING AN ECONOMY FOR THE
EARTH 4 (2001) (arguing that environmentally sustainable economy "requires that the
principles of ecology establish the framework for the formulation of economic policy");
DIGITAL FUTURES: LIVING IN A DOT-COM WORLD, supra note 7 (examining social and
environmental opportunities presented by e-commerce); ECOLOGY OF THE NEW
ECONOMY, supra note 7; JAN MAZUREK, MAKING MICROCHIPS: POLICY, GLOBALIZATION,
AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY (1999) (assessing
environmental impact of economic changes that have shaped semiconductor industry);
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Arnulf Grubler et al. eds., 2002)
(highlighting environmental effects from technological advances).
48 Stiglitz, supra note 12 (discussing how examination of information asymmetries and
costs has informed understanding of markets).
49 Kip Viscusi has addressed information as a regulatory issue with some reference to
environmental issues. See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL
APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992) (assessing impact of hazard warning regulations); W.
KIP VIscusi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998) (examining government's role in providing
risk information to consumers). Lawyer-economists such as Steven Shavell have, of
course, contributed significantly to the Cathedral debate, discussed infra note 55. Others,
such as Polinsky, see infra note 57, and, more recently Pfaff and Sanchirico, see infra note
303, have explored the incentives created by disclosure rules. But little of this work looks
at information as a central regulatory failure.
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nonrival in consumption.50 But she overlooks the fact that a great
deal of environmental data and information is publicly generated.5 1
Moreover, a good bit of privately generated environmental knowledge
is not shared publicly but instead guarded for commercial advantage.
This work, moreover, seems to miss the institutional dimension of
information production.
Finally, a number of legal scholars have explored information
issues in a broader regulatory context. Peter Schuck discusses the
information demands of legal systems, markets, and social norms and
develops a theory of the "economy of information. ' 52 In a series of
articles, Cass Sunstein explores the connections between information
and efficient regulation.5 3 Colin Diver, Richard Posner, and others
address the question of the optimal specificity of regulation and legal
rules.54 This Article seeks to build on these lines of scholarship,
honing in on the role of information in the environmental domain.
50 Graciela Chichilnisky, Knowledge and the Environment. Markets with Privately Pro-
duced Public Goods, in ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY 242,
242-43 (Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal eds., 2000).
51 Dozens of reports are put out each year by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Department of the Interior, and other government agencies. Environ-
mental knowledge also emanates from public research centers such as EPA laboratories,
the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Institutes of Health. Government-
supported research, such as work funded by the National Science Foundation at academic
institutions, produces a vast store of additional data and analysis. Nonprofit think tanks
and private research centers also generate significant data, information, and learning with a
degree of public funding. It is therefore a significant oversimplification to see environ-
mental knowledge as privately produced. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a
Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 308, 311 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that state plays role in pro-
ducing knowledge through intellectual property regimes).
52 SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 438-40.
53 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 327-28 (1997); Kuran &
Sunstein, supra note 19 (cautioning against regulatory decisions rooted in false informa-
tion); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1995) (advocating for increased emphasis on information generation and disclo-
sure in federal regulations); Sunstein, supra note 32 (proposing information disclosure as
regulatory tool that triggers political rather than market safeguards); Cass R. Sunstein,
Informing America: Risk, Disclosure and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653,
655-61 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Risk] (discussing importance of information in effec-
tive risk regulation and stressing government's fundamental role in providing it).
54 Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983) (providing model for determining appropriate degree of regulatory precision); Isaac
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 261-77 (1974) (exploring "optimum precision of legal obligation"); see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-70 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that key question
is whether benefits of particularization outweigh costs). Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 30-36 (1995) (arguing for simpler rules to achieve
higher overall productivity), with Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of
Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 161 (1995) (arguing that complexity arises because
precisely tailored rules provide benefits).
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B. A Deeper Theory of Information
In the Section that follows, I explore the breadth and depth of the
information failures that plague environmental protection efforts.
Mapping this terrain is a critical first step toward understanding the
potential for environmental gains from Information Age technologies
and the value of designing institutions to promote information
generation.
The debate over whether property rules or liability rules are the
best way to protect entitlements (and especially Calabresi and
Melamed's seminal Cathedral analysis) illuminates some of the ways
information needs come into play in the context of environmental
problems. But this line of analysis has also cast a long shadow across
the academic literature and narrowed the thinking on where the crit-
ical information gaps lie. In seeking to reframe the scholarly debate, I
highlight an array of foundational data and information issues that are
essential to good environmental decisionmaking-but which lie
"beneath" the Cathedral discussion.
1. The Shadow of the Property Versus Liability Rules Debate
Calabresi and Melamed powerfully demonstrated that the choice
of legal rules to protect entitlements affects efficiency. The Cathedral
article and its progeny have sharpened the focus of a generation of
legal scholars on the ways in which property and liability rules can (1)
be utilized, refined, and combined to generate information on the
value of harms (and the burdens of abatement); (2) limit strategic bar-
gaining; and (3) reduce the inefficiency created by holdouts.55
55 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distin-
guishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE
L.J. 235, 252 (1995) (arguing that "liability rules may induce more efficient postbargaining
outcomes even when no nonconsensual advantage exists"); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solo-
monic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J.
1027, 1083-90 (1995) (spelling out bargaining obstacles); Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal
Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703,
706-07 (1997) (distinguishing between higher-order liability rules and first-order liability
principles); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules &
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 267 (2002) (dis-
cussing valuation burdens courts face); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (explaining
why liability rules may be superior to property rules); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2193-94 (1997) (suggesting that liability rules require
courts to do more than determine average damages from pollution); Steven Shavell, Lia-
bility for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 359 (1984) (arguing for
liability rules rather than regulation where private parties are in better position to assess
risks than government).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 79:115
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 130 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The framework of legal rules does, undoubtedly, shape the incen-
tives for information production. But as Carol Rose argues, the con-
clusions drawn from various contributions to the Cathedral debate are
a function of the examples put forward. 56 The structure of the
hypotheticals chosen defines the analysis, assumes away certain issues,
and focuses the reader on others.57 Rose notes that the "shadow
examples" affect not only the choice of rules, but also the content of
the entitlements. 58
I contend that the shadow of the Cathedral is even more over-
whelming, distracting the scholarly community from the broader set of
information issues at play in the environmental domain. In fact, while
Calabresi and Melamed use environmental nuisance to illuminate
their argument, they really have in mind the law of accidents. They
ignore the underlying issue of whether there was an accident in the
first place. 59 More importantly, the Cathedral examples-and a focus
on nuisance cases more generally-stylize the environmental problem
in a way that oversimplifies the information issues, highlighting a few
concerns (e.g., the challenge of assessing damages and preventing
holdouts) to the exclusion of others. In the pollution context, the exis-
tence, contours, sources, movement, and impact of the harm in ques-
tion cannot be taken for granted.
2. Beneath the Cathedral
People affected by pollution often do not know what potential
environmental injuries they face, where particular harms are coming
from, how much those harms affect them, what value to place on the
injuries or effects they suffer, nor whether they have a right to be free
of the harm. Under these circumstances, a Calabresian bargaining
breakdown is the least of their problems. While some of these infor-
mation failures arise from the incentives created by legal rules, other
56 Rose, supra note 55, at 2177-97 (discussing "shadow examples"). Rose further notes
that contract law is the shadow example in the work of Ayres and Talley and that Kaplow
and Shavell again work from the shadow of the law of accidents. Id. at 2176.
57 Polinsky, for instance, assumes the government has "full information about the
externality problem." A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Enti-
tlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
2 (1979).
58 Rose, supra note 55, at 2179.
59 Calabresi's work on accidents in the late 1960s furthermore came against the back-
drop of a major policy debate about "no-fault" auto insurance, designed to overcome bar-
gaining breakdowns over how to tally damages in the context of car accidents. See, e.g.,
ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VicmM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 180-81 (1965). Cala-
bresi's work-and thus his examples-also predate the rise of a statutory approach to pol-
lution control.
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gaps are more a function of science or values, and thus require a quite
different line of attack to fix. 60
Modern day pollution control problems are rarely of the simple
"A causes harm to B" type that the property-versus-liability-rules
debate explores. Under an even slightly more complex model-with
multiple polluters (or harm causers) P, P', and P"; multiple "pol-
lutees" (or victims) V, V', and V"; and multiple pollutants (or emis-
sions) E, E', and E" causing harm X-a much broader array of
information failures can be identified.
(a) Problem Identification
In the environmental domain there is often a great deal of uncer-
tainty about whether a problem even exists. In Calabresi's world, V
knows he has been harmed by P. In the case of an accident, V knows
that P's car has hit him causing harm X. Calabresi and other Cathe-
dral commentators also use nuisance examples in which V is assumed
to be aware of P's harm to him. In the broader pollution context,
however, V may not see the emissions from P's factory smokestack.
In fact, V may not even see P's factory, which may be many miles
away. Even if V sees the smoke in the air or emissions going into the
water, he may not be able to tell if this pollution is harmful. To estab-
lish the existence of a harm, several basic questions must be answered:
* Is P emitting E?
" Does E cause harm?
To complicate this set of "existence" issues, many environmental
harms are not identified until many years after they have been gener-
ated. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were considered miracle chemicals
in the 1950s with uses that ranged from cleaning semiconductors to
refrigeration. Only in the 1970s and 1980s was it recognized that
CFCs were depleting the ozone layer.61 The inability to see many
problems arises from the fact that modern-day pollutants are often,
quite literally, invisible. Other harms are spatially or temporally dif-
fused. Problems may not emerge until an ecosystem's assimilative
capacity is overwhelmed or other critical thresholds are crossed. The
60 Some of the problems may also be "beyond science" and related to disputes over
values. On the role of values and culture more generally, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003) (arguing that what people accept as fact depends on personal
values and culture). See also Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regu-
lation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1619-22 (1995) (separating problems science can address
from "trans-science" issues that require political judgment).
61 See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 9-22 (1998) (summarizing development of scientific knowledge
regarding CFCs and depletion of ozone layer).
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invisible buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere-potentially causing climate change over a period of
decades or centuries-is the paradigmatic example of the hidden
harm spilling across space and time. To the harm identification tax-
onomy, we must therefore add:
* Can V (or V' or V") perceive E?
(b) Causal Specification
Even if the existence of a potential harm is clear, important ques-
tions may remain about its actual impact and thus its potential for
damage to people or the natural environment. In the ecological sci-
ences, these issues are studied as matters of the "fate and transport"
of pollutants. 62 In the law, these questions are analyzed as a matter of
causation. We need information to establish a link from particular
emissions to specific receptors or pollutees:
e Does P's E affect V?
In reality, the information issues and uncertainties surrounding
causal linkages are even more complex. Notably, V may be affected
by emissions from sources other than P. Are the particulates V is
breathing from the power plant next door (P)? The factory across
town (P')? The cars miles upwind (P")? Moreover, P's emissions and
those of P' and P" may well affect not only V, but also V' and V".
It may be, furthermore, that we cannot trace a problem back to
its source until multiple victims with similar harms emerge. This
makes information exchange across victims and the aggregation of
claims important. We therefore have several additional issues to
address:
" Do the emissions from P' and P" affect V?
" Does P's E affect V' and V"?
• Do V, V" and V" recognize themselves to be victims of a problem-
in-common?
(c) Impact Evaluation: Epidemiological and Ecological
Effects
Even when we can trace emissions of E from P to V, uncertain-
ties about how the pollution affects the pollutee may persist. In the
62 See, e.g., JERALD L. SCHNOOR, ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING, FATE AND TRANSPORT
OF POLLUTANTS IN WATER, AIR AND SOIL (1996) (proposing mathematical model of envi-
ronmental pollutants to gain better understanding of fate and transport of chemicals);
RICHARD J. WATTS, HAZARDOUS WASTES: SOURCES, PATHWAYS, RECEPTORS 405-37
(1998) (employing mathematical models to describe transportation of contaminants).
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policy domain these issues loom large. Does smog hurt people? 63 Do
radionuclides in drinking water lead to cancer? 64 Mere physical con-
tact does not necessarily create a need for redress or intervention. A
fundamental starting point for environmental policymaking is that
only actual damage or the real risk of injury requires action. Informa-
tion about the epidemiological and ecological impacts of E must
therefore be developed, analyzed, and disseminated. To our catalogue
of information needs, we must add:
* Does E harm V?
" How does E harm V?
* What dose of E affects V?
The issue of epidemiological and ecological effects may be further
complicated by a number of factors. First, the impacts on V may not
occur immediately. As noted above, threshold effects may emerge
only after a particular level of exposure or intensity of impact has
been realized. A single car in Los Angeles is not a problem, but five
million vehicles overwhelm the assimilative capacity of the airshed. In
other circumstances, harms accrue over time and only become visible
after a certain degree of accumulation.
Second, V's injuries might be a result of exposure to other pollu-
tants beyond E. Is respiratory distress a function of smog? Or rather
particulates? Or airborne toxics? This multidimensionality means we
must ask:
Do V's symptoms come from exposure to E' or E" as well as to
E?
Third, a further set of information needs emerges at the intersec-
tion of harms and causal uncertainties. Particularly vulnerable sub-
groups of the population-children, older people, or those with
compromised immune systems, for example, may all need to be ana-
lyzed separately. Moreover, some injuries may be a function of the
interaction of one pollutant with another or with other risk factors.
Exposure to radionuclides is, for example, much riskier for smokers
than nonsmokers. The potential for interactive effects means we must
inquire:
* Do V's symptoms come from the interaction of E with E' and
E"?
63 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SMOG-WHo DOES IT HURT?: WHAT You NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT OZONE AND YOUR HEALTH 3-4 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/
airnow/health/smog.pdf.
64 See NAT'L GROUND WATER ASS'N, RADIONUCLIDES: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
(2000), available at http://www.ngwa.org/pdf/Radionuclides.pdf (highlighting risks and
uncertainties posed by these naturally occurring radioactive contaminants).
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* Are there other factors that aggravate or mitigate E's impact on
V? 6 5
(d) Harm Valuation
Even if we are able to ascertain the precise physical effects of an
identified source of pollution on a pollutee, we face the additional
problem of calculating the dollar value of the injuries inflicted. It is at
this point that the Cathedral literature picks up. Consistent and
appropriate valuation of harms is critical-and subject to real uncer-
tainty.66 The valuation calculus raises a number of questions:
" Who should undertake the valuation?
* Is technical expertise required?
" Whose values and valuations should be used? Those of the pol-
lutee? Of society?
* Should we fully compensate victims who are unusually suscep-
tible to harm (e.g., those with weak respiratory or immune
systems)?
" Should we fully compensate those whose own behavior (e.g.,
smoking) creates the risk of injury or worsens the damage?
* How do we discipline exaggeration or other strategic behavior?
The multiperson, multielement model again reveals additional
complexities that add to our information needs and burdens. Specifi-
cally, if V is affected by E from P' and P" as well as P, how do we
determine for what share or for which units of harm P is responsible?
This issue is particularly important in circumstances in which the mar-
ginal cost of the harm is not steady, but rising or falling.67 The
damage assessment questions highlighted by the Cathedral debate are
thus significant but cannot be addressed without reference to the
broader set of underlying information needs that arise in any environ-
mental decisionmaking context.
65 Age, weight, sex, and other factors such as demographic groups with unusual dietary
patterns (e.g., Native Americans who eat a great deal more fish than the rest of the popula-
tion) may all be relevant variables to examine. See generally JOHN WARGO, OUR CHIL-
DREN'S Toxic LEGACY: How SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO PROTECT Us FROM PESTICIDES
(1996) (spelling out how and why some subgroups of population may be more sensitive to
certain harms).
66 Polinsky observes that difficulties in calculating damages could be more important
than strategic behavior as a source of breakdown in the Calabresi-Melamed model.
Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1110-11. Krier and Schwab similarly note that judicial efforts to
place a value on harms under liability rules often entail substantial "assessment costs."
Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 453.
67 Rose, supra note 55, at 2195-96 (arguing that average cost is not meaningful with
respect to allocating costs of pollution to specific actors, and therefore, polluters will not
fully internalize costs of their activities).
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(e) Rights Delineation
Coasean analysis focuses on what happens after an entitlement
has been allocated. The Cathedral debate similarly presumes that
there has been an allocation of entitlements prior to deciding whether
property or liability rules should be deployed. But in the environ-
mental realm, the delineation of property rights is often a contentious
issue, 68 requiring us to ask:
* Have the relevant property rights been established?
" Are the parties aware of who holds the rights?
" Are the boundaries clear?
Where the rights have been allocated, the inquiry turns to a
second set of questions:
" Has there been an encroachment on these rights?
" Can the rightsholder tell that an encroachment has occurred?
" Are the rights easily vindicated?
While Calabresi implicitly (and other contributors to the Cathe-
dral literature more explicitly69) assumes that the ownership, scope,
and boundaries of the relevant property rights are clear, in the real
world of environmental decisionmaking they often are not. Consider-
able effort often goes into ascertaining who holds the relevant rights
and whether an externality exists that interferes with those rights.70
What constitutes an externality is also a function of values and com-
munity norms, which makes the scope of rights fluid and subject to
further uncertainties. 71
68 One dimension of this issue centers on the fairness of the initial allocation of rights.
This Article elides such distributive justice issues. As others have noted, without dimin-
ishing the seriousness of equity concerns, other more direct policy approaches (e.g., pro-
gressive taxation) likely are better to achieve any desired distributive outcome. See, e.g.,
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 55, at 744.
69 See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1086-88.
70 See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1100; Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of
Federal Regulation, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 7, 11-12 (Paul
R. Portney et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that nonregulatory approaches are insufficient due to
difficulties in defining rights, prohibitive transaction costs, and market imperfections);
Carolyn Woj, Property Rights Disputes: Current Fallacies and a New Approach, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 411, 412 (1985) (arguing that current economic approach overlooks impor-
tance of relative value of entitlement as factor in determining value-maximizing exchange).
71 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728-29 (1973) (noting that evaluative
terms such as "beneficial" and "harmful" often are made with reference to community-
determined standards of conduct); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 429, 475-89 (1977) (noting uncertainty
and inconsistency resulting from fact that legality of municipality's exactions and special
assessments levied on new developers will turn in part on community's own past taxation
and funding practices).
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(f) Policy Intervention
Once an environmental harm has been identified and deemed
worthy of attention, two other sets of questions emerge, centered on:
(1) abatement options and costs, and (2) who should take action. In
many circumstances, an array of pollution control alternatives needs
to be considered: restructured processes, redesigned products, pollu-
tion prevention options, "end of pipe" treatment, and so on. Informa-
tion on these choices and on the costs and benefits of the various
alternative actions is critical. Optimizing incentives for creativity and
cost minimization in both information generation and intervention is
similarly important. 72
Finally, we need to figure out who should formulate and imple-
ment policy. Determining whether P or V is better positioned to
reduce the harm provides a useful starting point, but not an endpoint,
for this effort. Identifying the least-cost information provider is also
important. Given the scientific and technical complexity of many
modern-day environmental problems, neither P nor V really may be
in a position even to understand the options for abatement of E.
These added dimensions of uncertainty create new information
burdens:
* How do we best reduce the effects of E?
" What are our policy choices?
" What can be done to motivate innovation in information produc-
tion and pollution control?
* Who is best positioned to act to reduce E?
* How do we minimize overall system costs?
(g) Implementation
Once an optimal abatement strategy has been identified, some-
body must act to implement the chosen intervention. In general, these
"action" costs will be borne by a private party. But in the regulatory
model, a government agency may share action responsibilities. Thus,
an additional set of issues arises around how to minimize the costs of
administering the intervention strategy:
* Is the selected intervention implemented effectively and
efficiently?
* How can administrative costs be minimized?
72 Cf. Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, Sci. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168 (arguing
that performance standards rather than technology mandates are key to innovation).
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(h) Monitoring and Enforcement
Even after responsibility for reducing a pollution harm has been
assigned, there remain important questions about whether the respon-
sible party carries out the designated tasks. Courts must ascertain
whether their orders are obeyed-and intervene where parties do not
comply. Likewise, environmental agencies expend a great deal of
time and energy tracking the compliance of polluters. These moni-
toring and enforcement issues mean that we must add to our list of
potential areas for information failure questions such as:
* Did those assigned to reduce harm X do what they were sup-
posed to do?
" How do we best track compliance with our program of E control?
(i) Updating and Refinement
Given the dynamic nature of environmental problems and the
fast pace at which knowledge evolves in the ecological sciences, each
element of the foregoing analysis must be constantly reexamined and
refined. Changes in circumstances-increased population density,
greater scarcity of resources, shifts in the underlying scientific knowl-
edge base, or technological breakthroughs-often will change the
answers to questions somewhere along the information track that has
just been laid out. To the taxonomy of potential information failures,
we must therefore add the following set of issues:
" Is the current approach to X effective?
" Has anyone come up with a better way to deal with harm X?
" Has new information, knowledge, or technology emerged that
might change our assumptions about:
o the existence of X?
o the fate and transport of E causing X?
o epidemiological or ecological effects of E?
o the valuation to be placed on X?
o who holds the relevant property rights?
o intervention options for dealing with X?
o how best to monitor compliance with E abatement efforts?
Table 1 summarizes the above taxonomy of pollution control
"information needs."
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TABLE 1: TAXONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
INFORMATION NEEDS
Problem Identification: • Is P emitting E?
. Does E cause harm?
• Can V (or V' or V") perceive E?
Causal Specification: o Does P's E affect V?
o Do the emissions from P and P" affect V?
• Does P's E affect V' and V"?
• Do V, V', and V" recognize themselves to be victims of a problem-in-
common?
Impact Evaluation: • Does E harm V?
o How does E harm V?
• What dose of E affects V?
Epidemiological and o Do V's symptoms come from exposure to E' or E" as well as E?
Ecological Effects: • Do V's symptoms come from the interaction of E with E' and E"?
- Are there other factors that aggravate or mitigate E's impact on V?
Harm Valuations: * Who should undertake the valuation?
o Is technical expertise required?
o Whose values and valuations should be used? Those of the pollutee?
Of society?
o Should we fully compensate victims who are unusually susceptible to
harm (e.g., those with weak respiratory or immune systems)?
• Should we fully compensate those whose own behavior (e.g., smoking)
creates the risk of injury or worsens the damage?
* How do we discipline exaggeration or other strategic behavior?
Rights Delineation: • Have the relevant property rights been established?
o Are the parties aware of who holds the rights?
o Are the boundaries clear?
• Has there been an encroachment on these rights?
- Can the rightsholder tell that an encroachment has occurred?
• Are the rights easily vindicated?
Policy Intervention: * How do we best reduce the effects of E?
• What are our policy choices?
- What can be done to motivate innovation in information production
and pollution control?
• Who is best positioned to act to reduce E?
- How do we minimize overall system costs?
Implementation: o Is the selected intervention implemented effectively and efficiently?
• How can administrative costs be minimized?
Monitoring and o Did those assigned to reduce harm X do what they were supposed to
Enforcement: do?
- How do we best track compliance with our program of E control?
Updating and • Is the current approach to X effective?
Refinement: • Has anyone come up with a better way to deal with the harm?
o Has new information, knowledge, or technology emerged that might
change our assumptions about:
o the existence of X?
o the fate and transport of E causing X?
o epidemiological or ecological effects of E?
o the valuation to be placed on X?
o who holds the relevant property rights?
o intervention options for dealing with X?
o how best to monitor compliance with E abatement efforts?
Where:
Harm = X
Polluters => P, 11, and F"
Pollutees - V, V', and V"
Pollutants E, E', and E"
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The spectrum of potential information failures threatening to dis-
rupt efficient cost internalization is broader than the existing environ-
mental law literature in general, or the Cathedral debate in particular,
might lead one to believe. The range of issues may seem daunting. It
certainly argues for much more scholarly attention (and policy focus)
on categorizing and addressing various information gaps. The multi-
tude of information gaps that are often present in environmental deci-
sionmaking argues for having an array of institutional mechanisms for
producing information and for more emphasis on improving the infor-
mation underpinnings for decisionmaking across the spectrum of envi-
ronmental harms and responses.
II
INFORMATION GAP FILLING
Information gaps plague environmental decisionmaking from the
household level73 to the global scale.74 The U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) repeatedly has acknowledged significant short-
comings in the core data sets on which regulatory decisions depend.75
The White House Council on Environmental Quality similarly has
struggled with the issue of how to fill information gaps in the regula-
tory realm.7 6 Although scholars have tended to accept uncertainties
as a defining feature of the environmental sphere,77 observers of the
policymaking process have stressed that information problems
73 See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 49, at 47-65 (highlighting risk detection problems
facing consumers); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 42-45, 47-48 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting
consumer difficulties in getting and processing risk information).
74 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 14-17
(James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001) (identifying high priority areas for narrowing gaps
between current knowledge and policymaking needs); Daniel Bodansky, The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L.
451, 454-57, 475-76 (1993) (giving overview of information issues related to global
warming).
75 See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY
INVENTORY: 1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS 2, 29 (revealing serious water data limitations),
available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/96report/index.html; SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 6-8, 10, 15, 18 (1990) [hereinafter SCIENCE ADVISORY BD.,
REDUCING RISK] (identifying numerous data gaps).
76 See Farber, supra note 23, at 164-66 (discussing Council on Environmental Quality's
efforts to deal with scientific uncertainty).
77 E.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 343-405; Karkkainen, supra note 23, at
283-86 ("The world of environmental regulation is characterized by pervasive uncertainty,
an overall scarcity of high-quality information, [and] unevenness in its availability and reli-
ability .... ); Calabresi, supra note 1, at 1218-19 (noting that information gaps are perva-
sive and thus "a given degree of friction is a reality of life").
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represent a fundamental issue holding society back from better results
in pollution control and natural resource management.78 But the con-
text of environmental protection is changing. The emergence of new
information management and communications technologies promise
to make data collection, analysis, and dissemination much cheaper,
faster, and easier.79 This Part argues that institutional design plays a
key role in filling information gaps and that, in a like manner, the
presence or absence of information gaps significantly influences our
choices of both the means and ends of environmental policy.
A. Gap Filling and Institutional Design
The pioneering work on transaction costs in the context of infor-
mation and institutional design was done in the late 1970s by Oliver
Williamson. Working within the framework of corporate organization
and expressly putting aside the Coasean fiction of frictionless transac-
tions,80 Williamson observed that most contracts are to some degree
incomplete-some issues remain unaddressed or some information
remains unspecified.81 "Gap filling" to overcome limited information
becomes essential to complete the transaction. How voids are filled
and whether the institutions used to generate the needed information
minimize transaction costs are thus central determinants of economic
efficiency. This work has significant implications in the environmental
realm: The strategies selected to overcome uncertainties emerge as
critical determinants of regulatory efficiency. When crucial informa-
78 E.g., BREYER, supra note 19, at 42-50; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-257,
MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY 13-21 (Jan. 2001); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-97T, ENVIRON-
MENTAL INFORMATION: EPA NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION TO MANAGE RISKS AND
MEASURE RESULTS (Oct. 3, 2000); Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation:
The Only Path to a Sustainable Future, 29 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,148, 10,152-53 (1999).
79 Even if the legal issues posed are not entirely new, technological innovation can
change the policy framework in important ways. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and
Democratic Culture, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (citing Joseph H. Sommer,
Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) ("[F]ew of the legal issues
posed by the new information are novel.")).
80 Coase himself stressed the importance of tapping into unexploited information
resources and acknowledged the distance between the real world and the theoretical
Coasean world. See Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AMER.
ECON. REV. 713, 713-19 (1992); see also Ellickson, supra note 1, at 611-12 (pointing out
that Coase did not believe that we lived in "Coasean world").
81 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 141-43, 253-54 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES]; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 135-78 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert E. Willy eds., 1989); Oliver
E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233, 237 (1979).
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tion gaps go unfilled or are filled in haphazard ways, regulatory effi-
cacy suffers and costs go up.
Following Williamson's work on firms, an array of institutional
options for environmental policymaking exist-ranging from a pure
"market" (i.e., negotiated exchange of property rights) to a pure
"hierarchy" (i.e., command-and-control regulation). 82 Various inter-
mediate options also can be specified. If the property rights over envi-
ronmental resources are defined clearly and the transaction costs
associated with their purchase and sale are negligible, private party
"Coasean" bargaining can reallocate entitlements so as to generate an
economically efficient outcome that internalizes externalities.8 3 As we
shift, however, from frictionless two-person models to a multiperson
reality, information gaps like those identified in Table 1 often become
too numerous and complicated for the parties to bridge on their
own. 84
The relevant question becomes: Which institutional structure will
deliver the most efficient information gap filling and environmental
harm reduction? This inquiry-and the institutional design issue
more broadly-requires a focus on minimizing the sum of "action"
costs (the expense of pollution control), "inaction" costs (the burdens
of unabated pollution or failure costs), and "transaction" costs
(including, most notably, the administrative costs of gap filling across
the full array of activities outlined in Table 1). The least-social-cost
calculus is spelled out in Table 2 below. 85
Under a least-social-cost metric, high transaction costs (T)-par-
ticularly information gap filling costs-can overwhelm the benefits of
pollution control (reduced I). In some circumstances, the costs of
intervention to address environmental harms-both action costs (A)
82 Because Williamson's analysis centers on corporate organization, his transaction-
cost-based categorization of institutional structures requires some translation to make
sense in the environmental realm. The relevant "transaction" is not that of a firm but the
effort to protect (or exchange) environmental property rights. But Williamson's analysis
highlights the central thrust of this Article: An inquiry into what institutional structure
best fills information gaps, minimizes transaction costs, and provides a least social cost
approach to environmental protection. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES,
supra note 81, at 136-253.
83 See Coase, supra note 1, at 1-8.
84 See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 81, at 136-253; see also
Calabresi, supra note 1, at 1234 & n.70 (identifying and categorizing barriers to full
efficiency).
85 This taxonomy of costs builds on Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-14.
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TABLE 2: LEAST SOCIAL COST ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
- seeks to minimize Y (A + I + T), where:
A = action costs (i.e., pollution control costs or user costs)
I = inaction costs (i.e., failure costs, unabated harms borne by pollution victims)
T = transaction costs, which encompass:
- harm identification
- causal specification
- impact evaluation (epidemiological and ecological effects)
- harm valuation
- rights delineation
- intervention options and benefit/cost assessments
- implementation including:
* negotiation costs (contract)
• court costs (tort)
* policy determinations (regulation)
- monitoring and enforcement
- updating and reinforcement
and transaction costs (T)-are too high relative to the expected gains
(reduced I) to justify taking any action.8 6
If the gaps to be filled are relatively narrow-turning largely on
who holds the relevant rights, how to assess damages, or certain other
"legal" issues-tort law (supported by a court system) might be able
to fill the breach.8 7 Where the gaps are broader and involve scientific
or technical issues, other institutions, notably regulatory bodies, may
emerge as a more effective way to answer fundamental information
questions upon which the parties cannot agree. The need for some
sort of external decisionmaking mechanism or "hierarchy" will be
especially salient where the number of gaps, their complexity, or the
divergence of values around them is great.
Tort law and courts might, therefore, be seen as a way to rein-
force a market regime and to protect property rights, or as a first step
toward an environmental regime based on "hierarchy." Liability
rules, in particular, "collectivize" the damage assessment process and
thereby reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency. Such an enti-
tlement-protection regime changes the information dynamic, applying
court-determined damages in place of negotiation between the par-
ties. When a court fills the information gap that separates the parties,
86 Rose has demonstrated that a decision to "do nothing" may be the optimal response
to some environmental harms. Id. at 9, 17-18. This Article addresses the "do nothing"
option in infra Part IV.F.
87 But note that courts have trouble making such assessments as well. See Krier &
Schwab, supra note 3, at 453-55.
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it overcomes by fiat the potential negotiating breakdown over valua-
tion of the harm in question. 88
Just as the shift from property rules to liability rules achieves effi-
ciency gains in some circumstances by replacing individual damage
claims with court-determined awards, moving to command-and-con-
trol regulation further "collectivizes" the environmental decision-
making process. In particular, responsibility for filling the full
spectrum of information gaps falls to the government.
Centralizing the job of gap filling offers potential efficiency gains
in several respects. Centralized data collection and analysis may gen-
erate economies of scale in the identification of pollution sources, the
assessment of impact, and the valuation of harm. Because govern-
ments have an overarching perspective spanning a wide array of indi-
vidual problems, they may be positioned to spot harms that
individuals cannot see, recognize trends that might not be visible at a
decentralized level, and make judgments about which interventions
are most effective, on the basis of this broad experience. In addition,
a governmental decisionmaking model economizes on information
costs through repetition and learning. When regulators address sim-
ilar problems again and again, they learn from experience, build a
base of knowledge, and acquire some efficiency in overcoming uncer-
tainties and filling information gaps.
Regulatory decisionmaking also changes the scale of environ-
mental analysis by substituting average emission exposures and gener-
alized cost-benefit calculations for individualized evaluation of
exposures, impacts, and harm valuation. As a matter of institutional
design, regulation implies that the optimal specificity of analysis is not
on a case-by-case basis, but rather on a more generic, community-
wide scale. Obviously, this shift in scale implies a tradeoff. In return
for lower administrative costs, society accepts a loss of individual
focus and fine-grained intervention to right specific environmental
wrongs. In effect, the regulatory model accepts the judgment that the
transaction costs involved in case-by-case evaluations of environ-
mental harms are not justified by the benefits of individualized deci-
sionmaking, and that we do better to internalize externalities broadly.
Agencies nevertheless must consume significant resources
tracking, analyzing, and responding to environmental harms. They
either must undertake quite detailed studies, which allow them to
88 Analogous to Calabresi and Melamed's structuring of rules to impose liability on the
"cheapest cost avoider," I argue that environmental law and regulation should be struc-
tured to impose data and information-generation burdens on the "least-cost information
provider." See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1119; see also supra notes 55-56, 65,
and infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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reduce the "failure costs" of over- or under-regulation, or they must
employ information gap filling shortcuts, which reduce administrative
costs but inflict inefficiencies on society in the form of misspecified
environmental standards.89 A statutory approach to environmental
problemsolving often authorizes regulators to look for generalized
patterns of emission and harm, and to assert a causal nexus between
pollution and injuries where the particularized facts might have been
too limited to support a legal claim under the law of tort.90 The
greater the heterogeneity of the regulated community and the
problem set, the larger will be the likely policy errors from regulatory
shortcuts. 91 Precision is sacrificed for administrative convenience. 92
The desire for improved precision has led to the development of
hybrid institutional structures or "market-based" regulatory mecha-
nisms. These approaches blend some elements of hierarchical gap
filling with efforts to decentralize the information generation process
and to harness market forces to draw out information from private
parties. In essence, hybrid institutional designs shift some parts of the
gap-filling process back onto the regulated community, recognizing
that government may not be the least-cost information provider.
Market mechanisms such as environmental taxes, pollution allowance
trading systems, and deposit-refund schemes also reflect a judgment
that the shift from a particularized scale of analysis to a generalized
one may not always be welfare-enhancing.
An even broader shift of information-gathering and decision-
making responsibility occurs when environmental protection is done
on a "voluntary" basis.93 Where harm-causers act on their own to
89 By misspecified standards, I mean that the marginal costs and benefits of interven-
tion are not optimally calibrated.
90 See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1493 (1994) (discussing "uneasy coexistence" between CERCLA and causation).
91 See Robert Mendelsohn, Regulating Heterogeneous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 301 (1986) (demonstrating that greater heterogeneity leads to higher welfare
losses from standardized policies).
92 See Diver, supra note 54, at 66-71 (demonstrating that increased regulatory specifi-
cation comes at cost of reduced congruence or accessibility of rule).
93 See WORLD RES. INST., BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENT (Bruce Smart ed., 1992) (detailing reasons behind and results of voluntary
environmental efforts of twenty-four companies); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Govern-
ance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining collaborative
approaches to environmental protection). It is important to note that not all "voluntary"
actions are truly voluntary. Some such actions are taken in response to consumer demands
and should be seen, therefore, as an institutional offshoot of the marketplace. Others
represent efforts to forestall regulation, such as the EPA's 33/50 "voluntary" toxics reduc-
tion initiative. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, "Voluntary" Approaches to Envi-
ronmental Regulation: A Survey, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (Maurizio Franzini & Antonio Nicita eds., 2002) (describing 33/50 program); see
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internalize externalities without Coasean bargaining or orders from
courts or regulatory agencies, an array of gap-filling costs can be
reduced or eliminated. As Ellickson and others have noted, commu-
nity pressures, prevailing norms, and social context motivate some
potential harm causers to control their emissions or limit their con-
sumption of shared natural resources, reducing the need for contrac-
tual negotiations or external regulatory hierarchies. 94 The potential
savings to governments make reliance on the pressures of social con-
text and polluter accountability a major policy trend.
The EPA's 33/50 toxic emissions reduction challenge represents a
successful effort to induce voluntary environmental improvements. 95
The success of recycling campaigns all across America offers another
example of how the social context of environmental stewardship
changes behavior.96 But how far society can go in relying on social
context is a matter of debate; reliance on voluntary programs means
that the government gives up the ability to specify performance stan-
dards.97 Moreover, the strength of the social pressure to control pol-
lution varies across industry groups, geographic locales, political
climates, and over time.98
generally VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 31-51 (2001) (explaining logic of corporate
self-regulation with regard to environmental issues); Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason,
An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Pro-
gram, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 271, 273-75 (1995).
94 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991) (demonstrating that norms may be widespread and powerful even without force of
law); see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 88-91, 205-07 (1990) (noting
that individual members of homogenous communities are likely to conform their behavior
to narrowly defined norms of propriety held by community); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (proposing methodology for systematic analysis of relationship
between legal and nonlegal mechanisms of cooperation).
95 See OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ToxiCs, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PUB. No. EPA-745-R-99-04, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD (1999) (finding that 33/
50 program achieved its goal of fifty percent reduction in releases and transfers of seven-
teen targeted chemicals one year ahead of schedule).
96 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-530-R-02-001, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2000 FACTS AND FIGURES 123-25 (2002) (reporting growth in recycling), available at http://
msw.cecs.ucf.edu/MSW%202000.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); see also WORLDWATCH
INST., PAPER 121, THE NEXT EFFICIENCY REVOLUTION (John E. Young & Aaron Sachs
eds., 1994) (reviewing recycling efforts).
97 See Andrew J. Hoffman, Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and
the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 351 (1999) [hereinafter Hoffman, Institu-
tional Evolution]; Andrew J. Hoffman, Trends in Corporate Environmentalism: The Chem-
ical and Petroleum Industries, 1960-1993, 9 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 47 (1996)
[hereinafter Hoffman, Trends in Corporate Environmentalism].
98 The second Bush Administration seems to have created a particularly strong down-
draft in this regard. See ROBERT PERKS & GREGORY WETSTONE, REWRITING THE RULES,
YEAR END REPORT 2002: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
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Between fully voluntary programs and market-based regulation
are "command-and-covenant" approaches to environmental protec-
tion.99 Popular in parts of Europe, a covenant strategy results in gov-
ernments and regulated entities "contracting" for a certain degree of
environmental protection, defined either by effort or outcome.100
Both sides in the negotiation have an incentive to pursue cost-effec-
tive interventions.' 0' As with market mechanisms, "command-and-
covenant" approaches allow for some of the information burden to be
shifted off the government and for a greater degree of case-specific
data to be brought to bear.







(c) command-and-covenant procedures; and
(4) social context.
Given the diversity of pollution control and natural resource
management challenges and the concomitant array of action, inaction,
and transaction costs, it is unlikely that any single institutional strategy
will produce optimal results. Mixed strategies and a mix of institu-
(2003) (finding "diverse and far-reaching Bush administration regulatory initiatives to
cripple key environmental programs"). But see Andrew Goldstein & Matthew Cooper,
How Green is the White House?, TIME, Apr. 29, 2002, at 30 (arguing that the Administra-
tion is "greener than the environmentalists admit. But it still rolls out the red carpet for
corporations.").
99 See E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGI-
CALLY, supra note 31, at 170,183-85 (explaining how "command-and-covenant" approach
allows flexible compliance with existing benchmark standards).
100 See ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS: NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR A
REALISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? 1-3, 5-12 (Jan M. Van Dunne e-d., 1993); Jan W.
Biekart, Environmental Covenants Between Government and Industry: A Dutch NGO's
Experience, 4 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 141 (1995) (reviewing covenants
in Netherlands from perspective of NGO and discussing whether covenants can serve
public interest in environmental protection); Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, Introduc-
tion: Environmental Contracts and Regulatory Innovations, in ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
TRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE 1, 5-11 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) (summarizing
origin and practice of environmental contracting in European countries).
101 E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles: Why Interpollutant and
Interrisk Trading are Good Ideas and How We Get There from Here, F. APPLIED RES. &
PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1998, at 48, 50-52 (arguing that, even where it is difficult to measure
risks exactly, "bubbles" still can reduce harm more effectively than command-and-control
regulation).
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tions likely will be required.102 Indeed, a good bit of recent "regula-
tory reform" can be seen as an effort to find the optimal mix of
institutions and strategies to minimize misspecification costs, reduce
transaction costs, and otherwise optimize the A+I+T calculus spelled
out above.10 3
As the discussion above makes clear, the choice of institutional
design can shift the burden of information production. Table 3 high-
lights the information generation responsibilities that emerge under
various institutional options.
Coasean contracting requires the parties-polluters and vic-
tims-to generate much of the information that is required in order to
negotiate successful outcomes. Tort law shifts a small part of this
burden to the courts, notably with regard to rights delineation and
damages assessment. Command-and-control regulation places virtu-
ally the entire information burden on the government. Market-based
regulatory approaches draw the harm-causers back into the process at
the stage of evaluating intervention options and implementing pollu-
tion controls. Command-and-covenant strategies create incentives to
further lure the polluter into the information generation process. And
voluntary programs can be seen as a nearly complete shift of informa-
tion responsibility onto polluters.
Any regulatory reform and institutional design effort should
therefore focus in part on identifying systematically the least-cost
information generator for each potential gap spelled out in Table 1.
Too many recent efforts seem to have been aimed narrowly at deregu-
lation or simply reducing reliance on government information produc-
tion. Future reform initiatives should be more attentive to who bears
information-generating responsibilities, and whether they are posi-
tioned optimally to generate the data and analysis required to achieve
least-social-cost outcomes.
B. Rethinking Ends as Well as Means
Information requirements not only determine our institutional
design choices, but they also define the possible ends of environ-
mental law. Indeed, the panoply of information gaps that must be
confronted to address industrial-scale pollution has led to a narrowing
102 See NEIL GUNNINGHAN ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 15-16 (1998) (arguing for mix of policy instruments).
103 See, e.g., DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 5, at 287-98 (arguing that "[t]he future
system should be results-oriented, integrated, efficient, participatory, and information-
rich"); LANDY ET AL., supra note 5; NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES,
GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
1-5 (1995).
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of our environmental vision. The present environmental regime seeks
to internalize externalities in a least-social-cost manner, but ignores
(1) the traditional (tort law) goal of making victims whole and (2) the
reality that some pollution problems are understood better as ineffi-
ciencies or mistakes, not as externalities.
1. Corrective Justice
If pollution harms and the economic gains from the activities that
generate them were distributed evenly across all citizens, pollution
could be conceptualized as a tax on economic activity paid in terms of
public health and ecological effects. Under this conception, it would
be rational to apply a strict cost-benefit test to all regulation and to
argue against intervention to address emissions whenever the eco-
nomic benefits of the polluting activities exceed the gains from pollu-
tion abatement. But if the harms fall disproportionately on a subset of
citizens, the pollution burden appears less like a tax and more like a
taking, where some individuals have their property-in this case their
"environmental" rights to breathe fresh air and drink clean water-
seized to fund a community benefit. Conceived this way, social wel-
fare still may be maximized by letting harms fall as they may, but this
optimization comes at the expense of private property rights and indi-
vidual justice.
Perhaps because the transaction costs of making victims whole
are perceived to be too high, environmental decisionmaking in an
information-constrained world tends to deemphasize corrective justice
in favor of a focus on least-social-cost outcomes and efficiency.' 0 4 An
emphasis on efficiency rather than protection of individual property
rights comes through especially strongly in "law and economics"
scholarship. 10 5 But if information costs are reduced significantly, this
tradeoff ought to be reexamined.
104 Even Rose, who argues that property is the "keystone" right, takes for granted that
least-social-cost efficiency is the fundamental goal in the environmental realm. See Carol
M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996); Rose, supra
note 85, at 12-14.
105 In elevating efficiency above other goals, "law and economics" scholarship often
under-attends to the protection of property rights and the need to make victims whole. An
emphasis on internalizing externalities in a least-social-cost manner translates into a utilita-
rian approach to policymaking that tends to crowd out corrective justice as a policy goal.
Calabresi and Melamed, for example, relegate justice concerns either to an element of
efficiency based on protecting expectations, or to a distributional issue that should be sepa-
rately addressed. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1105, 1123. Calabresi recognizes
this point but still is known better for his emphasis on efficiency. See Calabresi, supra note
1, at 1224-28 (noting that distributional analysis becomes inevitable and hence essential);
cf JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 184-201 (1988) (advancing a
"theory of torts based on the principle of corrective justice"); Frank I. Michelman, Poilu-
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Consider, for example, a town with 1000 residents and a polluting
factory where each resident suffers a pollution harm valued at $1.
Two distinct goals of governmental intervention can be identified.
First, from the perspective of resource optimization, we want the pol-
luter to face the costs of the factory emissions. Otherwise, the fac-
tory's production will be inefficient. Thus, for the sake of allocative
efficiency, we would like to internalize the pollution externality by
making the factory pay for the $1000 worth of harm it is causing.
Second, for the sake of corrective justice, we would like to make the
pollution victims whole by giving them each $1.
Under command-and-control regulation, these two goals seem to
be in conflict. The factory faces government requirements (either
technology mandates or performance standards) to reduce emissions
by some amount. Rational regulators, operating in a fashion that pro-
motes least-social-cost outcomes, will push to reduce emissions to the
point where the marginal costs of further regulation would exceed the
marginal benefits. But this standard likely leaves emissions above
zero, imposing residual pollution harms on the residents. Although
regulatory efficiency has been achieved, full cost internalization has
not because some uncompensated harms continue to be borne by the
residents. This means that neither the goal of allocative efficiency nor
the goal of corrective justice has been met.
Alternatively, under a market-based pollution control regime, the
regulators might charge the company for its emissions. By carefully
setting pollution fees, they could induce the company to reduce its
emissions to the point where the marginal cost of additional controls
would exceed the marginal benefit in reduced fees. The company
would then pay for its residual emissions and the harm they cause.
This would fully internalize the pollution externality and produce an
allocatively efficient outcome. If the town collects the fees, and
thereby offsets taxes the residents would have borne, the victims
would also be made whole. Under current practice, however, the pol-
lution fees would be kept by state or federal authorities so the local
victims-who actually bear the harms-would not be fully
compensated.10 6
tion as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 649,
666-83 (1971) (book review) (critiquing Calabresi's approach). A full discussion about
"taking environmental rights seriously" will have to be deferred to another day and
another article. But note that a cramped conception of justice seems inconsistent with an
insistence that liability rules must not be applied to crimes against property or bodily integ-
rity. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1124-27. Why don't pollution "assaults"
fall into this category?
106 If the fees are shared across all citizens in the regulating jurisdictions, the town's
residents would get only a tiny offset against taxes.
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This scenario is complicated further in the real world because not
every citizen, even within the town, is similarly situated. A more real-
istic scenario would entail ten citizens (perhaps next-door neighbors)
facing harms of $20 each, a second tier of one-hundred citizens
(nearby neighbors) facing $3 each in harms, and the rest of the com-
munity suffering damages of just 50¢ each. In this case, the $1000 in
pollution fees, even if absorbed by the local government as a tax
offset, dramatically undercompensates the next-door neighbors who
receive $1 (in reduced taxes) but suffer harms of $20, somewhat
undercompensates the nearby neighbors who face harms of $3 but
receive just $1, and overcompensates everyone else, as they receive $1
but face harms worth only 50g. Thus, under a scenario in which the
harms are not spread equally, even a locally controlled, allocatively
efficient pollution control regime fails to meet the corrective justice
goal of making victims whole. It is this sort of scenario-e.g., under-
privileged neighborhoods living in the shadow of chemical facilities in
Louisiana's "cancer alley"-that raises real-world questions about
"environmental justice. '' 10 7
Why is the corrective justice dimension of environmental law and
policy so often neglected despite the frequency with which environ-
mental policy fails actually to compensate victims? Several reasons
can be identified. First, distributional considerations may, at times,
cut against a strict "polluter pays" principle. If those who bear dispro-
portionate environmental damages (the next-door neighbors) are the
most affluent members of the community, then a result that holds the
pollution fee revenue as an offset against taxes will, in effect, improve
distributional equity. But as an empirical matter, the equity argument
generally goes the other way: Those who are undercompensated for
pollution harms turn out to be poorer than the average. 108
Alternatively, the disregard for individualized pollution harms
may reflect a policy choice to promote industrialization and economic
107 For background on the concept of environmental justice, see generally CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, AND REG-
ULATION (2002); EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A
NEW PARADIGM (2003); K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETrE, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CRE-
ATING EQUALITY, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Envi-
ronmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 787 (1993).
108 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384-85 (1994) (explaining
that in addition to unfair siting, market forces cause environmental harms to fall dispropor-
tionately on poorer people); William Bowen, An Analytic Review of Environmental Justice
Research: What Do We Really Know?, 29 ENVTL. MGoT. 3 (2002) (surveying numerous
studies connecting poverty to disproportionate environmental harms).
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growth.10 9 Some scholars argue that neglect of pollution victims can
be traced to the power of the nineteenth-century industrialist class,
which constructed a legal regime that favored their economic inter-
ests.110 Still others conclude that justice considerations dropped out
of the environmental equation as a result of utilitarian legal analysis"'
or a judicial desire to promote wealth maximization. 12
While all of these arguments are plausible and each represents
part of the explanation for the minimal role corrective justice plays in
our present day pollution control regime, I think another reason must
be considered: the historically high cost of protecting environmental
property rights on an individualized basis. Sorting out who has been
harmed and how much each should be compensated has been consid-
ered too information-intensive. In my example, if the residual harm
were $1 per resident, but the transaction costs (largely information
costs related to computing the harm, identifying the affected residents,
and paying out compensation) were greater than $1000, there would
seem to be no point in going forward. The costs of intervention would
exceed the benefits. This decision must be understood, however, as a
choice to elevate welfare maximization over the protection of indi-
vidual property rights and corrective justice.
Now consider how the picture changes if transaction costs decline
dramatically. Assume that new pollution tracking technologies lower
the expense of measuring the harm and delivering compensation from
more than $1000 to $1. The cost-benefit logic flips in favor of inter-
vention, and the option of paying out compensation to the victims
becomes feasible. And what if we were able to determine precisely
which residents were harmed and by how much, and could thus tailor
the compensation payments to the precise level of harm each pollutee
suffered? Would we not then want to provide collective justice tai-
lored to individual damages alongside efficiency? To the extent that
109 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at
97-108 (1977) (discussing how "triumph of negligence" acted as subsidy to industrializa-
tion); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645,
670-78 (1983) (discussing "utilitarian" principles of nineteenth-century jurists).
110 E.g., PAUL H. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF EFFICENT RULES 27-30 (1983); Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of
Pollution Abatement Across Time and Place: Balancing Doctrine in Pollution Nuisance
Law, 1840-1906, 11 L. & HIST. REV. 303, 354-78 (1993).
111 Rosen, supra note 110, at 315-22 (arguing that utilitarian analysis has resulted in
underattention to pollution).
112 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-36 (1972)
(arguing that judges pursued efficiency goals even before economic logic of this posture
was fully understood); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-
Making, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 131, 133 (1984) (arguing that wealth maximization is
only value that courts can do much to promote).
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the cost of compensation falls in the Information Age, this change in
relative prices may revive interest in corrective justice by softening the
apparent trade-off with economic efficiency.
2. Beyond Externalities
In the classic pollution situation, B benefits from externalizing
environmental harms onto his neighbor A or the community at large.
Benton saves money in his pig farming operation if he can dodge the
burden of addressing the effluent and odors that emanate from his
sty.1 13 The prevailing regulatory designs, therefore, focus on internal-
izing externalities. 1 4 There are, however, a set of environmental
problems that do not fit this model, where the harm arises from pro-
duction or consumption inefficiencies or mistakes, not externalities per
se.115
Think, for example, of cases where B's factory equipment is out-
dated and inefficient and, incidentally, highly polluting. If the plant
were modernized, we might assume that efficiency benefits would flow
to the factory's bottom line. B does not need to be forced by law or
regulations to internalize his externalities: He has an incentive to fix
the problem regardless of the impact on A or others. Those down-
wind of the polluting production process would incidentally benefit as
increased resource productivity translates into reduced emissions.
Why would B fail to make the improvements? In some circumstances,
B fails to act because he believes he has better ways to deploy limited
investment capital. In many other cases, however, B's inaction
derives from inertia or ignorance-a basic lack of information about
the better environmental options.
Such circumstances differ from the usual externality case because
self-interest, at least over time, should drive B to correct his mistake
and adopt the environmentally preferable technology, product, or
production process.116 Environmental policy in this context should
center on addressing the information failure and providing guidance
113 Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611).
114 See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 14, at 7-35 (examining types of externalities and
approaches for forcing internalization).
115 See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Envi-
ronment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 106 (1995) (describing how
improvements in "resource productivity" will align environmental improvement and com-
petitiveness interests).
116 See Esty & Porter, supra note 46, at 36-40 (discussing resource productivity opportu-
nities available to companies).
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about better practices and potential efficiency gains rather than nar-
rowly focusing on internalizing externalities. 17
A great deal of attention in recent years has been paid to oppor-
tunities for such "win-win" environmental gains." 8 A vigorous debate
rages over how often polluters obtain net benefits from changing their
own behavior. 119 The truth is that investments in pollution control
sometimes, but by no means always, pay off economically. Nonethe-
less, the mistake and inefficiency category of environmental problems
deserves particular attention in the Information Age context because
the cost of overcoming ignorance goes down. Easier and cheaper dis-
semination of information about the existence of better technologies
and production practices promises to squeeze out inefficiencies and
eliminate mistakes more quickly.
III
THE COMING REVOLUTION
The economic and social transformation being wrought by
advances in information technology has been the subject of a vast
amount of writing, both popular and scholarly.1 20 But little of this
117 Progress is likely only "over time" because of the need to depreciate existing capital
investments and the "lumpiness" of investments in a new plant and equipment. To speed
up the transition process, the government might highlight the better options and available
efficiency gains. To ensure an optimal degree of investment in pollution control, B's deci-
sion process should be structured to reflect externalized pollution harms. But a pure "cost
internalization" strategy will not highlight the potential gains within the enterprise from
higher-efficiency, less-polluting equipment, and will systematically result in less new capital
investment.
118 E.g., AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 342
(1992) (pointing out existence of win-win opportunities such as 3M's "Pollution Prevention
Pays" program); ERNST ULRICH VON WEIZSACKER ET AL., FACTOR FOUR: DOUBLING
WEALTH - HALVING RESOURCE USE xxi-xxii (1997) (arguing that there are numerous
opportunities in advanced resource efficiency that are both feasible and cost-effective).
119 Compare Porter, supra note 72 (advancing "Porter Hypothesis," which suggests that
environmental investments may result in competitiveness gains), and Michael E. Porter &
Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate, HARV. BUs. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 120 (discussing how environmental rigor can generate innovation bene-
fits), with Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy Being Green, HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1994, at 46 (suggesting that win-win gains are very limited in real world).
120 For a sampling, see generally STANLEY H. DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER MEYER, BLUR:
THE SPEED OF CHANGE IN THE CONNECTED ECONOMY (1998); MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS,
WHAT WILL BE: How THE NEW WORLD OF INFORMATION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES
(1997); KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL: THE NEW BIOLOGY OF MACHINES, SOCIAL
SYSTEM AND THE ECONOMIC WORLD (1994); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE (1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS];
Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 431 (1998) (discussing how technological growth is
outpacing law's ability to respond); Spencer Reiss, Power to the People, WIRED, Dec. 1996,
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literature addresses the domain of pollution control and natural
resource management. This Part seeks to provide an initial survey of
how Information Age technologies might be deployed in the environ-
mental realm and what impact they might have on our ability to fill
the information gaps identified in Part II.
A. The Environmental Promise of the Information Age
Technological advances in data collection, analysis, and dissemi-
nation have the potential to revolutionize our response to environ-
mental problems.
1. Data Collection
Environmental databases historically have been patchy, unreli-
able, and woefully inadequate to the needs of efficient decision-
making. 121 Breakthroughs in nanotechnologies and small-scale
sensors, however, have begun to provide a vastly improved ability to
detect and measure pollutants at a fine-grained level. 122 Similarly,
remote sensing from satellites in space 123 and other new macroscale
sensor technologies appear poised to provide on-the-ground moni-
toring of environmental conditions from anywhere, at any time, at
at 184, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/4.12/esgage.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2004).
121 See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 5, at 269 ("There is a systematic underinvest-
ment, in some cases a disinvestment, in the information-gathering efforts necessary to run
an intelligent pollution control program."); LANDY ET AL., supra note 5, at 282-83 (arguing
that EPA's data collection is marked by oversimplifications and arbitrary categorizations);
MORGENSTERN, supra note 5, at 463-66 (discussing inadequacies in risk assessment models
due to data limitation); see also WORLD ECON. FORUM, 2001 ENVIRONMENTAL SUS-
TAINABILITY INDEX: AN INITIATIVE OF THE GLOBAL LEADERS OF TOMORROW ENVIRON-
MENT TASK FORCE 17-22 (2001) (decrying lack of usable environmental data), available at
http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/ESI 0la.pdf.
122 Some observers even forecast a time when humans could be outfitted with a "digital
skin" that allows a precise record of pollution impacts to be generated. See H. Scott
Matthews, Environmental Impacts and Policy Implications of the Growth of the Informa-
tion and Communications Technology Sector 27-28 (unpublished manuscript, presented
Mar. 16, 2001 at Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Environment Directorate Work-
shop, Paris; on file with New York University Law Review).
123 See Anthony Vodacek, Environmental Applications of Remote Sensing, INFORMATIK/
INFORMATIQUE, Aug. 2000, at 21 (outlining various environmental uses for remote sen-
sors); see also Fred Hansen, Three Emerging Issues, Three Needed Changes, ENVTL. F.,
May/June 2000, at 45, 46 (noting that remote satellite sensing will enable "identification
with pinpoint accuracy of all emission discharges"); Alex de Sherbinin et al., Remote
Sensing Data: Valuable Support for Environmental Treaties, 44 ENV'T 20, 22-25 (2002);
Paul F. Uhlir, Applications of Remote Sensing Information in Law: An Overview, in
EARTH OBSERVATION SYSTEMS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE '90s 8, 16-17 (1990)
(describing how remote sensing systems will lead to better ecological understanding and
management).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 79:115
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 156 2004
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
increasingly low cost. 124 We thus are approaching the day when virtu-
ally all emissions will be susceptible to tagging, tracking, and measure-
ment at relatively low cost. 125
Air emissions already are being tracked with a degree of sophisti-
cation that was unimaginable just a few years ago. Gaussian plume
analysis now permits regulators to plot the drift of air pollutants with
increasing precision. 126 Advances in meteorological modeling have
further enhanced our ability to understand the sources and "recep-
tors" of air pollution. Similar gains are being made in tracing pollu-
tants as they flow through watersheds and hydrological systems. 127
These advances in measuring and monitoring translate into much-
improved comprehension of exposure pathways, impacts, and dose-
response relationships. It may not be long before emissions sources
will be nearly completely mapped, if not fully understood. 28 As a
leading toxicologist observes:
Admittedly, there are a large number of factors to consider when
estimating exposure, and it is a complicated procedure to under-
stand the transport and distribution of a chemical that has been
released into the environment. Nonetheless, the available data indi-
124 The scientific literature is rich with examples of breakthroughs in sensors and moni-
toring technologies. See, e.g., Eric J. Hinsta et al., SPADE H20 Measurements and the
Seasonal Cycle of Stratospheric Water Vapor, 21 GEOPHYSICAL REs. LETTERS 2559 (1994)
(discussing new methods for measuring lower stratospheric water vapor); Christopher R.
Webster et al., Quantum-Cascade Laser Measurements of Stratospheric Methane and
Nitrous Oxide, 40 APPLIED OPIrcs 321 (2001) (highlighting advances in laser technology
allowing for first atmospheric gas measurements).
125 See Braden R. Allenby et al., Information Systems and the Environment: Overview
and Perspectives, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 45, at 1
(noting pollution tracking potential of "information and communications revolution").
126 Such modeling has transformed the debate over the sources of air pollution in the
northeastern United States. For an example of ozone modeling, see ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FINAL REPORT, OZONE TRANSPORT ASSESSMENT GROUP (OTAG) TECHNICAL
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ttnlnaaqs/ozone/rto/otag/finalrpt (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004).
127 Kurt Stephenson et al., Watershed-Based Effluent Trading: The Nonpoint Source
Challenge, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 412, 415-18 (1998) (describing several programs
successfully measuring movement of nonpoint source pollutants).
128 See Dennis J. Paustenbach, The Practice of Exposure Assessment: A State-of-the-Art
Review, 3 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 179 (2000) (chronicling extraordinary recent
gains in understanding environmental risk exposures); see also Carl B. Meyer, The Envi-
ronmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, The Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation,
19 ENVTL. L. 321, 323-24 (1989) ("Toxic wastes can be fingerprinted; emission sources can
be linked with the toxic residues found in the bodies of environmental injury victims; the
extent of the accumulation of toxics in the environment can be predicted; and the body
burden of toxic exposure victims can be measured with a high degree of scientific cer-
tainty." (citations omitted)); Jennifer Brown, Comment, Pediatric Environmental Health
Hazards and the Role of Government in Adopting Standards to Protect Children, 16 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 197-202 (1998) (describing new national initiatives and research into
effects of pediatric exposure to pollutants).
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cate that scientists can do an adequate job of quantifying the con-
centration of the chemicals in the various media and the resulting
uptake by exposed persons .... 129
In combination with extraordinary new data production and col-
lection in genomics 130 and medicine,131 we stand on the verge of more
scientifically robust answers to questions about how much harm pollu-
tants cause to particular individuals.
2. Analysis
Environmental problemsolving long has been defined by the
need to simplify issues to a level that humans can absorb and
manage. 132 The sheer computational power available today, however,
changes this policy dynamic. 133 Data is not just being collected more
easily; it is being refined and processed in ways that generate firmer
analytic foundations for environmental decisionmaking.134 Simply
put, these gains in data management, analysis, and retrieval make pos-
sible a more empirical and quantitative approach to environmental
protection.
Where sheer numerical quantity might once have overwhelmed
analysts, computers now permit "data mining"-quick and efficient
sifting of raw data. 135 Useful information can be extracted even under
129 Paustenbach, supra note 128, at 264.
130 See generally JUAN ENRIQUEZ, As THE FUTURE CATCHES You: How GENOMICS &
OTHER FORCES ARE CHANGING YOUR LIFE, WORK, HEALTH & WEALTH (2001); MATr
RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS (1999).
131 See, e.g., Solana Pyne, Small Particles Add Up To Big Disease Risk, 295 ScI. 1994
(2002) (analyzing mounting evidence of harms of air pollution to human health).
132 See Sunstein, Risk, supra note 53, at 667-70 (finding that informational strategies
can be ineffectual if people "have limited ability to process information" or if "information
is not provided in a clear and usable form"); see also Graham & Wiener, supra note 19
(discussing lack of coherent system for measuring levels and trends of environmental risks,
and pervasiveness of "risk tradeoffs").
133 See BRADLEY EFRON, THE JACKKNIFE, THE BOOTSTRAP, AND OTHER RESAMPLING
PLANS 2-3 (2002) (highlighting gains made possible by expanded computing power and
nonparametric methods for assessing errors in statistical estimation).
134 See Dashboard of Sustainability: Sustainable Development Indicators for the
WSSD, at http://esl.jrc.it/envind/dashbrds.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (describing
software that allows presentation of complex relationships between economic, social, and
environmental issues); ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS (1998) (proposing uniform set of environ-
mental indicators for OECD countries); MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM E. REES,
OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH (1996) (intro-
ducing "econological Footprint" analysis which accounts for flows of energy and matter to
and from any defined economy and converts them into corresponding land/water area
required to support these flows); see also WORLD ECON. FORUM, 2002 ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY INDEX (2002), available at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/esi/.
135 Recent computational advances have vastly increased the power of many statistical
techniques. See, for example, the websites of the IEEE Neural Network Society, http://
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conditions that present very high noise-to-signal ratios.136 Advanced
statistical techniques, such as neural nets, 137 facilitate sophisticated
pattern recognition and issue analysis. 138
Without eliminating all of the uncertainties, computers make it
possible to fill data gaps in a systematic and sophisticated manner and
to respond better to problems that involve multiple variables. As it
becomes ever faster, easier, and cheaper to sort, store, and analyze
data, the boundaries of learning are being pushed out at an acceler-
ating rate.139 The sweeping potential for improved causal specifica-
tion derives not only from new analytic tools developed in the
environmental field, but also from the computer-enabled knowledge
revolution occurring within other disciplines, including public health,
epidemiology, hydrology, statistical modeling, and risk-benefit
analysis.1 40
Perhaps most importantly, enhanced tools for data analysis make
it easier to manage complexity. Cumulative impacts and synergistic
effects of emissions become easier to disentangle. Likewise, the inter-
actions that underlie natural resource management become easier to
disaggregate. Ecologists, for example, are learning how timbering
ieee-nns.org/research/nnpubs.html, and the International Neural Network Society Journal,
http://www.inns.org/nnjournal.asp, for a sampling of the literature on the latest computer-
aided advances in neural networking and its widely expanded commercial applications.
See also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATISTICAL PRIMER, at http://www.epa.gov/
bioindicators/primer/index.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2002) (detailing EPA's efforts to
apply regression analysis and other recent advances in statistical modeling techniques to
aquatic resources and biodiversity management).
136 See TREVOR HASTIE ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA
MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2001) (describing application of modern statistical
techniques for sorting data); Michael Goebel & Le Gruenwald, A Survey of Data Mining
and Knowledge Discovery Software Tools, 1 SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS: NEWSLETER OF
THE ACM SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 20,
23 (1999) (describing certain "noise tolerant" data mining methodology), available at
http://www.acm.org/sigkdd/explorations/issuel-1/survey.pdf.
137 SIMON HAYKIN, NEURAL NETWORKS: A COMPREHENSIVE FOUNDATION 1-6 (1999)
(explaining advanced statistical technique of pattern recognition); Ian R. Kerr, Spirits in a
Material World: Intelligent Agents as Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 22 DAL-
HOUSIE L.J. 190, 208 (2001) (describing how neural nets work).
138 See SERGIOS THEODORIDIS & KONSTANTINOS KOUTROUMBAS, PATTERN RECOGNI-
TION (1999) (explaining neural networks, rule learning systems, and statistical analysis).
139 See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (reviewing Digital
Age breakthroughs).
140 Researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health, for example, are using
advanced computer modeling to assess better the health impacts of air pollution. See
Study Details Impact of Pollution on Public Health from Nine Older Fossil Fuel Power
Plants in Illinois, at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/press01032001.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004); see also Deborah Schoen, A Renaissance for Genotoxicity Testing?,
32 ENVTL. SCIENCE & TECH. 498A (1998) (discussing techniques to investigate effects of
various toxics on humans and other organisms).
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practices, such as clear-cutting, affect levels of sunlight on wetlands,
which in turn affect habitat productivity and thus species diversity.141
As a general matter, while the complexity of the environmental realm
will not diminish, our ability to make sense of what is going on and to
tailor policy responses to particularized circumstances appears likely
to increase rapidly, improving our capacity to fill information gaps in
problem identification, causal specification, impact evaluation, and
policy intervention. 142
3. Dissemination
As a number of observers have noted, wireless communications
and the Internet portend the "end of distance" and the "collapse of
time."'1 43 Connection speeds are increasing at a dramatic pace while
the cost of communications is falling rapidly. 144 Links to virtually
anyone on the planet, or to data sets anywhere in the world, are now
available at any time at very low cost. These communications break-
throughs represent another dimension of the Information Age with
potentially important environmental applications.
One of the most striking features of the Internet is its capacity for
speedy and low-cost dissemination of information. Advances in envi-
ronmental understanding thus can be transmitted immediately across
the world. Hyperconnectivity changes the cost of establishing an
appropriate technical foundation for environmental decision-
making.145 Relevant information-details about on-the-ground con-
ditions, answers to many scientific questions, and data on how others
141 E.g., M.A. Halverson et al., Forest Mediated Light Regime Linked to Amphibian Dis-
tribution and Performance, 134 OECOLOGIA 360 (2003).
142 The ability to manage complexity allows decisionmakers to understand and address
anomalous circumstances and optimize "slippage" from general rules. See Daniel A.
Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environ-
mental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315-25 (1999); see also Farber, supra note 23
(applying complexity theory in environmental realm); Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and
the Special Case: EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 256-57 (2001)
(arguing that informational advances from rigorous evaluation of experimental projects
may reduce need for waivers from general rules).
143 See generally DOUGLAS F. ALDRICH, MASTERING THE DIGITAL MARKET PLACE:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR COMPETITIVENESS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 31-32 (1999)
(highlighting time impacts of digital breakthroughs); MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 15-20
(explaining how information technologies reduce time and distance). The costs of over-
coming time and distance have often precluded potentially useful information from being
brought to bear on environmental problems.
144 INDUS. ANALYSIS Dlv., FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE
SERVICE 14-5 (2000) (charting price drop of directly dialed five-minute long-distance calls
for certain calling distances).
145 See Joshua Knauer & Maurice Rickard, Internet Global Environmental Information
Sharing, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 45, at 185, 187-89
(highlighting declining cost of environmental information sharing).
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have dealt with particular issues-becomes much more readily avail-
able. 146 Internet-based tools, such as the emissions "scorecard" cre-
ated by Environmental Defense, increasingly put key data at anyone's
fingertips. 147 Just as computers facilitate the information collection
and analysis that makes a more data-driven approach to environ-
mental protection possible, digital communications systems (and par-
ticularly the network structure of the Internet) allow access to vast
quantities of "distributed information" that would previously have
been unobtainable or unsearchable in a cost-effective manner. 148 In
so doing, they expand the pace of both knowledge exchange 149 and
the generation of new ideas or tools to address environmental
harms.150
146 More plentiful and less expensive information does not guarantee that unprocessed
data will be translated into usable knowledge. We can analogize to manufacturing: Data is
the raw material. Information is the intermediate good, reflecting some processing of the
data. Knowledge is the final product. To move from data to substantive content requires a
rigorous scientific process of developing and testing hypotheses, careful analysis, system-
atic quality controls, and sensitivity analysis to highlight the effects of remaining
uncertainties.
147 The Environmental Defense interactive Scorecard site invites visitors to "just enter
your zip code and find out what pollutants are being released into your community-and
who is responsible." See Envtl. Def., Scorecard, at http://www.scorecard.org (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004). The EPA provides results of its annual Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
online in very accessible formats, including state fact sheets, public data releases, state data
files, and searchable databases. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Toxic RELEASE INVENTORY PRO-
GRAM, available at http://www.epa.gov/triltridata/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
Indonesia's PROPER toxics disclosure system shows that these gains can be extended to
the developing world. See SHAKEB AFSAH & JEFFREY R. VINCENT, PUTTING PRESSURE
ON POLLUTERS: INDONESIA'S PROPER PROGRAM, A CASE STUDY FOR THE HIID 1997
ASIA ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS POLICY SEMINAR (1997), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/nipr/work-paper/vincent/vincent.pdf.
148 See MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 13-21 (discussing time, space, transportation, and
coordination efficiencies gained from digital networks); see also Dan Taylor, Environment
and Infrastructure: How We Can Use Information Technology to Avert Another Tragedy of
the Commons, IMP: THE MAG. ON INFO. IMPACTS, Oct. 1999, at http://
www.dantaylor.com/insights/water-tragedy.html (proposing Internet-based management
monitoring system for Great Lakes); A. Voinov & R. Costanza, Watershed Management
and the Web, 56 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 231 (1999) (showing how Internet can advance and
improve watershed management).
149 See Ramamurti Shankar, Globalization and Science: A Speeded-up Virtuous Cycle,
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2003, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1259
("For scientists all over the world, the internet and electronic publication revolution have
proved a boon-expanding the areas of research and accelerating the pace of knowledge
exchange.").
150 See Greg Pitts & Jerry Fowler, InfoSleuth: An Emerging Technology for Sharing
Distributed Environmental Information, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 45, at 159 (describing Environmental Data Exchange Network's
InfoSleuth technology and its ability to fuse data from multiple sources).
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B. A Reshaped Environmental Decisionmaking Context
While the pace of technological change itself gives reason to
question our assumptions about persistent information gaps, even
more compelling are the environment-specific applications of new
technologies. This Section explains how information technology gains
will improve the visibility of pollution harms and natural resource
problems, enhance environmental modeling and predictive capacity,
enable greater quantification of policy choices, and promote trans-
parency and the democratization of policymaking.
1. Visibility of Harms
Information Age technologies make the invisible visible in a
variety of ways. Combining the advances in data collection described
above with improved computing power that permits scientists to
extract usable information from vast data sets gives us the capacity to
"see" many environmental problems more clearly. Cancer clusters,
for example, can now be found in public health data that was previ-
ously unintelligible. 151 In the realm of natural resource management,
the data-aggregation capacity of computers has proven to be espe-
cially helpful in spotting "tragedies of the commons" at earlier stages,
where the impact of individual behavior is minute. A single fisherman
or fishing boat seemingly has no effect on fish stocks, for example, but
fishing fleets collectively can deplete entire fisheries if the aggregate
catch is not tracked from an overarching perspective. 152
Improved data collection and computer-supported analytic
capacities are especially helpful in revealing diffuse harms that spread
across space or time. The downwind impacts of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions from the tall smokestacks of power plants now are recognized,
despite being highly dispersed, because better data collection and
analysis reveals patterns of respiratory distress, acidification of lakes,
and other harms. Even greenhouse gas emissions, which spread spa-
tially across the planet and inter-temporally across generations (per-
sisting in the atmosphere for as long as several centuries) now can be
measured carefully and increasingly understood. 153
As noted earlier, many pollutants mix in ways that have proven
difficult to untangle, making problems hard to bring into focus. Air
151 See, e.g., Susan D. Richardson et al., Identification of Drinking Water Contaminants
in the Course of a Childhood Cancer Investigation in Toms River, New Jersey, 9 J. ExPo-
SURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 200 (1999).
152 Michael De Alessi, Fishing for Solutions, IEA STUD. ON ENV'T., Nov. 11, 1998, at
40-43.
153 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 74, at 17 (dis-
cussing advances in assessment of impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation).
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pollution, for example, represents a complex "soup" derived not only
from millions of cars and trucks emitting particulates, NOx, carbon
monoxide, volatile organic chemicals (VOCs), and other byproducts
of combustion in their exhaust, but also emissions from thousands of
individual homes, factories, and commercial facilities. With the help
of modern sensors and information management systems, it is now
possible to identify the separate "ingredients" of air pollution. 54
Additional "realization" gains have come from advances in the
visual display of information. 55 While no one could see the ozone
layer thinning, computer-generated representations of the expanding
Antarctic ozone hole helped to induce global action in response to the
release of CFCs and other ozone-depleting chemicals.' 56 In fact, one
of the areas of greatest promise from a more data-driven approach to
environmental protection is the ability to overcome cognitive failures
that have plagued problem identification and policymaking. 57
Indeed, from the dawning of the Enlightenment to the present day, a
fundamental tenet of science and intellectual inquiry more broadly is
the belief that better evidence (particularly empirical support) will
yield better answers to questions.' 58 As John Stuart Mill famously
observed, "Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and
argument."1 59
154 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
155 See EDWARD R. Tuvri, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION
(1983) (demonstrating how sophisticated data displays can change perception).
156 See BENEDICK, supra note 61, at 18-22.
157 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1150-52, 1168
(2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)) (critiquing Slovic's con-
ception of psychiatric paradigm and instead explaining divergence between experts' and
lay people's evaluation of risk in terms of accessibility to "off-screen" data); Sunstein,
supra note 19; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 303-13 (arguing that powerful social and cognitive limitations
prevent the international community from working collectively to combat global warming);
Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 19, at 558-60 (explaining why regulatory "experts" none-
theless fall prey to heuristic shortcuts that contribute to inferior policy choices).
158 See D. Kabraman, Modeling Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate 4-7
(unpublished paper presented at the Yale Law School, Nov. 15, 2003; on file with New
York University Law Review) (explaining logic and foundations of the "factual Enlighten-
ment model"); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of
error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other
truths."). See generally KARL R. POPPER, The Defence of Rationalism, in POPPER SELEC-
TIONS 33 (David Miller ed., 1985).
159 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859). But see D.
Kabraman, supra note 158, at 4, 13 (arguing that "cultural cognition constrains factual
enlightenment" and that individual's belief formation process and acceptance of "facts" is
constrained by his values).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 2004]
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 163 2004
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Modeling and Prediction
Computer modeling narrows the range of uncertainties related to
pollution impacts and causal pathways that have plagued environ-
mental policymaking on all levels. Better forecasting allows potential
problems to be spotted before they emerge and helps to target policy
interventions. The examples are manifest. Regulators now plot the
drift of particulates, smog, and other air pollutants with a degree of
precision unheard of just a few years ago.160 Likewise, foresters
increasingly can project the sustainable yield from a timber stand.161
And fisheries now are being managed with models that help to specify
what constitutes a sustainable yield from a particular stock. 162
Similarly, genetic algorithms make it possible for decisionmakers
to model policy options and combinations of options, forecasting
results in a matter of hours rather than waiting years for actual results
to emerge. The evolutionary process of policy evaluation and refine-
ment through trial and error thus can be sped up dramatically. And
when empirical results are needed, new technologies permit feedback
loops to be shortened and the process of "adaptive behavior" and
learning through trial and error to be compressed. These advances
improve policy implementation and allow for more real-time updating
and refinement. 163
3. Quantification
As environmental decisionmaking becomes more data-driven,
several trends are likely to emerge. First, quantification expands the
available menu of policy options. Most notably, quantitative data
facilitates the "pricing" of pollution and natural resource consump-
160 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
161 Jerome K. Vanclay, Realizing Opportunities in Forest Growth Modelling, 33 CANA-
DIAN J. FOREST RES. 536 (2003), available at http://pubs.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/cgi-bin/rp/
rp2_tocse?cjfrcjfr3-03_33.
162 See De Alessi, supra note 152; see also Orbimage Global Imaging Info., SeaStar Pro
Service: Find Fish Faster and Reduce Costs with Seastar Service From ORBIMAGE, at
http://www.orbimage.com/seastar/seastar.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (describing tool
for tracking fish stocks).
163 A number of commentators have stressed learning as the key to a process of environ-
mental progress through trial and error. See DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM:
MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 198 (1999)
(arguing for creation of decisionmaking structures that "allow us to take advantage of
increased knowledge over time"); KRIER & URSIN, supra note 24, at 287-95 (discussing
regulations as information-centered system of collective trial and error); James Salzman et
al., Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 Wyo. L. REV. 253, 286 (2002) ("Although much stock has
been placed in both of the conventional models of regulatory compliance behavior, in
truth, both rest at bottom on behavioral theories that postulate indicia of the respective
behavioral trait and then rely for confirmation through the trial and error of policy
responses.").
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tion, making market-based interventions more viable. If we know
how much water a homeowner has used, it is much easier to impose
usage fees. And if we can measure the level of emissions coming out
of a car's exhaust pipe, charging for the harm becomes much easier.
Just as importantly, quantification changes the terms of the policy
dialogue. Environmental decisionmaking increasingly can rely on
actual on-the-ground results rather than expert opinion or, worse yet,
rhetoric and emotion. 164 Best guesses about optimal policy tools can
be replaced with determinations based on measured results. Deci-
sionmakers increasingly will be positioned to gauge environmental
results not by "inputs" (e.g., how much money was spent to address a
problem) but by "outputs" (e.g., how much improvement can be docu-
mented in ambient pollution levels). As the base of established fact
expands, the zone of uncertainty-and thus political judgment and
disputation-shrinks. 165 This shift in the underpinnings for environ-
mental decisionmaking may allow rationality and informed debate
slowly to supplant ideological shrillness and partisan bickering. 166
"Soft" data long has plagued the environmental realm and led critics
to doubt whether policy choices were well-founded. In a data-rich
environment, numerous opportunities exist to solidify the analytic
foundations for policy.
Quantification also makes it easier to find environmental invest-
ments that are not paying off. In business, not every new product
sells; in government, not every program works. Finding failing efforts
is an important element of good management. A recognition that pol-
icies and programs must be evaluated regularly and rigorously-and
resources redeployed where good results are not being achieved-has
been long absent from the environmental domain. Quantitative per-
164 The problems with expert analysis have been well documented. See ROBYN N.
DAWES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY: How PSEUDO-SCIENTISTS, LUNATICS, AND THE REST
OF Us SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO THINK RATIONALLY 6-13 (2001) (demonstrating that
decisions based on data and statistical prediction almost always outperform those based on
expert judgment); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 53, at 48-55 (highlighting problems with
expert analysis).
165 See THE URBAN INST., BEYOND IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, & GUESSWORK: THE CASE
FOR EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY (2003) (arguing for data-based decisionmaking as way to
get beyond "ideology, politics, and guesswork"); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environ-
mental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495, 1519 (1999) (demonstrating how zone of
uncertainty shrinks with additional data). But see Kabraman, supra note 158, at 25
(arguing that culture and values can suppress truth).
166 A shift toward a more quantitative and empirical approach to environmental protec-
tion might not be embraced by all. Environmentalists, in particular, have long been suspi-
cious of quantitative, and especially cost-benefit, analysis. See e.g., Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Laws: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 562, 584-86 (1992) (discussing theoretical limitations of comparative risk
analysis).
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formance measures promise to be an invaluable tool in changing the
environmental policy culture in this regard.
As noted above, a more data-intensive approach to environ-
mental decisionmaking facilitates analytic precision and refined stan-
dard-setting that respects differences across jurisdictions, issues, and
individuals. The ability to handle diversity-of conditions, percep-
tions, and preferences-is one of the most critical factors required for
improved environmental decisionmaking. 167
Abundant data also makes it easier to find the best solutions
within and among jurisdictions. Comparative analysis provides an
important mechanism for improved environmental policy choices.
The trend toward greater use of metrics and indicators is underway,
with important gains already evident.168 Performance rankings make
it easier to identify superior environmental strategies, policies, and
technologies. Recent studies have shown that enormous progress can
be achieved simply by moving laggards toward the "best practices" of
those with top-ranked results.1 69
Data and information on what others are doing helps to define
what is possible in the environmental arena. In many cases, govern-
ments, corporations, and households do not have a clear picture of
what might be obtained in pollution control or resource management
gains. Developing good environmental metrics thus helps to clarify
appropriate targets or goals.
In the corporate context, environmental metrics allow executives
to evaluate their pollution control and resource management practices
with rigor. Facility-specific data can be used to identify top-tier per-
formance, establish targets for progress, and provide a foundation for
programs to move a corporation's operations toward leading-edge
standards. Comparative statistics published by industry associations,
international bodies, or the scientific community can generate addi-
tional benchmarks to guide environmental action.
167 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339-44 (1994) (arguing that
diverse circumstances across jurisdictions requires customized law); Richard Briffault, Our
Localism Part I1-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (explaining
how legal theory must track divergent circumstances); Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at
34-35, 43-44 (discussing need to address diversity in federal system); James E. Krier, The
Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV.
323, 326-30 (1974) (highlighting divergent circumstances that make uniform standards
inappropriate).
168 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169 See ROBERT G. ECCLES ET AL., THE VALUEREPORTING REVOLUTION: MOVING
BEYOND THE EARNINGS GAME 211-35 (2001) (providing examples of diffusion of best
practices).
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Similar benchmarking opportunities may emerge at the house-
hold level. Electric bills in most places, for example, show not only
how much energy was consumed in the prior month, but also provide
a comparison with the last few months' electricity use or with the
same month last year. But they do not provide the relevant compar-
ison-showing how much a similar household of comparable size in
the same geographic locale consumes. Such benchmarks could pro-
vide a real spur to action at the individual level with society-wide
potential for reduced pollution, especially if combined with informa-
tion on how the top performers have been able to reduce their use of
electricity.
Additional benchmarking gains derive from the tendency of com-
parative analysis, particularly rankings, to spur competition. Evidence
that others are outperforming one's country, community, or company
on environmental criteria can heighten attention to opportunities for
improved pollution control and better resource management.170
Competition not only motivates better performance; it often sparks
innovation. 171
4. Transparency and Democracy
Persuasive data and easy dissemination inevitably will increase
"transparency" and undermine the governmental monopoly over deci-
sionmaking.1 72 Even the governmental capacity to define the forum
for political dialogue seems to be crumbling. Anyone with a website
now can express a viewpoint and attack the prevailing wisdom. Data
access gives "outsiders" and critics of those in power the means to
challenge established policies as well as the assumptions and analyses
on which they are based.
170 Daniel C. Esty, Why Measurement Matters, in ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT: THE GLOBAL REPORT 2001-2002, at 6 (Daniel C. Esty & Peter K. Corne-
lius eds., 2002).
171 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 586-87, 610-11
(1990) (explaining why competitive pressures generate innovation); Louis Lowenstein,
Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335-36 (1996) (explaining logic of disclosure rules); Ronald B.
Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 INT'L
STUD. Q. 109, 110-13 (1998) (explaining logic and value of transparency); Cynthia A. Wil-
liams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1211-23 (1999) (explaining justification for disclosure emphasis in
securities realm).
172 On the value of transparency, see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945) ("[T]he widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... ). See also Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making, and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.N. 517, available at www.unece.org/env/pp/docu-
ments/cep43e.pdf.
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Subpar regulatory results historically have been hard to spot, but
when citizens (or environmental groups or the media) find out that
other cities, states, or countries are delivering much better environ-
mental results than their own government, they have a basis for com-
plaint. For example, although Belgium has suffered from poor
environmental conditions for decades, when the 2001 World Eco-
nomic Forum Environmental Sustainability Index ranked the country
seventy-ninth, just behind Albania, an uproar ensued in Brussels. 173
Environmental groups, the media, and opposition politicians all
pressed the government to explain the nation's relatively poor pollu-
tion control performance. 174 A major rethinking of Belgium's envi-
ronmental approach began.
The effects of increased transparency extend to the corporate
realm.175 Companies now face scrutiny from "green" consumers, cap-
ital market analysts (some of whom see a correlation between envi-
ronmental performance and financial results), 176  corporate
sustainability rating agencies, 177 community activists,178 NGOs, 179
173 Marc A. Levy, Measuring Nations' Environmental Sustainability, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, supra note 170, at 12, 19-20.
174 Political inquiries, press reports, and website "hits" are on file with the Center for
International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University (CEISIN), one
of the groups involved in generating the Earth Science Information rankings.
175 See generally DON TAPSCOTr & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION 3-36
(2003) (arguing that firms must accept world of transparency and improve their perform-
ance and governance).
176 See Glen Dowell et al., Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or
Destroy Market Value?, 46 MGMT. Sci. 1059, 1065-69 (2000) (finding positive market valu-
ation associated with adoption of stringent environmental standards); Shameek Konar &
Mark A. Cohen, Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?, 83 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 281 (2001) (finding that reduced emissions of toxic chemicals are correlated with
higher market value); Michael V. Russo & Paul A. Fouts, A Resource-Based Perspective on
Corporate Environmental Performance and Profitability, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 534, 549
(1997) (reporting positive correlation between environmental performance and economic
performance, especially in higher-growth industries).
177 See Frank Dixon, Financial Markets and Corporate Environmental Results, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, supra note 170, at 54 (providing overview of
EcoValue'21 environmental performance ratings system); Alois Flatz, Corporate Sus-
tainability and Financial Indices, in ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT,
supra note 170, at 66, 66-80 (discussing challenges of assessing sustainability and financial
performance of leading companies).
178 See HILARY FRENCH, VANISHING BORDERS: PROTECTING THE PLANET IN THE AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION 10-12 (2000) ("New information and communications technologies
are facilitating international networking, and activist groups, businesses, and international
institutions are forging innovative partnerships."). These activists are also empowered by
easy-access TRI data and other information such as the Environmental Defense "Score-
card." See Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Information, Public Participation, and Justice, 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,784, 10,791-92, 10,795 (2002).
179 See generally P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, 112 FOREIGN POL'Y 82
(1998) (discussing NGO activism); Timothy E. Wirth, Disinfectants, Nudes and Other
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industry associations, 180 and environmentally conscious employees.
Bad acts and poor results have become almost impossible to hide.
Although it may be uncomfortable for some companies (as it has been
for some governments), this new world of comparative data, instanta-
neous connections, open access, and transparency seems likely to
intensify the focus on pollution problems and subpar natural resource
management, speed up feedback loops, and increase the pace of envi-
ronmental progress.181
In addition to increasing transparency, greater access to data and
new mechanisms for "voice "-e-mail, websites, chat rooms, and
blogs-democratize the environmental decisionmaking process.1 82
Simply put, more people can participate in the policy dialogue on any
and every scale. Democratization does not just describe a new policy
reality but has real normative value in the context of the uncertainties
and information gaps of environmental policymaking. Connecting
more people to cutting-edge thinking and engaging them in environ-
mental debates means that a wider set of views, analyses, values, and
policy options are considered. Cheaper and better data makes the
intellectual marketplace undergirding the regulatory process operate
Adventures, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 15 (2002) (exploring domestic and inter-
national impact of NGOs); The Non-Governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratize or
Disrupt Global Governance?, Economist, Dec. 11, 1999, at 20 (discussing NGOs' increasing
political power and use of Internet).
180 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law
and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 454-55 (1999) (noting that programs like
Chemical Manufacturing Association Responsible Care "constitute efforts to improve the
behavior of firms in different sectors and commit associations and their members to a more
public responsibility for the environment"). For an overview of Responsible Care princi-
ples and requirements, see Responsible Care Practitioners Site, at http://
www.americanchemistry.com/rc.nsf/secondaryprofiles/lsgs-4nmdz?opendocument (last vis-
ited Feb. 23, 2004). See also Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev., Mining and Minerals Sustainability
Survey 2001, at http://www.iied.org/mmsd/activities/industrysurvey.html (last visited Feb.
23, 2004); Nat'l Mining Ass'n, NMA Sustainable Development Principles, at http://
www.nma.org/policy/sustainable..dev.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
181 As management guru Don Tapscott likes to tell corporate leaders, "[I]f you're going
to be naked, you'd better be buff." Face Value: Get Naked, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at
66 (detailing Tapscott's belief that greater business transparency is "an unstoppable
force").
182 On the Internet's democratization potential, see generally Balkin, supra note 79, at
19 ("[S]peech becomes democratized because technologies of distribution and transmission
are put in the hands of an increasing number of people and increasing diverse segments of
society throughout the planet."); Anupam Chandar, Whose Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1479, 1481, 1493-95 (2002) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001)) (explaining
democratizing power of Internet).
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more efficiently. 183 Open decisionmaking also subjects environmental
choices to ongoing review and critical comment.
Administrative law especially stands to be transformed by trends
toward increased openness. In fact, a world of e-government is
emerging.1 84 The Internet opens up regulatory proceedings, such as
the notice-and-comment process required by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. Today anyone with a computer can track critical policy
debates as they unfold in the public docket. Anyone with e-mail can
register a comment, making distance from the physical locus of poli-
cymaking much less important.185 People with good ideas-even
those who never get to Washington or their state capitals-thereby
can have a chance to shape policy outcomes.186 This trend bodes well
for the environment, as there is a growing scholarly literature that
connects good environmental results with the strength of a jurisdic-
tion's democratic institutions and the robustness of public debate.187
183 See Daniel C. Esty, NGOs at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competi-
tion, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 123, 135-37 (1998) (explaining value of competitive
pressures in environmental policymaking process).
184 See, e.g., EPA Homepage, at http://www.epa.gov (last visited January 27, 2004) (pro-
viding full overview of EPA activities, including EPA Dockets, "online public docket and
comment system designed to expand access to documents in EPA's major dockets"). For
information on the Bush administration's broader e-government agenda, see egov: The
Official Web Site of the President's e-government Initiatives, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). See generally Barbara H.
Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening our
Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421 (2002) (explaining how Internet is fundamen-
tally transforming administrative rulemaking); Irwin & Bruch, supra note 178 (discussing
impact of increased access to information on public participation).
185 Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemaking 5-6 (REGU-
LATORY POLICY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, WORKING PAPER RPP-2003-05, 2003),
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2003-05.pdf.
186 Easy access could also result in "loud" interests having an easier time wielding influ-
ence. But the mechanisms for sifting inputs into the decisionmaking processes also may
get better. In fact, significant efforts are being made by a number of software companies to
produce programs that will sift and sort data and information. See, e.g., Press Release,
Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft's Bill Gates Previews New "HailStorm" Technologies to
Usher in New Era of More Consistent, Personalized and User-Centric Experiences (Mar.
19, 2001), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/marO1/
03-19hailstormPR.asp; see also Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Unveils Hailstorm Initiative,
An Ambitious Web-Service Expansion, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 21, 2001, at 26 (describing
Microsoft web initiative providing wide array of networking opportunities for consumers).
187 See, e.g., Scott Barrett & Kathryn Graddy, Freedom, Growth and the Environnent, 5
ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 433 (2000) (demonstrating impact of civil and political freedoms on
environmental quality); Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Measuring National Environ-
mental Performance and Its Determinants, in GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000, at
60-75 (Michael Porter et al. eds., 2000) (showing empirical correlation between legal and
political institutions and environmental results).
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C. New Challenges and Old Problems
Though there are many reasons to be optimistic about the contri-
bution of Information Age technological advances to environmental
protection, there are also reasons for caution. This new age could
unfold in ways that make policymaking in general, and environmental
decisionmaking in particular, more difficult.188
As data becomes more plentiful and less expensive, systematic
efforts will be required to ensure that it gets translated into usable
information and, ultimately, knowledge. 189 As Enriquez notes, half of
all the data ever collected in history has been obtained in the last four
years.1 90 With more and more raw data and information being gener-
ated, environmental decision processes face the risk of information
overload. In fact, the ability to sift information may soon become as
important as the capacity to gather it.'9'
Environmental decisionmaking processes also will be vulnerable
to concerted disinformation campaigns from both traditional special
interests and perhaps new quarters. The Internet offers a cascade of
crackpot theories, half-baked analyses, and unscientific data sets.
Mechanisms to ensure accountability in cyberspace have not yet fully
been developed. 192 The free-wheeling spirit of the Internet commu-
188 Some even worry that the shift to a technology-based economy might in itself create
new hazards or exacerbate existing pollution problems. These issues-including the need
to dispose of heavy metals in computers, the unleashing of dangerous new substances,
increased energy use, and a "rebound" effect from information-technology-induced eco-
nomic growth-are beyond the scope of this Article, but have been addressed in detail
elsewhere. See generally BILL McKIBBEN, ENOUGH: STAYING HUMAN IN AN ENGI-
NEERED AGE (2003); Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us, WIRED, April 2000, at 238
(highlighting new Information Age dangers); Joseph Romm, The Internet Economy and
Global Warming 22-24 (1999), available at http://www.cool-companies.org/energy/
ecomm.doc (analyzing energy use of Information Age economy); Eric Williams & Takaro
Hatanaka, Sustainable Consumption and the Information Technology Revolution (United
Nations University, Working Paper, 2003) (noting risk of environmental deterioration due
to economic lift from information technologies), available at http://unit.aist.go.jp/lca-
center/lca/symposium/ws0303l9pfd/S1-5 %2OWilliams.pdf.
189 Douglas Aldrich has identified three requirements for the effective use of informa-
tion: "[T]he ability to access it, the ability to assimilate and analyze it, and the ability to act
on it." ALDRICH, supra note 143, at 31.
190 JUAN ENRIQUEZ & RODRIGO MARTINEZ, THE SMALLEST EVER GUIDE TO LIFE SCI-
ENCES 22 (2003).
191 See supra note 189; see also Balkin, supra note 79, at 9 ("[T]he digital revolution
makes salient what was always the case: the importance of organizing, sorting, filtering
and limiting access to information.").
192 See generally LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 120; WEB OF DECEPTION: MIS-
INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (Anne P. Mintz ed., 2002) (alerting readers to flood of
deceptive, misleading, and erroneous information pervading the Web); see also Anne Wells
Branscomb, Anonymity, Accountability, and Autonomy: Challenges to the First Amend-
ment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1646-47 (1995) (discussing difficulties of regu-
lating misuses and abuses of informational resources on Internet); Edward Lee, Rules and
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nity' 93  thus creates an added risk of dissemination of
misinformation. 194
More generally, giving "voice" to more people does not guar-
antee better policymaking. The promise of cyberdemocracy with a
fully informed and engaged populace could give way to "spam," mis-
information, and dialogue among the uninformed that diminishes
thoughtful deliberation. 195 More opinions being heard may lead to
chaos and breakdown rather than higher quality decisions. 196 Even if
some participants in the policy process stay engaged, a flood of infor-
mation could lead to narrowly focused decisionmaking with little con-
sideration given to the broader context of a policy choice.
Some observers fear that the Information Age will narrow the
flow of information that the average citizen sees, leading people to
talk only to those who are like-minded, and reducing the level of polit-
ical discourse and substantive debate. 197 The extreme version of this
fear can be seen in Sunstein's caricature of the "Internaut" who gets
all of his information from a highly tailored set of websites producing
a quotidian information sheet, which he mocks as the "Daily Me." 198
Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1317-21 (2002) (urging Congress
to promulgate rules to ensure accountability in cyberspace); Beth Simone Noveck,
Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 14 (2003) (detailing informational problems on Internet and challenges
of enacting accountability and transparency regulations); Saul Hansell, Internet Is Losing
Ground in Battle Against Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at Al (describing futility of
technological and legal efforts to control unwanted solicitation over Internet); U.S. Seeks
to End What it Calls Deceptive Email Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at Cl (chroni-
cling recent government attempts to crack down on deceptive Internet practices).
193 See LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 120, at 9 (hailing freedom to "rip, mix,
and burn").
194 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
195 See Dennis Thompson, James Madison on Cyberdemocracy, in DEMOCRACY.COM:
GOVERNANCE IN A NETWORKED WORLD 35, 40 (Elaine Ciulla Kamarck & Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. eds., 1999) (noting that "directness" may be advanced at expense of deliberation).
196 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Technology.gov: Information Technology and Democratic Gov-
ernance, in DEMOCRACY.COM, supra note 195, at 1, 8-14 (reviewing opportunities and
challenges of Information Age democracy); see also supra notes 192-93 and accompanying
text.
197 See William A. Galston, (How) Does the Internet Affect Community? Some Specula-
tions in Search of Evidence, in DEMOCRACY.COM, supra note 195, at 45; see also Roza
Tsagarousianou, Back to the Future of Democracy? New Technologies, Civic Networks and
Direct Democracy in Greece, in CYBERDEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY, CITIES, AND CIVIC
NETWORKS 41-59 (Roza Tsagarousianou et al. eds., 1998).
198 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 3 (2001) (arguing that, with advent of television
and Internet filtering technologies, one will "need not come across topics and views that
[one has] not sought out. Without any difficulty, [one is] able to see exactly what [one]
want[s] to see, no more and no less"). Sunstein later backed away from this position in
response to a critique of Republic.com, claiming that it was only meant as a "thought
experiment designed to cast light on the neglected requirements of a system of free expres-
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While the Internet enables knowledge about best practices to
move quickly to places where it can be productively employed, this
access often comes at the cost of intellectual property rights. Open
access and a lack of respect for intellectual property could induce
more innovation and faster dissemination of good ideas, 99 but over
time it might also result in reduced incentives for knowledge
generation.200
Speedy dissemination also may exacerbate "network effects,"
locking in suboptimal standards and approaches.201 In the environ-
mental area, the problem of existing technologies that have become
de facto standards-deterring innovation-has long been under-
stood.20 2 Governments can combat this tendency by ensuring that all
environmental regulations take the form of performance standards
(not technology mandates) and by quickly testing and certifying new
methods of meeting requirements.
The presumption that more complete data and analysis yields
better results will not always hold true. A "Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance" may promote policy progress and negotiated agreements in
some circumstances: 20 3 Climate change negotiators, for instance,
sion," and was in no way suggestive of "what most people are doing." Cass R. Sunstein,
Response to James Fallow's "He's Got Mail", N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 25, 2002, at 61.
199 See Niall FitzGerald, Tomorrow's Wash: Challenges and Opportunities for the
Detergents Industry in the 21st Century, Address Delivered by Chairman of Unilever PLC
(Oct. 5, 1998) (casting doubt on whether environmental advances should "remain proprie-
tary, thus limiting the potential benefits to society"), available at http://www.unilever.com/
news/speeches/2000/englishspeeches_967.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
200 MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 63 (noting digital information technologies have caused
collapse of traditional intellectual property approach to information). Nevertheless, the
net impact may be neutral given the complex dynamics of information production in an
open environment. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1057, 1072 (2001) (arguing for loose intellectual property rules in cyberspace). See gener-
ally Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369 (2003) (highlighting complexities of knowledge generation and intellectual property in
cyberspace).
201 See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITrLE THINGS CAN
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000) (discussing "social epidemics" and their causes); Michael
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93
(1994) (discussing network effects). It is important to note that the dynamic nature of the
Information Age itself may overcome the risk of network effects and encourage contin-
uous thinking about new directions for progress, but the uncertainty associated with tech-
nology argues in favor of the diligence described above. See GLADWELL, supra, at
196-203; Katz & Shapiro, supra, at 108.
202 See, e.g., Byron Swift, Barriers to Environmental Technology Innovation and Use, 28
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,202 (1998) (describing significant and somewhat peculiar barriers to
development and adoption of new environmental technologies, many of which stem from
regulatory system itself).
203 See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: CON-
STITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985), reprinted in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES M. BUCHANAN 35-36 (2000) (arguing that fundamental principles are best devel-
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might find it easier to agree on a strategy for reducing greenhouse
gases if they do so in general terms before knowing the precise costs
and benefits of emissions reductions in their own countries.20 4 Fur-
thermore, transparent policymaking processes may be susceptible to
manipulation by special interests unless administrative law and proce-
dures evolve to control this threat. The Information Age also may
empower only some segments of society and create a "digital divide"
that leaves a disadvantaged subset out of the decisionmaking. 20 5
Finally, it is possible that some data could actually be put to
malevolent use. In the post-September 11 period, the EPA pulled a
great deal of information on chemical sites and risks off its web page
for fear that this material might facilitate the work of terrorists. 20 6
Ultimately, as with any technological development, the potential for
improved environmental policymaking in the Information Age will
only be realized if the possible downsides to the new technologies are
confronted and mitigated.
oped under veil of uncertainty); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PRO-
TECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 101-03 (1994) (demonstrating how
uncertainty can facilitate agreements).
204 See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Effi-
ciency, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 125 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) (discussing impact of different approaches
to determining appropriate discount rate for climate change analysis).
205 Much of the logic of this Article applies only in parts of the world where computers
are common. See Irwin & Bruch, supra note 178, at 10,793 (arguing that "[diespite some
notable efforts to cross the digital divide and to create a digital dividend, much of the
United States' investment went into the technology bubble rather than into building a
more sustainable world"). However, the World Resources Institute recently released a
report finding that even developing countries are advancing policies that promote access to
information. See ELENA PETKOVA ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CLOSING THE GAP: INFOR-
MATION, PARTICIPATION, AND JUSTICE IN DECISIONMAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 33-64
(2002), available at http://pubs.wri.org/pubspdf.cfm?PublD=3759 (last visited Feb. 21,
2004).
206 See Right to Know After September 11th: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water
Res. and Env't of the House Comm. on Trans. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 14, 16 (2001)
(testimony of Amy E. Smithson, Director, Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Pro-
ject, Henry L. Stimson Center) (explaining removal of sensitive data from EPA website to
avoid providing terrorists with "a roadmap to the chemical calamities they could cause"),
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpwl7-55.000/hpwlO7-55_O.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2004). For an inventory of post-September 11 changes to federal
government websites, see Gary Bass, A Post-September 11 Attack on the Right-to-Know, at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2121/1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 79:115





The changed policymaking context outlined above will enable
some important refinements to our existing structure of environ-
mental institutions and may ameliorate some existing sources of
market or regulatory failure. As Information Age technologies pene-
trate the environmental realm, the optimal mix of policy tools and
institutions seems likely to evolve. The ability to fill information gaps
changes the relative advantages and disadvantages of different regula-
tory regimes and effects a shift in our environmental protection "pos-
sibility frontier."
A. Revitalizing the Environmental Property Rights Market
Reliance on a property rights approach to environmental protec-
tion has been in decline for more than a century. As environmental
problems became more complex, the resulting information demands
led to widespread market failure. New digital technologies seem
likely to reverse this trend by filling several types of information gaps
that currently limit the utility of Coasean bargaining in the environ-
mental context.
1. Search Costs
One of the most striking features of the Internet is its capacity to
lower search costs and to bring together potential buyers and sellers
who might otherwise not have found each other.207 In so doing, the
Internet helps to "make markets" and to improve the efficiency of
existing systems of exchange.20 8 This market-making capacity has sev-
eral environmental applications. Most notably, "waste" more easily
can be reused and recycled. Particular opportunities exist where one
company's byproducts can serve as another's raw material. 20 9 The
chemical maker Rhone-Poulenc found, for instance, that the diacids
207 Cf. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 79-109 (1976) (concluding
that in any decision process, number of alternatives that must be explored and information
required to do so is so great that individuals cannot achieve "any high degree of ration-
ality"); Douglas C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 ECON.
INQUIRY 419 (1987).
208 See KELLY, supra note 120, at 185-94 (discussing attributes of "networked
economy"); Alan Cohen & John M. Jordan, Electronic Commerce: The Next Generation,
PERSP. ON Bus. INNOVATION, Issue 3, 1999, at 7, 8-11.
209 See Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy, 25 ANN.
REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 313 (2000) (reviewing literature covering "industrial symbiosis" );
Keith Pezzoli, Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) and Regulatory Innovation, 36
CAL. W. L. REV. 335, 363-64 & n.87 (2000) (providing examples of industrial symbiosis).
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which are a byproduct of nylon production need not be incinerated
but can be sold to tanneries for use as coagulants.2 10 Historically, the
cost to the waste generator of finding such a synergistic partner often
would have been prohibitively high, and the byproducts would have
been discarded. Today, Internet-driven reuse/recycling relationships
are multiplying rapidly.211
More plentiful and available information promises also to create
better-informed consumers and thus to transform many existing
product markets where environmental issues are a factor in the
purchase decision.2 12 When the cost of getting information on the
environmental dimensions of products is high, most purchasers ignore
environmental factors. But as environmental data and analysis
become more accessible, additional buyers will be positioned to factor
environmental considerations into their choices. Eco-labels, Internet
"environmental facts" websites, and other tools have created a wave
of "green consumers" in markets from electric power to furniture to
food.213
2. Delineation of Environmental Rights
Contractual exchange of environmental rights often seems unten-
able because those holding the rights are not in a position to bargain
over their exchange. They lack sufficient information about the scope
of their rights, whether an infringement has occurred, and what value
to place on their rights. With improved technology, the victims of pol-
lution will be better positioned to understand and defend their rights.
While we may not be able to move to a pure market approach to
protecting environmental rights anytime soon, improved problem visi-
bility, harm traceability, analytic capacity, and transparency all seem
likely to make Coasean bargaining viable in more circumstances.
The most visible improvement may come in physically delineating
environmental rights.21 4 For example, Global Positioning Systems
210 Porter & van der Linde, supra note 119, at 125.
211 For a list of more than one hundred Internet bulletin board systems that are facili-
tating business-to-business "waste" transfers, see Recycler's World: The Recycler's
Exchange, at http://www.recycle.net/recycle/exch (last visited Feb. 21, 2004); Waste
Exchange Services Ltd.: Waste Exchange, at http://www.wasteexchange.com/
Waste%20Exchange.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
212 See supra note 35.
213 Already, a number of online entities are seeking to fill this environmental informa-
tion market niche. See, e.g., Ecomall, at http://www.ecomall.com (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).
214 This potential has been recognized for some time. See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CON-
TRACrING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTs 17 (1989) ("New technology, which lowers the costs of
delimiting individual claims, detecting rule violations, arbitrating disputes, and punishing
violators, provides for further gains from applying a more specific assignment of property
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(GPS) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) make the demar-
cation of property boundaries faster, easier, and cheaper. 215 In combi-
nation with remote sensing, GPS and GIS technologies have the
potential to improve the management of various open-access natural
resources that are difficult to police. Historically, such resources have
been vulnerable to overexploitation as each individual maximizes his
or her own consumption at the expense of the community as a
whole.216 "Tragedies of the commons," from overgrazing of cattle to
overfishing of the ocean, long have vexed environmentalists. 217 But
just as barbed wire helped clarify property rights in the American
West and facilitated more sustainable land use, information technolo-
gies can be deployed as "virtual barbed wire," permitting the fencing
off of shares in common resources that previously might have been
seen as ineluctably open for all. To return to the problem of fisheries
management, quotas can be allocated and enforced using satellite
tracking to observe and even measure the number of fish being taken
by particular vessels. And while the prospect of keeping track of hun-
dreds or even thousands of fishing boats might have seemed daunting
a few years ago, today's computers can manage the task with relative
ease.218 In fact, New Zealand's fisheries recently have been revived
under a tradable quota regime reinforced by a sophisticated electronic
tracking system.219 In light of such breakthroughs, our view of what
constitutes an inherently collective resource may be dramatically
altered.
Where resources are, by choice, managed as a public good (e.g.,
parks), the capacity to enforce limits on exploitation of the resource
by individual actors will greatly be enhanced. From electronic signup
rights to reduce common pool losses."). In a similar vein, emissions-detecting technologies
may be used to delineate and enforce "pollution rights." See Todd Hartman, Plan Aims to
End Emissions Test: Remote Screening Would Target Polluters, But Clean Vehicles Would
Get Pass in Mail, DENVER ROCKY MoUTsrAI NEWS, Aug. 31, 2000, at A4.
215 See generally Scott D. Makar & Michael R. Makar, Jr., Geographic Information Sys-
tems: Legal and Policy Implications, 69 FLA. B. J. 44 (1995).
216 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968)
(explaining how common ownership of resources leads to overexploitation).
217 See, e.g., Frederick W. Bell, Technological Externalities and Common-Property
Resources: An Empirical Study of the U.S. Northern Lobster Fishery, 80 J. POL. ECON. 148
(1972) (documenting overexploitation of fishery).
218 Satellite tracking of fishing fleets is now both well-developed and cheap enough that
it is marketed directly to private corporations in the marine industry for individual fleet
communication and observation. See SASCO, Economical Satellite Communications and
Tracking for the Marine Industry, at http://www.sasco-inc.com/default.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2004). Satellite tracking is also being incorporated into environmental regulation in
Britain. See Sea Fishing (Enforcement of Community Satellite Monitoring Measures)
(Wales) Order 2000, (2000) SI 2000/1078.
219 See De Alessi, supra note 152.
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sheets for tent sites in Yellowstone National Park to the tracking of
greenhouse gas emissions released into the earth's atmosphere, 2 0 the
costs of defining, protecting, and trading environmental property
rights appear likely to drop precipitously in the coming decades.
Finally, information advances may ease the strain that often exists
where ecological resources are divided between private property
owners and public entities. Computer-aided mapping and data
storage in high-resolution GIS makes the presence of endangered spe-
cies or protected wetlands on private lands much easier to track and
predict. The capacity to foresee a problem also reduces the chances
that those buying land will face a use-restricting "surprise" that raises
a takings issue.221 Simultaneously, the extent of "positive externali-
ties" generated by private landowners will be much easier to gauge,
facilitating compensation or credit for those whose careful private
land management practices generate public benefits.222
3. Valuation and Strategic Behavior
Even if we know with a reasonable degree of precision the
sources and impacts of emissions and who holds the relevant property
rights, a market-based approach to environmental protection remains
untenable unless those engaged in exchanges know how much value
to place on the various resources or harms in question. Important
dimensions of the "valuation" problem soon may be overcome
through greater emphasis on data-driven decisionmaking, which facili-
tates better risk assessments and more sophisticated cost-benefit
analysis.223
Of course, a more quantitative approach to environmental pro-
tection will not eliminate all information gaps and concomitant deci-
sionmaking breakdowns, bargaining failures, and strategic behavior.
220 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 709-13, 763-68 (1999) (arguing that allocation of atmos-
pheric property rights may become possible).
221 To the extent that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area turns on "reason-
able investment-backed expectations," see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019 n.8, 1027 (1992), increased information should reduce the number of Endangered
Species Act takings cases and wetlands disputes to near-zero.
222 See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGI-
CALLY, supra note 31, at 49, 57-58 (arguing that private property owners should be com-
pensated for public benefits they provide).
223 See ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
6-31 (2000) (discussing possible improvements in cost-benefit analysis); James K.
Hammitt, Data, Risk, and Science: Foundations for Analysis, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY,
supra note 31, at 150, 152-57 (describing refined tools for cost-benefit analysis); see also
generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2002) (suggesting that risk regulation should be based on cost-benefit analysis).
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But better data, in combination with a more transparent policymaking
process, will make anomalous value claims stand out more sharply. In
trying to place a value on a child's pollution-induced asthma, for
example, the amounts paid in compensation in other similar cases will
be easily accessible. Thus, a rights holder who tries to overplay his
hand and advance an indefensibly large claim will be stymied.
Value judgments will, of course, still have to be made.224 The
price to be placed on particular kinds of harms, such as loss of a life,
an increased risk of cancer, or a diminished view are not obvious.
These questions are not so much technical as they are philosophical
and political. 225 Even so, a more information-rich decisionmaking
process can reduce the scope for dispute and ameliorate the institu-
tional challenges posed.
4. Decollectivization
In some cases, information technologies offer the prospect of pro-
moting individual environmental decisionmaking in the marketplace
instead of "policymaking" with its susceptibility to error, inefficiency,
and special interest capture. Such a shift makes sense where risks and
impacts can be internalized at the individual or household level.
Decollectivization is particularly useful where tastes and values vary
and where individuals are capable of making informed choices in a
market context.226 Under such an approach, individuals decide for
themselves how to weigh the competing risk and cost factors and can
thus determine what to buy. The regulatory role can be limited to
providing reliable information.
Food safety stands out as an area where some choices that are
presently made in a regulatory setting can be devolved to the indi-
vidual and the market. The decision, for instance, whether to buy
food derived from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or to
purchase GMO-free products may be better left to individuals rather
than regulators. 227 Where individual choice represents the preferred
environmental protection strategy, eco-labels or other information-
224 See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988) (dismissing feasibility of purely scientific or rational environ-
mental decision making).
225 See Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradic-
tion in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283, 286-97 (1982) (arguing that valuations inevi-
tably turn on value judgments).
226 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 5-6, 32-33 (2002) (defending plu-
ralism and recognition that some value conflicts cannot be reconciled).
227 See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environ-
mental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 859-72 (2001) (explaining why
regulation of genetically modified organisms should have information focus).
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provision strategies make sense as a way to promote informed con-
sumer preferences.
5. Contracting Beyond Small Numbers
The likelihood of negotiating efficient environmental outcomes-
where harm-causers compensate those whose rights have been
infringed or where pollutees pay polluters to reduce the harms-long
has been understood to diminish beyond the realm of small num-
bers.228 But the Internet and the growing network of other Informa-
tion Age mechanisms for linking people together may change what
counts as "small. ' 229 Dispersed individuals with a common purpose
may find it easier to achieve collective action.230 More specifically,
environmental rightsholders may be able to organize themselves at
much lower cost than in the past, enabling them (or their agents) to
negotiate more systematically and effectively. 231
One can imagine, for example, that property developers seeking
to site a new factory may be able to negotiate electronically with the
neighbors over compensation for any associated noise or dust. Indi-
vidualized payments might be determined by modeling an array of
factors such as distance from the site, direction of the prevailing wind,
and susceptibility to harm. The greater the experience base and the
more data we have to build such analysis, the more likely we are to be
able to generate a proposal that meets the expectations of both harm
causers and victims.
There are, however, real limits to how much environmental infor-
mation individuals can process and thus how far Coasean bargaining
can go as the centerpiece of our environmental regime. 232 Some
dimensions of environmental problemsolving are inescapably com-
plex. The presence of good data and analysis does not therefore guar-
antee good decisions.
228 See Coase, supra note 1 (discussing parameters for successful bargaining).
229 One of the greatest values of the Internet is its capacity to "connect people in a
relevant and timely fashion." JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING
MARKETS WHEN CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES Xii (1999).
230 See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002)
(explaining how Internet facilitates collective action).
231 See e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1648-50 (1999) ("Cyberspace has the potential to emerge as an essential focal point
for communal activities and political participation."); see also Jocelyn C. Adkins, The
Internet. A Critical Technology for the State of Environmental Law, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
341 (1997) (describing how Internet makes retrieval and dissemination of critical environ-
mental information more efficient on global scale).
232 See Jolls et al., supra note 73 (discussing difficulties individuals have in making accu-
rate risk assessments).
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Individuals also rationally may choose to limit the number of
environmental choices they make. Even as the cost of becoming
informed falls dramatically, extensive individual environmental deci-
sionmaking still may be onerous for many citizens. Simply put, how
many individuals would want to negotiate compensation agreements
with the polluting factories in town? Or even find an agent to do so?
The combination of human cognitive limitations, an environ-
mental problem set that is technically complex, and a rational choice
on the part of many citizens to limit the time they spend on environ-
mental matters circumscribes the ultimate scope of pollution control
and natural resource management based on a property rights model.
Thus, while we can anticipate a more robust environmental market-
place in the future, a pure market approach to environmental protec-
tion seems unlikely anytime soon.
B. Court Protected Entitlements
Insofar as the shift toward regulation arose, in part, because of
frustration with the inability of courts to overcome information gaps
in environmental cases,233 better analytic underpinnings for court-
based decisionmaking may reverse the trend. It is likely that the data
gains and decisionmaking advances outlined above will narrow the
scope of environmental information gaps in ways that facilitate judi-
cial decisionmaking.
To the extent that courts have been troubled by causation and
valuation issues, advances that make harms more visible, easier to
understand and evaluate, and more amenable to pricing will ease the
burden on the judicial system. The presence of vast stores of compar-
ative data also makes it easier to spot outlier damage claims, bring
pressure to bear on holdouts, and discipline strategic behavior, facili-
tating adjudication of contract disputes.
233 In a series of nineteenth century pollution cases both in Britain and in the United
States, courts failed to stop harms emanating from industrial facilities, finding that data to
justify intervention had not been brought forward. See, e.g., Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53
N.Y. 152 (1873); Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Ry. Co., 54 Pa. 401 (1867); St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (1865); Hole v. Barlow, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113
(1858). In Huckenstein's Appeal, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a
special master's conclusion that sulfuric fumes from the defendants' brickyard caused
plaintiff's harms, suggesting that a sufficient causal link had not been established. 70 Pa.
102, 107 (1871). The broader case history of this period is replete with decisions turning on
problems of harm identification, causation, valuation, and other elements of the informa-
tion gap taxonomy developed above. For a complete discussion, see Joel Franklin Brenner,
Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974). See also Rosen,
supra note 110.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 20041
HeinOnline -- 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181 2004
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
These gap-filling gains are important because a well-functioning
tort system is a necessary backstop for a property-rights-based envi-
ronmental regime. Thus, many of the advances enumerated in the
preceding Section, which make markets function more smoothly and
negotiations easier to conduct, also facilitate court-based decision-
making. Improved judicial capacity to adjudicate environmental dis-
putes simultaneously makes it possible to envision an expanded
domain for environmental property rights and their exchange.
C. Command-and-Control Regulation
Improved information will not mean perfect information. But
even where command-and-control regulation persists, enhanced envi-
ronmental information promises to mitigate various sources of regula-
tory failure including: (1) technical deficiencies; (2) cognitive
shortcomings; (3) structural (or jurisdictional) mismatches; (4) public
choice failures; and (5) administrative inefficiencies.
1. Technical Deficiencies
Most fundamentally, information technologies will enable regula-
tors to sharpen their evaluation techniques, deal with diversity, and
manage complexity. Thus, to the extent that incomplete or inaccurate
information leads to regulatory mistakes, the number and magnitude
of these errors seem likely to diminish. Moreover, regulatory short-
cuts taken to reduce administrative costs will become less necessary.
As noted earlier, as the cost of precision falls, reliance on gross-
average data can be cut back.234 Uniform standards can be replaced
with a more individualized regulatory regime that is tailored to partic-
ular circumstances.
Access to the requisite scientific, technical, and analytic under-
pinnings for sound regulation will make decentralization-and its rec-
ognized advantage of moving decisionmaking closer to the people and
the problems involved-more viable. 235 State and local regulators,
and regulators in less developed countries, will be better positioned to
manage the challenges they face in a sophisticated manner. Online
training and Internet access to "help desks" staffed by technical
experts could further diminish capacity problems and strengthen the
claim for devolution of environmental responsibilities to decentralized
officials who can fine-tune interventions to meet local conditions.
234 See text accompanying supra notes 122-25.
235 See Butler & Macey, supra note 18 (arguing for reallocation of regulatory authority
to states); see also James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards
in a Federal System-and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1228-35 (1995) (explaining
advantages and disadvantages of decentralized decisionmaking).
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2. Cognitive Shortcomings
In a number of areas, environmental progress has been stymied
by the limits of the human mind to process risk information, take
unseen problems seriously, understand points of environmental lev-
erage, and agree on appropriate actions in response.236 Perception
problems can be difficult to overcome, but they may be mitigated
through quantification and more sophisticated information displays.2 37
Public understanding of drinking water problems, for example, has
been enhanced greatly by mandatory "consumer confidence reports"
which spell out the maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in a water
supply and how these results compare with the EPA-established max-
imum contaminant level goals (MCLGs). 238
A more empirical and data-driven approach to environmental
protection also offers a promising avenue for overcoming the exagger-
ated emphasis given to sensational or emotion-laden problems and
mitigating the effects of "availability cascades" triggered by the media
or those with special interests to advance.2 39 To the extent that Infor-
mation Age technologies help to sharpen our understanding of
problems, provide context for decisionmaking, and provide empirical
foundations for policy choices, they will ease the human tendency to
focus on the "here and now," reduce the impact of the availability
heuristic, and mitigate other cognitive failures.
3. Structural or Jurisdictional Mismatches
The potential for more refined governance at a variety of levels
should help to reduce welfare losses from structural failures where
governmental regulation is undertaken at the wrong scale or jurisdic-
tion. The ability, more specifically, to identify environmental
problems makes it easier to match the scope of regulating jurisdictions
to the scope of environmental problems. 240 We know that environ-
236 See supra note 19.
237 See TUFTE, supra note 155; supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing
ozone depletion). But see Kahan & Braman, supra note 60 (arguing that more statistics
will not penetrate if people are culturally distrustful of "factual" sources).
238 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613,
1639 (1996) ("[E]ach community water system... [is required to] mail to each customer of
the system at least once annually a report on the level of contaminants in the drinking
water purveyed by that system.").
239 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less
Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003) ("Over time, a body of empirical
research can disentangle thorny issues at causation and lead toward consensus.").
240 See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of
Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 479, 482-84
(1969) (arguing that scope of public goods should match scale of jurisdiction making deci-
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mental problems exist on multiple geographic scales.2 41 To the extent
that the "matching principle" 2 4 2 -a core element of optimal environ-
mental governance and its underlying public goods theory-argues for
regulatory intervention at the same scale as the problem, we face the
prospect of a nearly infinite number of "optimal environmental
areas."2 43 While the administrative costs of having regulating authori-
ties available at every such scale would be exorbitant, the relative
burden of a multi-tier environmental governance structure goes down
as information costs fall, making more affordable a structure that
better matches the scale of problems.
Likewise, the greater ease with which policy complexity can be
managed in the Information Age makes environmental federalism,
with responsibilities shared across levels of government, more fea-
sible. Under such an approach, the federal government can be
charged with undertaking those aspects of policymaking (e.g.,
problem identification, dose-response evaluations) where economies
of scale are salient or the logic of centralization is strong. City or state
officials can take on those elements of the regulatory process (e.g.,
evaluating intervention options and costs in light of local circum-
stances) that benefit from localized information.
4. Public Choice Distortions
Environmental progress ultimately depends as much on institu-
tional reforms as it does on technological advances. The capacity for
more refined internalization of externalities must be matched with the
political will to do so. But the technological advances of the Informa-
tion Age may help to mitigate existing decisionmaking pathologies-
most notably, public choice distortions-clearing the way for institu-
tional reform.
sions); see also Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 25 (explaining "matching principle,"
which suggests regulation be undertaken at scale of harm).
241 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW
CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE
FUTURE Vi, 11-23, 83-107 (1996) (discussing need to address environmental problems at
community, national, and international levels), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/PCSD/
Publications/TFReports/amer-top.html. A related discussion of geographic scales is
found in J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environ-
mental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 41-42 (1999).
242 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (discussing jurisdictional scale and provision of public goods);
Butler & Macey, supra note 18, at 25; Olson, supra note 240, at 482-84 (observing that
"internalities" arise when public good reaches only subset of population in jurisdiction).
243 See ANDRE DUA & DANIEL C. Esmr, SUSTAINING THE ASIA PACIFIC MIRACLE:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 123-31 (1997) (developing
concept of "optimal environmental areas").
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In an opaque and data-poor policy environment, judgments cor-
rupted by special-interest influence may go unchallenged for long
periods.2 44 In a more transparent world, however, rent-seeking
behavior stands out more distinctly. An information-rich environ-
mental regime cannot put a stop to special-interest manipulation of
the policymaking process, but it can expose poor choices and weak
results, thereby helping to reinforce pressures for better perform-
ance. 245 Furthermore, where data is plentiful and comparisons are
easy to make, outcomes that deviate from established best practices
are more likely to be visible.
More generally, environmental politics has been marked by a
particular asymmetry whereby narrow, well-organized interests-
often industrial producers or natural resource extractors-distort poli-
cymaking at the expense of a diffuse and politically unorganized
public.246 Special interests thrive on chaos, confusion, and weak ana-
lytic footings in the policy process. The wider the array of information
gaps to be filled, the greater the opportunity to mold outcomes.
Closing the information gaps therefore will reduce the opportunities
for special-interest manipulation and clear space for an appropriate
public policy dialogue.
Easy access to information on who is participating in the deci-
sionmaking process provides an additional tool for controlling special-
interest influence. 247 Mandatory lobbying disclosure reports, for
instance, make it much easier to throw a spotlight on instances of reg-
ulatory "capture," where disproportionate influence is being wielded
by certain groups or individuals.248 Similarly, in jurisdictions where
244 See Ross GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS, THE COVER-UP, THE
PRESCRIPTION 33-61 (2d ed. 1998) (describing fossil fuel industry's financing of climate
science contrarians to cloud policy picture).
245 Daniel C. Esty, Toward Data-Driven Environmentalism: The Environmental Sus-
tainability Index, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,603, 10,606-09 (2001) (discussing how data illumi-
nate problems); Esty, supra note 170, at 4-6 (highlighting nature of comparative data).
246 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-89 (1988) (highlighting
capacity of special interests to subvert policy process). But see Daniel A. Farber, Politics
and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 78-79 (1992) (observing
that environmental legislation defies traditional interest-group theories, conferring broad
public benefits in face of organized special interests).
247 The Common Cause website, for example, allows users to search a database of spe-
cial interest soft money contributions to the major political parties. See The Soft Money
Laundromat, at http://www.commoncause.org/laundromat (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). For
a comprehensive picture of campaign contributions and lobbying spending, see Open-
Secrets: Your Guide to the Money in U.S. Elections, at http://www.opensecrets.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004) (providing information on donors to political candidates).
248 Senate lobbying disclosure reports are available at the U.S. Senate Office of Public
Records website, at http://sopr.senate.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
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lavish campaign contributions or even outright corruption taint deci-
sionmaking, Information Age tools (e.g., online access to campaign
finance reports or officeholder financial disclosure statements) can
unveil such influence, making improper behavior much harder to
sustain.249
More dramatically, the shift towards an environmental regime
where corrective justice is taken more seriously and victims are com-
pensated for the harms they suffer could fundamentally transform
environmental politics. Specifically, the potential for compensation
changes the payoff matrix for political engagement and collective
action among the diffuse set of pollutees. With real money at stake,
political entrepreneurs might be motivated to organize pollution vic-
tims and to act as their agents in negotiating better programs of pollu-
tion control, more complete cost internalization, and full
compensation.
5. Administrative Inefficiency
To the extent that inefficiency can be traced to incapacity, the
powerful dissemination tools of the Information Age will make it pos-
sible for regulators more easily to identify and adopt successful poli-
cies, technologies, and regulatory approaches from across the country
and around the world. Ignorance of the presence of better
approaches increasingly will be unavailable as an excuse.
New disciplines on bureaucratic behavior are likely to yield more
efficient regulation. The general trend toward transparency and easily
available benchmarks on environmental results facilitates govern-
ment-to-government performance comparisons. 250 As discussed
above, rankings and comparisons intensify "regulatory competition"
and may help to reduce bureaucratic self-dealing or inefficiency.
Wider flows of information increase the number of competitors in
the intellectual marketplace and intensify regulatory competition on a
number of fronts. The pressure on governments for better environ-
mental performance increasingly will come not just from a Tieboutian
"horizontal" interaction (e.g., California's innovations being copied by
Oregon, cutting-edge U.S. strategies being emulated by the European
249 Federal campaign disclosure reports can be found at The Federal Elections Commis-
sion: Campaign Finance Reports and Data, at http://www.fec.gov/finance-reports.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2003). For another approach to the same set of issues, see Open-
Secrets: Your Guide to the Money in U.S. Elections, at http://www.opensecrets.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004).
250 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. Initial efforts to rank governments
based on their environmental performance have begun to emerge. See WORLD ECON.
FORUM, supra note 134, at 3 tbl.1; Esty & Porter, supra note 187, at 31-36 (using regression
analysis to identify determinants of environmental policy success).
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Union), but also from "vertical" competition (and cooperation)
between levels of government.251 With easier access to comparative
data, policy successes at the state level (or international level) can
stimulate "copycat" federal legislation or regulations.252 Likewise,
superior regulatory performance at a local or federal scale will keep
state environmental decisionmakers on their toes.
The same principles of "co-opetition," 253 fostered by greater
access to information and broadened capacity for leading-edge ana-
lytic work, will create the potential for a welfare-enhancing mix of
competition and cooperation between governments and non-govern-
mental organizations, including environmental groups and the busi-
ness community. 254 Although there is some risk of cacophony or
information overload, input from alternative perspectives generally
facilitates problemsolving in the environmental realm. 255
D. Market-Based Regulation
Economic-incentive-based regulation represents a waypoint
between the information intensity required for a fully functioning
property rights regime and the broad-scale collectivized decision-
making of command-and-control regulation. The same breakthroughs
in information technology that may eventually facilitate a vibrant
market in environmental rights promise more immediate gains
through the expanded use of market-based regulatory tools.
To the extent that information technologies ameliorate valuation
disputes, make property rights easier to define and defend, and gener-
ally lower transaction costs, they eliminate a number of the obstacles
that have prevented broader adoption of market-based regulatory
251 For a review of "horizontal" regulatory competition theory, see generally Richard
Revesz, Federalism and Regulation: Some Generalizations, in REGULATORY COMPETITION
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 21, at 3; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (proposing model for calculating "the
level of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the popula-
tion more adequately than they can be reflected at a national level"). Esty and Geradin
argue for an expanded conception of horizontal competition and a focus on vertical com-
petition. Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-opetition, in REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 21, at 30 (discussing value of both
competition and cooperation).
252 The 2002 adoption in California of a law mandating reduced greenhouse gas emis-
sions from vehicles, in the face of federal government inaction on climate change, provides
a vivid example of this dynamic. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West
2003).
253 Esty & Geradin, supra note 251, at 30.
254 Id. at 38-46 (explaining virtues of inter-, intra-, and extra-governmental co-opetition
on both horizontal and vertical axes).
255 See supra Part IV.B.
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strategies. 256 Market-based regulation, moreover, tends to draw out
decentralized data and information that would otherwise not be avail-
able to decisionmakers. 257
An improved capacity to measure emissions and trace harms is
especially important to the internalization of externalities using
pricing mechanisms. In the last decade, market forces have been har-
nessed to promote environmental objectives through the use of both
Pigouvian pollution fees and emissions allowance trading schemes in
such critical areas as CFCs and acid rain control. 258 Wetlands
"banking" is made much easier, for example, with sophisticated
databases that track, price, and make available for purchase various
wetlands restoration and creation projects so that developers can
more easily and precisely offset the damage they cause. 259
Emissions allowance trading regimes traditionally have been seen
as vulnerable to the possibility that either the wrong number of per-
mits to achieve the desired level of control would be issued or that the
price of the permits would fluctuate wildly.260 Information technolo-
gies can be used to generate valuable supply and demand information,
speed up feedback loops, and thus facilitate quicker "clearing" of
256 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environ-
mental Policy, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 559, 594-98
(Robert N. Stavins ed., 2000) (describing how limits on information available to voters
create incentives for politicians to choose command-and-control, rather than market-
based, strategies).
257 Under a traditional command-and-control regulatory model, the government must
develop an in-depth understanding of the regulated industry so as to determine the right
level of pollution control and the best approach to abatement mandates. In contrast, under
a market-based approach, the companies themselves-armed with site-specific information
on emissions, alternative production possibilities, and abatement options-make the crit-
ical decisions about how to meet the regulatory requirements. This process requires infor-
mation production-and sometimes information sharing. See SCHUCK, supra note 13, at
439 ("Whereas law must rely on centralized political institutions to gather, process, inter-
pret, disseminate and correct information, markets radically decentralize it to individuals
and firms.").
258 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (2000) (authorizing acid rain allowance trading); J. Andrew
Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF
SUCCESS 39, 44-47 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996) (discussing contribution of Ozone-Depleting
Chemicals Tax to reduction in consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals).
259 ENVTL. LAW INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING (1993) (explaining how mitiga-
tion banking works); Royal C. Gardner, Federal Wetland Mitigation Guidance: Missed
Opportunities, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,075 (1996) (highlighting critical issues in wetlands
banking). But see James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 648-61 (2000) (noting factors that limit value
of banking and trading).
260 See B.S. Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combating
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 204, at 397 (discussing possibility
of implementing tradable-permit system in combination with international carbon tax, and
potential for under- or over-abatement).
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emissions markets. Similarly, when environmental taxes are
employed as a pollution control measure, there is no guarantee that
they will be set at the right level to achieve the desired degree of emis-
sions control. Again, recently developed information and communi-
cations technologies provide a capacity to monitor market behavior
on a real-time basis, including behavioral changes induced by eco-
nomic incentives.2 61 By tracking activity patterns, regulators will be
able to adjust tax rates to achieve optimal emissions levels.
Although political obstacles undoubtedly stand in the way, we are
not very far away, as a technical matter, from being able to measure
and thus establish a marginal cost for all emissions harms.262 This
capacity creates an opportunity to shift our regime of environmental
protection dramatically toward market-based institutions. The leading
edge of this trend can already be seen in places like Singapore, where
commuters pay electronically-deducted tolls with differential charges,
depending on how far into the urban center they take their cars and at
what time of day.2 6 3 Complicated, multivariable fees might confuse
the paying public, but the chance to tailor incentives with considerable
precision nonetheless represents a major policy opportunity.
E. Social Context
The fact that community norms can shape environmental
behavior even in the absence of legal structures is well established. 264
The environmental movement of the past thirty years has done a great
261 See, for example, the work of Richard Sandor and his company, Environmental
Financial Products, at http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) (creating
carbon emissions reduction market).
262 See, e.g., M. A. Gondal, Laser Photoacoustic Spectrometer for Remote Monitoring of
Atmospheric Pollutants, 36 APPLIED OPIcs 3195, 3195-96, 3200-01 (May 20, 1997)
(describing technology that will simplify monitoring of air pollutants); see also Ion-Optics
website, at http://www.ion-optics.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) (highlighting emerging
laser-beam-based technologies).
263 John T. Berg & Felicia B. Young, Value Pricing Helps Reduce Congestion, PUB.
ROADS, March/April 1999, at 47, 50. The Singapore experience suggests that pollution
charges can be set to reflect not only the precise amount of pollution coming out of the
tailpipe of a particular vehicle, but also varied according to the time of day as well as the
geographic locale in which one is driving-both factors which affect the level of harm
inflicted and thus the appropriate charge under an economically-optimal marginal cost
pricing scheme. London has recently adopted a similar vehicle pricing regime for the
center city. See Randy Kennedy, The Day the Traffic Disappeared, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr.
20, 2003, at 42-43.
264 Robert Ellickson has chronicled a number of circumstances where externalities are
internalized on the basis of community norms rather than formal legal mandates. See
ELLICKSON, supra note 94, at 184-206; Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers
Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL S-UD. 537, 540 (1998) ("Informal systems of external social
control are far more important than law in many contexts .... "); see also FLORINI, supra
note 34 (discussing how transparency and disclosure strengthen norms); Eric Talley, Dis-
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deal to change the social context within which individual and corpo-
rate environmental choices are made. Although the emergence of
environmental protection as a societal goal predates the Information
Age, more visible harms, information on best practices, transparency,
and the democratization of decisionmaking may reinforce the inculca-
tion of environmental values and help to speed up the norm consoli-
dation process.
Corporations in particular will face redoubled environmental
scrutiny amidst greater transparency. As the social context within
which they operate has evolved, many companies have developed
sophisticated environmental programs. Business executives almost
universally recognize that they must go beyond mere compliance with
regulatory requirements in order to meet the high expectations of
their customers, employees, and other stakeholders. 265 Aided by the
emergence of information-intensive environmental management sys-
tems, including ISO 14000,266 the European Union's Eco-Manage-
ment and Auditing Scheme, 267 and the Global Reporting Initiative,268
a growing number of companies are making environmental protection
or sustainability part of their business strategy and practice. 269 Recent
closure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2001) (arguing that norms and laws can help to
reinforce each other).
265 See WORLD RES. INST., supra note 93 (explaining logic of voluntary environmental
efforts and pressure to go "beyond compliance"); Leslie Carothers, The Environmental
Manager: Integrating EHS into Manufacturing, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 12.
266 See generally ISO 14001 and Beyond (Christopher Sheldon ed., 1997) (providing
overview of environmental management system standards and requirements); see also
MARC J. EPSTEIN, MEASURING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: BEST
PRACTICES FOR COSTING AND MANAGING AN EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY
128-29 (1996) (discussing role of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 standards in global
marketplace).
267 See Andrea Spencer-Cooke, From EMAS to SMAS: Charting the Course from Envi-
ronmental Management to Sustainability, in ISO 14001 AND BEYOND, supra note 266, at
243.
268 See Global Reporting Initiative, GRI at a Glance, at http://www.globalreporting.org/
about/brief.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (identifying Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
as "multi-stakeholder process and independent institution whose mission is to develop and
disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting Guidelines" and providing access
to GRI 2002 Guidelines); see also CERES Network for Change, Our Work: Overview, at
http://www.ceres.org/ourwork/main.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (stating that CERES
encourages corporate environmental responsibility by working with companies on environ-
mental reporting through GRI).
269 See Forest L. REINHARDT, DOWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (discussing corporate environmental pressures
and providing strategies for managers to respond to those pressures); Andrew J. Hoffman,
Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42
ACAD. MGMT. J. 351, 363-64 (1999) (chronicling evolution toward environmental manage-
ment in chemical industry); Hoffman, Trends in Corporate Environmentalism, supra note
97; see generally GREEN LEDGERS: CASE STUDIES IN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING (Daryl Ditz et al. eds., 1995) (providing case studies on how business
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corporate scandals and the growing momentum for more "corporate
responsibility" add to the values-based pressures for environmental
care.
270
Internet-based pressure groups271 fuel the process of "informa-
tion arbitrage" whereby multinational corporations face questions
from everywhere about their actions anywhere. A company with a
poor environmental record in a distant corner of its worldwide empire
may find its reputation suffering globally, not just where the harm has
occurred. For example, Rio Tinto, an Anglo-Australian mining con-
cern, has come under attack in Europe and the United States for
exposing workers to radiation at its uranium mine in Namibia and for
causing cyanide to leach into nearby waters at its gold mine in Kali-
mantan, Indonesia.272
The rise of pressure groups also signals a sea change in how envi-
ronmental groups organize and pursue their goals. Increased informa-
tion flows will accelerate this shift. Some of these groups may even
become "norm entrepreneurs," consciously working new avenues of
information dissemination to reshape public values. 273
The Internet can also be used to "roll up" public opinion in new
ways, providing novel modes of collective action that may change the
political context within which both companies and government
operate. The international treaty banning landmines provides an
accounting practices can include information on environmental costs); Aris Solomon &
Linda Lewis, Incentives and Disincentives for Corporate Environmental Disclosure, 11 Bus.
STRAT. ENV'T 154, 156-59 (2002).
270 See MICHAEL HOPKINS, THE PLANETARY BARGAIN: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSI-
BILITY MATTERS (2003) (making case for changed business context that incorporates social
responsibility); Stuart L. Hart, Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 66 (making case that corporations should address
environmental issues to achieve environmental and business sustainability).
271 See, e.g., CorpWatch, at http://www.corpwatch.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2004);
Friends of the Earth, at http://www.foe.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Global Witness, at
http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Human Rights Watch, at http://
www.hrw.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); Stakeholder Democracy Network, at http://
www.stakeholderdemocracy.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
272 See Danny Kennedy, PT Kelian: A Case Study of Global Operations, Corpwatch, at
http://www.corpwatch.org/compaigns/PRT.jsp?articleid=622 (July 13, 2001) (investigating
human rights and environmental abuses by Rio Tinto in violation of United National
Global Compact).
273 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2029-33 (1996) (discussing role of "norm entrepreneurs"); see also Dan M. Kahan, The
Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 448-51, 459-62 (1999) (describing
how "expressive zealots" work to inculcate social norms and mold public values regarding
capital punishment and gun control).
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example of how NGOs can organize, even globally, to bring political
pressure to bear.274
F. The End of "Do Nothing"
In the Information Age, the number of cases where it makes
sense to "do nothing" in the face of an environmental problem will
shrink, perhaps significantly. In particular, as the optimal specificity
of regulation is recalibrated based on the developments discussed
above, a series of environmental practices and policy presumptions
that have rationalized a "do nothing" environmental strategy will have
to be rethought.
1. No Visible Harm Means No Harm
It is perhaps human nature to want to see, smell, hear, taste, or
feel the purported link from harm to victim as a test of whether a
problem is real. But the dismissal of harms that cannot be traced by
the human senses is intellectually and ecologically curious if not
indefensible. 275 Modern science permits us to detect many things that
an average person cannot sense.276 Nevertheless, the maxim "out of
sight, out of mind" continues to hold significant sway in the environ-
mental realm,277 and the out-of-sight-means-no-big-harm legend fre-
quently leads to narrow policy vision. Indoor air pollution provides a
paradigmatic example of this phenomenon: No one sees the problem,
but the harms from invisible gases and chemicals are real and increas-
274 Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Barring Landmines, the Role of Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 104-12 (2001) (discussing how NGOs achieved global-scale collective
action).
275 See generally DAWES, supra note 164 (explaining how and why people ignore harms
they cannot themselves perceive).
276 Technologies that detect unseen pollutants are being developed by universities, gov-
ernments, and private companies. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects; Project
XL Proposed Final Project Agreement: Progressive Insurance Company, 65 Fed. Reg.
39,614 (June 27, 2000) (describing efforts to fit automobiles with global positioning devices
that can track automobile usage statistics). For a private-sector example, see John
Medearis, Skies Finally Clearing for Pollution Control Firm, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1989, at
9A (describing firm that manufactures stack monitors).
277 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059,
1064-73 (2000) (describing tendency to overregulate "on-screen" dangers because of
failure to perceive trade-offs); Cass R. Sunstein, Economics & Real People, 3 GREEN BAG
2d 397, 400 (2000) (describing "availability heuristic" and tendency of public to assign
greater seriousness to those risks more easily called to mind or made visible through pub-
licity); Wiener & Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 19, at 226, 234-35 (explaining
public policy preoccupation with prominent and recent environmental disasters, to exclu-
sion of other risks).
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ingly well documented. 278 Because the risks are hard to perceive, the
public is not clamoring for action. Thus, policymakers have tended to
skip over the problem and assume that nothing needs to be done. A
more data-driven approach to environmental problems combined with
new "realization" effects likely will change this pattern.
2. Limited Resource Pressure
Pollution control and resource management costs money. If pol-
lution intensity is low, no policy intervention may be justified. Simi-
larly, if a resource is not scarce or otherwise under pressure, a regime
of no controls may well be optimal.279 In the early nineteenth century,
when land seemed endlessly available in the American West, it made
sense to permit "free" exploitation of available resources.
It stands to reason, then, that resources under pressure must
somehow be allocated or managed to avoid overexploitation and
market failure. The level of resource pressure determines when inter-
vention is justified. But the level of resource pressure at which inter-
vention is justified also depends on intervention costs, which are in
part a function of information costs. As lower-cost, information-based
resource management regimes become available, the point at which
some sort of control system makes sense will emerge earlier (see
Figure 1). If the cost of tracking fish stocks is low, the point at which
it makes sense to intervene to protect a fishery from overexploitation
will emerge earlier.
278 See Science Advisory Bd., Reducing Risk, supra note 75, at 10, 18, 23 (1990) (noting
need to better assess and reduce human health risks associated with chemicals in
environment).
279 Rose, supra note 85, at 17 (discussing situations when "do-nothing strategy" might
be appropriate); see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 350-59 (1967) (discussing when control systems emerge).
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Distinct from the cost logic of earlier intervention, Information
Age tools, which promote visibility and enhance the quantification of
problems, also may make it easier to confront the entrenched expecta-
tions of those who have been taking advantage of below-cost
resources. 281 By making more vivid resource depletion or pollution
that is overwhelming the assimilative capacity of an ecosystem, these
tools highlight the changing circumstances and the need for behavior
modification. Satellite imaging, for instance, makes deforestation and
the harmful effects of those indiscriminately clearing the land much
easier to track.2 8 2
280 This figure is a refinement of that in Rose, supra note 85, at 6 fig.1.
281 See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE
(1986) (describing ways behavior can be modified without reliance on law and govern-
ment); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 35-40 (1989) (highlighting
differences in perceptions of losses compared to gains).
282 Indonesia, in response to such evidence, intervened to reduce rainforest clearing, in
part by empowering NGOs to enforce forestry laws through private suits. See Simon SC
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3. Assumption of Rough Reciprocity ("Live and Let Live")
A corollary of the theory that abundant resources need not be
managed is the notion that if pollution harms or natural resources
consumed are roughly reciprocal, then the cost of intervention to
internalize externalities is not justified. For example, if A is causing
ten units of harm to B with the smoke from his coal furnace, but B is
causing ten units of harm to A with the smoke from his coal furnace, it
makes little sense (or so the theory goes) for A to be required to pay
B for the ten units of harm only for B to pay A the same amount back
again. The calculus that intervention is not justified seems especially
strong when the harms are small and the cost of taking action to inter-
nalize the externality is not.
The reciprocity rationale is, however, a crude and increasingly
inappropriate rule. First, the assumption of roughly equal harm across
users is often wrong. In a few instances, such as breathing, the use of
the resource (air) and the emissions released (carbon dioxide) is
roughly equal across all individuals. But in other cases, some people
use far more than their share of a collective resource or emit far
greater than average pollution. Those who consume a much smaller
fraction of common resources or emit less than others are disadvan-
taged by a presumed equality of impacts. For example, tailpipe con-
trols under the Clean Air Act limit (but do not eliminate) vehicle
emissions, but there has been no serious attempt to require compensa-
tion for the not-insubstantial residual harm from exhaust. The harm
caused is assumed to be more or less reciprocal to the extent that eve-
ryone in the United States drives a car.283 But if Amory drives a
highly fuel efficient hybrid car (and sometimes rides his bike) while
Betty drives a gas-guzzling sports utility vehicle, their air pollution
impacts are by no means roughly equal. Betty's emissions will cer-
tainly be three or four times greater than Amory's and might be as
much as ten times higher. 284
Second, the assumption of rough reciprocity, which focuses our
attention on the balance of emissions between Amory and Betty as
drivers, distracts us from the underlying allocative inefficiency. Spe-
cifically, when emissions are not fully priced, the consumption by both
Amory and Betty of the polluting good (cars) is subsidized relative to
Tay, The Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge of International Law and Development, 11
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 241, 251-54 (1999).
283 See generally KRIER & URSIN, supra note 24.
284 See DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, at http:/I
www.fueleconomy.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (providing information about green-
house gas emissions, gas mileage, air pollution ratings, and safety statistics for new and
used cars and trucks).
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other goods (e.g., bicycles). As a result, polluting goods and activities
(driving gasoline-powered cars) are overconsumed relative to nonpol-
luting ones (riding bicycles) or less polluting ones (driving hybrid vehi-
cles).285 If Amory and Betty faced the full costs of driving, both of
them might choose to drive less, make more efficient use of their cars,
or demand vehicles that generate less pollution.
As the cost of tracking pollution and pricing externalities falls, it
will become economically rational to address environmental harms in
a larger number of cases. In fact, as the transaction costs of pollution
monitoring approach zero, the number of cases where presumed reci-
procity makes sense will also shrink toward zero. Ultimately, only in
cases where harms are truly reciprocal and de minimis will it be effi-
cient to ignore them.
4. Small Equals Zero
Beyond disregarding presumed reciprocal harms, the existing
environmental regime often treats small harms as unimportant and
thus not worth addressing.286 When these small sources are aggre-
gated, however, the impact can be quite large. Thus, if Betty's car
were the only one on the roads, it would not merit any attention. But
alongside 200 million other vehicles on America's highways, the
cumulative air pollution from vehicles looms very large. 287 In fact, the
cumulative impact of small-source emissions today represents the bulk
of the remaining pollution problems in many areas.288
As with other cases where a "do nothing" response has been pre-
sumed to be appropriate, the logic for ignoring small harms collapses
as the cost of tracking and internalizing them drops. As transaction
285 See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 14, at 14-23 (describing limitations of free market
pricing systems wherein environmental externalities are not reflected in costs and prices
paid).
286 See Sunstein, supra note 19, for a discussion of the tremendous insensitivity to low
probability events, explained by both a human inability to comprehend differences among
low probabilities, and a psychic desire to establish "safety thresholds," thereby eliminating
anxiety over real, but low, probability risks.
287 Americans cumulatively drive more than two trillion vehicle-miles per year. FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., OFFICE OF HIGHWAY POLICY INFO., TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS, at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tvtw/tvtpage.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (providing
monthly reports based on hourly traffic count data).
288 See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT, 1997 (1998), at http://
www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd97/toc.html; OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STAN-
DARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS
REPORT, 1998 (2000), at http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnds.html; see also OFFICE OF AIR
QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLU-
TANT EMISSION TRENDS: 1900-1998 (2000), at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/
trends98/index.html.
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costs fall, the efficiency gains from internalizing the externality will
outweigh the administrative burden in more and more circumstances.
V
MOTIVATING INFORMATION PRODUCTION
As the prior Parts of this Article demonstrate, data and informa-
tion availability shape our institutional options for addressing environ-
mental harms. Reciprocally, our institutional choices define what data
and information is available to decisionmakers. Given the centrality
of information to environmental problemsolving, more policy
emphasis should be given to driving data and analysis into the envi-
ronmental rights marketplace, the regulatory process, and the hands
of consumers. 289
A. Driving Environmental Information into the
Decisionmaking Realm
In developing incentives for information production, it is useful
to understand why the requisite data and/or analysis is not now avail-
able. The thinking to date has been dominated by an economics per-
spective that sees such information in terms of whether it is a public or
a private good and whether or not it is rival in consumption. 290 These
dichotomies are of limited analytic value in the environmental
domain. A broader set of motivations must be recognized.
It is an oversimplification to see environmental knowledge as
purely a public good. Environmental data often are privately gener-
ated and not publicly shared. Such information may be guarded for
commercial advantage or as a shield against government action. Con-
sider, in this regard, the cutting-edge, pollution-reducing seeds devel-
oped by biotechnology companies. These "knowledge" products are
not rival in consumption the same way that an apple can be eaten by
289 Ironically, the recent trend has been to disinvest in data production. Congress abol-
ished its own Office of Technology Assessment in 1995. Legislative Branch Appropria-
tions Act 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, § 112, 109 Stat. 468, 525-26 (1995). Congress also has
refused fully to fund the National Biological Survey. See Charles Oliver, A New Push on
the Environment?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al (noting Clinton Adminis-
tration's efforts to use administrative regulations to fund and catalogue plant and animal
species in United States, in light of Congress's refusal to fund National Biological Survey).
The National Biological Survey (later renamed the National Biological Service) was termi-
nated in a 1996 spending bill and transferred in part to the Geological Survey. See Bal-
anced Budget Downpayment Act I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 123, 110 Stat. 26, 32-33 (1996).
290 See Adam M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITIoN 198-227
(1996) (explaining how dynamics of information generation, nondisclosure, and use can
impact business strategy); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Introduction, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL MARKETS, supra note 50, at 1, 3-4.
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only one person. But neither are they pure public goods in the strong
sense, like national defense, of being not only nonrival, but also "non-
excludable." Access to knowledge is often limited and controlled by
those who hold it for economic advantage.
Significant amounts of environmental data, analysis, and informa-
tion are nevertheless publicly generated. The panoply of reports put
out each year by the EPA and other government agencies attest to this
fact. A great deal of knowledge also is produced in public research
centers (i.e., the National Institutes of Health) or publicly funded aca-
demic institutions. In addition, noncommercial private research cen-
ters and universities generate significant data, information, and
learning (often with a degree of public funding). This reality comports
with economic theory, which suggests that to the extent environ-
mental information has a public good element, it will be under-
produced by the private marketplace. Government funding helps to
overcome this market failure.
Environmental knowledge therefore needs to be understood in a
more nuanced manner. A more useful analytic framework focuses on
whether the data, information, and analysis needed for a functioning
market or sound policymaking exist and whether this knowledge is
viewed as a strategic asset. A further distinction can be drawn
between information that is held close to keep it out of the hands of
the government versus that which is not shared because of its value to
competitors. In each case, it is important to specify: (1) what infor-
mation gaps plague decisionmaking; (2) who is best positioned to fill
the gap in question (i.e., who is the least-cost information provider);
and (3) what incentives are needed to induce the production of the
requisite information.
B. Critical Environmental Information Does Not Exist
In many cases, essential information or knowledge is simply not
available. These gaps can be traced to: (a) technical and analytic limi-
tations, which translate into cost barriers; (b) market failures; and (c)
institutional shortcomings. Structuring incentives to overcome these
barriers is critical.
1. Cost Barriers
As discussed earlier, the optimal specificity of regulation is a fun-
damental issue in the environmental realm. Sometimes we know what
data we would like to have to make a policy decision, but we choose
not to obtain the information because the cost of acquisition would
not be justified by the anticipated gains in policy precision. It would
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be technologically feasible, for example, to stop each car on the road
each day and measure its particulate emissions. But the cost of under-
taking such a detailed monitoring program has been seen as prohibi-
tively expensive. In other cases, the information production process is
simply slow. Precise levels of chemical exposure and pesticide safety
have not yet been established because generating the requisite data
takes time and money.291
Some environmental knowledge gaps naturally will be filled over
time. Although the world is dynamic and new challenges constantly
are emerging, knowledge is cumulative. 292 Ongoing investments in
environmental data and analysis broaden the information base for
future decisionmaking. And, as discussed earlier, advances in allied
fields (statistics, biology, chemistry, epidemiology, meteorology, etc.)
constantly strengthen the foundations for environmental decision-
making. Technical, scientific, and analytic constraints will therefore
soften over time as a natural outgrowth of the accumulation of
knowledge.
The pace at which new data and relevant knowledge is generated
can be affected, however, by institutional design. Where the costs of
obtaining information currently exceed the benefits to the regulated
community, incentives can be developed to lower the costs of informa-
tion gathering or to increase the benefits that can be obtained from
the data and knowledge to be generated.
In some instances, scale economies can be achieved by central-
izing the data collection or analytic processes. The EPA's Toxic
Release Inventory demonstrates this potential.293 In this spirit, some
observers have called for an environmental "super study" to fill crit-
ical data gaps.2 94 But a government monopoly on data generation
may not be advisable. Competition and decentralization of the data
gathering, information generation, and analytic processes may pro-
291 Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1810-17 (concluding that public intervention is necessary
"to ensure that accurate data are produced and distributed optimally"); see also Thomas 0.
McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law
of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 559-63 (2002) (explaining how pesticides evade safety
testing); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 40, at 873-82.
292 In some cases, theories unravel over time as we determine that they were based on
faulty analysis. But more often, knowledge is refined as more precise data and thinking
become available. Thus, the technical gap trends downward over time. See, e.g., Robert
Wright, Mr. Order Meets Mr. Chaos, FOREIGN POL'Y, May-June 2001, at 50, 52-53
(arguing that history is process that has "direction"). But see THOMAS HOMER-DIXON,
THE INGENUITY GAP 1-4 (2000) (arguing that world is getting more complex and that
information gaps are worsening rather than improving).
293 See Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 294 (discussing information generation through
TRI).
294 Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1837-41.
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duce better results.295 The government-versus-private-sector battle to
map the human genome demonstrates this potential.296 In other
cases, "gatekeepers" might be identified who are positioned to gather
data from potential polluters. The obligations of banks and lenders
under CERCLA provides an example of how this mode of informa-
tion production operates. 297 Case-by-case analysis and judgment
about whether cooperation or competition is more likely to produce
efficient data generation will be required.
Ensuring that the opportunities for improved information genera-
tion systematically are explored in the regulatory context will require
more effort to identify the "least cost" information generators and to
structure society's environmental rules to deliver an optimal degree of
relevant information to decisionmakers at the lowest possible cost.
A number of proposals might be considered in this regard. One
idea would be to fold a required "information gap analysis" into the
existing regulatory process. This could be done by Executive Order,
as a supplement to the existing requirements for regulatory impact
and cost-benefit analyses.2 98 Thus, for example, in promulgating new
regulations under the Clean Air Act, the EPA would be required to
factor into its rulemaking process some overt consideration of: (1)
what information is needed to make sound air pollution policy deci-
sions going forward; (2) what data and analysis is missing or incom-
plete; (3) who is best positioned to generate this information; and (4)
what incentives could be adopted to ensure that the requisite data and
information gets collected and analyzed.
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
White House Office of Management and Budget might be asked to
take the lead in reviewing the information analyses produced by the
regulatory agencies and in identifying opportunities to drive informa-
295 Cf. Esty, supra note 21, at 605-52 (assessing benefits of regulatory centralization
versus decentralization more generally).
296 See Courtney Humphries, Public, Private Drafts of Genome Found Comparable,
Focus, NEWS FROM HARV. MED., DENTAL & PUB. HEALTH SCHS. (Feb. 23, 2001), at http:/
/focus.hms.harvard.edu/2001/Feb23_2001/genetics.html (pointing out rivalry of public and
private enterprises has spurred and improved human genome project).
297 Salzman, supra note 31, at 472-75 (describing how imposition of strict liability for
environmental contamination on range of potentially responsible parties creates "gate-
keepers" with low-cost and ready access to information relevant to corporate wrongdoing).
298 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30,
1993)). The White House Council on Environmental Quality has issued various guidance
documents on how agencies should deal with uncertainties. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22
(1991); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2003); see also Farber, supra note 23, at 164-66 (discussing
CEQ efforts to address information gaps).
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tion into the decisionmaking process. OIRA also might be charged
with developing a broad-gauge study of persistent information gaps
and possible strategies for filling them.
A further refinement might entail amendment of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act so that explicit consideration is given to identifying
and filling information gaps. Making the analytic foundation for deci-
sionmaking part of the notice-and-comment process, for example,
would engage a broader set of actors in thinking through the knowl-
edge-generation questions that are part of any regulatory action.
2. Market Failures
Even where the social benefits of generating environmental infor-
mation exceed the social costs, the private costs to the information
generator may exceed her private benefits, and the information will
not be produced. For instance, while society would benefit from a
better understanding of the range of endangered species, the land-
owners on whose property these species reside might well bear costs
from habitat protection obligations that exceed any private benefits
that they could anticipate from better knowledge. 299
To the extent that the presence of endangered species may trans-
late into land use restrictions, those best positioned to generate infor-
mation (i.e., the regulated industry or persons) have no reason to
produce or share what is needed and perhaps even an incentive to
destroy the data. Indeed, the information-gap-ridden status quo
advantages some interests, particularly those which benefit from
existing below-cost resource use or the underpriced externalization of
pollution harms.
Such asymmetries between those who bear the costs and those
who obtain the benefits of environmental information generation lead
to chronic underinvestment in relevant data and analysis.3°° Interven-
tion to change the information-generation calculus of these actors,
and of the least-cost information generators more generally, therefore
is required. Gaining support for wetlands mapping or endangered
species tracking may require payments to property owners with land
299 See Jacqueline L. Brown, Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act Versus
Ecosystem Management Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and Recommen-
dations for Reform, 12 J. ENvrLm L. & LrrG. 151, 246-47 (1997) (noting that perverse
incentives arise under existing regulatory scheme); Andrew G. Frank, Note, Reforming the
Endangered Species Act: Voluntary Conservation Agreements, Government Compensation
and Incentives for Private Action, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 145-46 (1997) (noting that
current ESA regulations give landowners incentive to destroy or hide species on their land
or develop land before ESA regulations are in place).
30 See Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1810-17 (discussing disincentives to production of
chemical toxicity and exposure data).
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containing resources that generate community benefits. Subsidizing
positive externalities would reverse the current incentive to hide such
resources and to fight information production efforts.301
In some cases, the underlying market failure could be corrected
by subsidizing information generation more broadly as a public good.
A stronger budget commitment to data generation and analysis should
therefore be seen as a priority for the EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, and other pollution control and resource management agen-
cies.30 2 Similar investments in environmental information generation
should be made at the local, state, regional, and global scales.
The benefits of generating and releasing data and knowledge also
can be increased. Under current legal rules, companies often fear that
having information on their environmental problems or the risks asso-
ciated with their activities will create legal exposure rather than bene-
fits. In particular, they fear that the government will use this
information against them. The existing incentives could, however, be
realigned. 30 3 Companies could be required, for example, to disclose
more fully their environmental liabilities and potential risks in their
annual reports or in their annual 10-K filings, and in return, environ-
mental enforcement fines might be reduced for companies that can
show that they have appropriate environmental management and
measurement systems in place.304 The EPA's new "Audit Policy" tries
to reshape the information-generation incentives, but empirical evi-
dence suggests that the EPA has not gone far enough to assuage cor-
301 Carol Rose suggests a variety of incentives to induce private property owners to
cooperate with environmental regulations. Many of these tools, such as tax breaks, might
be used to promote environmental information generation. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights
and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 31, at 49, 56.
302 As noted above, the trend has been in the opposite direction. See supra note 289; see
also Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the
Contract With America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental
Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 19 (1996) (criticizing elimination of Office of
Technology Assessment and efforts to eliminate National Biologic Survey); Dennis Hayes,
Environmental Law and Millennial Politics, 25 ENVTL. L. 953, 958 (1995) (criticizing special
interest groups' lobbying Congress to cut knowledge generation).
303 See Alexander S.P. Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing:
Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm, 16 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 189, 191-93 (2000) (modeling information incentives of EPA's corporate
environmental audit policy). The new Sarbanes-Oxley Act, requiring top executives to
certify that their financial statements are accurate (including references to environmental
liabilities and issues) could provide an impetus for change. See Michael Saul & Katherine
P. O'Halleran, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Environmental Management, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2003, at 76.
304 Cf. Jennifer Arlen & Reiner Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 742-44 (1997) (showing
how conditioning fines on monitoring can shape corporate incentives for environmental
care).
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porate fears that self-generated information will be more harmful than
helpful. 30 5
At the same time, environmental disinformation needs to be dis-
ciplined. Government officials-through the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and similar state agencies-need to be vigilant about policing
product claims relating to environmental quality.30 6 If misinformation
and false promises of biodegradability, recycled content, recyclability,
and the like are not prosecuted, consumer confidence in environ-
mental claims will falter.30 7 Procedures to screen against information
overloads or disinformation designed to confuse the consumer or the
policy process may also be required. The risk of misinformation or
confusion seems especially serious in the context of the Internet and
e-commerce. Over time, reliable information filters and content
evaluators may appear,30 8 but some interim governmental support for
the integrity of this emerging marketplace may be needed.
3. Legal and Institutional Failures
While legal instruments can spur information generation, some
laws actively reward ignorance. U.S. pesticide laws and regulations
(notably, the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIIFRA) 309) allow companies to keep their products on the market
until regulators prove them to be harmful. Companies have no
affirmative duty to demonstrate the safety of their products and thus
little incentive to do detailed risk analyses until the government raises
a question about a particular product.310 Beyond FIFRA, the Toxic
305 Alexander S.P. Pfaff et al., Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of
EPA's Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. (forthcoming 2004).
306 Without government regulation, misleading or false claims of environmental product
attributes are likely to proliferate, rendering environmental labeling meaningless. In 1991,
for example, the State of Washington reached a settlement with Mobil Chemical Company
regarding advertising "degradable" claims regarding Hefty brand trash bags. The Hefty
packaging seemed to promote the product as environmentally-sensitive and biodegradable
although the bags actually were unlikely to decompose in landfills where there is no sun
exposure. See June Camille Bush Raines, The Green Giant: Environmental Marketing
Claims, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 689, 698-703 (1992).
307 See REINHARDT, supra note 269, at 39-43 (discussing eco-label schemes).
308 An example of such a phenomenon is the development of technologies designed to
filter out violent or sexually explicit television shows or websites. See Jack M. Balkin,
Media Filters, The V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J.
1131 (1996); C. Dianne Martin & Joseph M. Reagle, An Alternative to Government Regula-
tion and Censorship: Content Advisory Systems for the Internet, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 409 (1997) (proposing Internet advisory rating system).
309 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (2000) (requiring pesticide manufacturers to present "a full
description of the tests made and the results thereof" to register pesticide upon request by
administrator).
310 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 385-87, 474.
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Substances Control Act (TSCA),311 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 312 the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Liability, and Cleanup Act (CERCLA) or "Superfund," 313
and a number of other laws are structured so that potential harm
causers find that it is in their own interest not to know about a
problem or not to explore the full extent of a potential harm. Such
disincentives for information generation represent a critical form of
regulatory failure.
Companies have no incentive, moreover, to look for harms where
there are no laws or regulations. Thus, many areas of potential risk,
such as indoor air pollution, go unattended because there is no reason
to invest in harm identification, impact evaluation, mitigation or
abatement. The problem again can be traced to the structure of envi-
ronmental laws, particularly the limited coverage of the current patch-
work of statutes.
Strategies exist, however, for reversing the incentives for igno-
rance. In a number of circumstances, such as FIFRA, legal "burden
shifting" could be undertaken. California's Proposition 65 provides a
good example of how this might work.314 Under the California toxics
statute, the burden of proving safety shifts from the government to the
producers of products that may be carcinogenic or may expose the
public to reproductive hazards.315 Rather than allowing manufac-
turers to sell their wares until the government proves they are unsafe,
Proposition 65 threatens significant legal penalties for the marketing
of any product that later is found to create greater than a 10' addi-
tional risk of harm. The California law thus transforms the incentives
for data generation. 316 By placing the burden on industry to prove the
safety of its products, California has generated a vast quantity of
information about chemical risks. 317 From "White Out" correction
311 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692.
312 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k).
313 Id. §§ 9601-9675.
314 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25249.5 (West 2003).
315 See David Roe, An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls, 3
ECON. DEV. Q. 179, 180-82 (1989). But see Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 345-47 (arguing
that Proposition 65 does not generate useful streams of data); Michael Barsa, Note,
California's Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1223 (1997) (emphasizing that, while Proposition 65 fails to educate consumers about
product's risk level, such warning statutes do provide manufacturers with incentives to
improve safety of their products).
316 This approach can be seen as an application of the Precautionary Principle. See
Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, ENV'T, Sept. 1991,
at 4, 5.
317 David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,232, 10,235 (2002).
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fluid to the lead solder in tuna fish cans, dozens of products have been
taken off the market or reformulated to reduce their public health
risks.318
A related approach involves the careful structuring of "default
rules" and legal presumptions. A presumption against the party in the
best position to produce relevant data creates an incentive to resolve
uncertainties. Creating a "duty to test" or a presumption that any new
product must have its safety demonstrated before being allowed into
the marketplace changes the benefit-from-delay dynamic. Such a rule
creates an incentive for producers to generate safety data, reduce
uncertainty, and speed their product to market. Fundamentally, if
uncertainty were to carry a clear commercial price tag, data on envi-
ronmental risks would be generated as companies seek to reduce their
cost burdens. 319
Changes in accounting rules also may encourage information pro-
duction. Under current Federal Accounting Standards Board rules,
environmental liabilities-such as potential responsibility for
Superfund cleanups that are "contingent" and "unquantified"-need
be mentioned only in passing in audit statements. 320 In contrast, more
well-documented liabilities require fuller explanations and the setting
aside of reserves. Similarly, Securities and Exchange Commission dis-
closure rules sometimes discourage companies from knowing the full
extent of their environmental liabilities because more complete infor-
318 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 315, at 478-82; see also Roe, supra note 315, at 181, 185
n.27a (noting that under TSCA, federal government had "applied quantified testing limits"
to only seventeen chemicals between 1976 and 1988). California thus managed to draw
bright lines for more chemicals in the first twelve months following passage of Proposition
65 than the federal government had managed to accomplish in twelve years, under the
supposedly omnibus Toxic Substances Control Act. Id. at 181.
319 The European Union's REACH program (Registration, Evaluation, and Authoriza-
tion of Chemicals) moves in this direction. Under recently promulgated regulations, man-
ufacturers must prove the safety of their products if they are to stay on the market. More
than 50,000 chemicals could be affected by this new regulatory default rule.
See The New EU Chemicals Legislation-REACH, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enter-
prise/chemicals/chempol/whitepaper/reach.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); see also The
Forum, The Long Arm of REACH: A Bold Proposal from the EU on Chemical Safety,
ENvmL. F., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 46.
320 Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 requires tabulation of a contingent liability if it
is likely to occur and if the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. Although there
have been recent efforts to clarify how this standard applies to environmental liabilities
(including specific guidance outlined in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92), companies are
allowed to make their own determination of whether an environmental liability must be
reported under this standard with very little oversight. See Susan Millington Campbell &
Carol E. Remy, Disclosure Requirements and Securities Laws, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1997, at
S4.
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mation triggers broader disclosure requirements. 321 A 1998 study on
disclosure of environmental lawsuits in 10-K filings found a nonre-
porting rate of 74% for 1996-97.322 Revised rules could change these
incentives.
Finally, and most generally, corporate incentives could be restruc-
tured by a shift from a command-and-control regulatory strategy to a
"command and covenant" model. As Elliott suggests, such an
approach puts the burden on corporations to measure and report on
the public health or ecological harms they are causing and then to
negotiate reduction targets.323
Additional information failures may arise because the entity best
positioned to undertake environmental decisionmaking is not the
same entity that is best positioned to do environmental data gathering
or processing. As noted earlier, where externalities do not extend
beyond a relatively small jurisdiction, local or state decisionmakers
may be better positioned than distant federal regulators to understand
all of the relevant circumstances and to make appropriate tradeoffs.
But given the scale economies in some dimensions of environmental
information generation, devolution of information-generating respon-
sibilities to local units may be inappropriate. A prerequisite to suc-
cessful devolution of environmental decisionmaking might well be the
creation of a National Institute for the Environment, which would do
the requisite background data collection and analysis.324 Hybrid insti-
tutional structures and multi-tier regulatory approaches which divide
information gathering and analysis responsibilities among levels of
government thus may be the optimal solution.
321 See generally Michael Gollub, Reducing Uncertainty in Environmental Disclosure:
Why the Securities and Exchange Commission Should Return to the Basics, 4 ENVTL. L. 311
(1998) (providing overview of SEC rules on disclosure of environmental liabilities).
322 Memorandum from Mary Kay Lynch & Eric V. Schaeffer to OECA Office Direc-
tors, Guidance on Distributing the "Notice of SEC Registrants' Duty to Disclose Environ-
mental Legal Proceedings", reprinted in EPA Administrative Enforcement Actions (Jan.
19, 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/incentives/programs/sec-
guid-distributionofnotice.pdf.
323 Charnley & Elliott, supra note 30, at 170, 183-85; see also Orts & Deketelaere, supra
note 100, at 5-11 (detailing development of regulatory contracts in United States and
Europe); Elliott & Charnley, supra note 101, at 49-50 (explaining how this approach cre-
ates incentives for improved measurement and risk-comparison technology, and may result
in large efficiency gains in regulatory system).
324 A number of attempts have been made to create a National Institute for the Envi-
ronment (NIE). For example, the 1997 "Sound Science for the Environment" bill called
for the creation of the NIE as an independent organ of the National Science Foundation.
H.R. 2914, 105th Cong. (1997).
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C. Information Withheld
In some cases, environmental information exists, but those who
have it choose not to share it. Companies may decide not to be forth-
coming with environmental information if they see themselves in an
adversarial relationship with regulators. 325 In addition, businesses
that see economic opportunities in their superior environmental data,
analysis, or technologies will also treat environmental knowledge as a
strategic asset and a potential source of competitive advantage.
1. Antagonism Toward Government
A number of other long-established policy practices exacerbate
the tension between regulators and the regulated community and lead
to a stifling of information availability. Notably, the threat of prosecu-
tion for shortcomings identified in company environmental audits has
chilled many corporations' interest in measuring and documenting the
environmental problems they face.326 A "safe harbor," which gives
companies a clear incentive to undertake rigorous environmental self-
evaluations, would therefore be useful.327
Ayres and Braithwaite have argued that if our regulatory
approach were less contentious, companies would be much more
likely to bring forward the information they have about their polluting
325 See Pfaff & Sanchirico, supra note 303, at 191, 207 (discussing chill created where
self-auditing and disclosure make inspections and fines more likely without generating any
offsetting advantages); see also supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
326 See REINHARDT, supra note 269, at 172 (spelling out risk that corporate environ-
mental audits could aid prosecutors); Frank Friedman, Is This Job Worth It?, ENVTh. F.,
May/June 1991, at 20, 23 (raising specter that audits which identify unresolved problems
could create legal exposure); Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental Litigation on its
E.A.R.: The Effects of Recent State Initiatives Encouraging Environmental Audits, 8 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (noting that "[t]he regulated community fears that prosecuting
authorities will improperly request and use internal environmental audits to bring civil and
criminal actions against parties").
327 The EPA's present policy limits the incentives that regulators can use to encourage
companies to pursue internal environmental audits. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Dis-
covery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violation, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, at
III(B)(1) (Dec. 22, 1995). Many states, however, have adopted laws or policies that
encourage environmental audits by limiting penalties associated with infractions discov-
ered during such audits or offering other forms of regulatory relief. For an overview of
these EPA and state policies, see Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environ-
mental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37
AM. Bus. L.J. 237, 267-68 (2000). For a view on the potential harms of such audits, see
generally David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81
IOWA L. REV. 969 (1996) (arguing that such audit immunity weakens incentives for care).
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activities and opportunities for mitigation. 328 Elliott's call for a shift in
regulatory focus emanates from the same spirit.329
One way around the strategic withholding of information is
through environmental "contracting. '330 If entities within the regu-
lated community were allowed to propose ways to reduce environ-
mental risk, they would have an incentive to generate and share data.
Environmental contracting as a strategy to overcome information fail-
ures and to promote better environmental protection at a lower cost
long has been used in the Netherlands. 331
Similar approaches have been tried in the United States, but on a
very modest scale. In particular, the EPA's XL initiative promised a
degree of regulatory flexibility for companies that committed to
"beyond compliance" performance. 332 The limited success of this
effort highlights the need for careful program design and clear statu-
tory authority. 333
2. Competitive Positioning
When corporations withhold information because they see stra-
tegic advantage in keeping it from competitors, a different approach is
required. Properly harnessed, market forces can promote a degree of
environmental information sharing, particularly by those with suc-
cessful pollution control procedures or equipment. Companies with
328 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 45-46 (1992).
329 See Charnley & Elliott, supra note 30, at 170, 179-85.
330 See Orts & Deketelaere, supra note 100, at 5-11.
331 As Stewart notes, in the Netherlands
[e]ach industry is allocated a designated share of the required reductions and
improvements. The responsible government authorities and a number of
industry groups ... have signed or are currently negotiating contracts in which
the industry agrees to achieve the overall targets assigned to it. In return, the
government agrees to substitute the contractual arrangements for the pollu-
tant-by-pollutant regulations otherwise applicable ....
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2090 (1993).
332 Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of EPA's Legal
Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129,
130; see also Freeman, supra note 93, at 55-65.
333 See Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 399, 412-34 (1998) (discussing obstacles to Project XL's implementation,
including legal uicertainty of EPA's authority); Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental
Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need For
Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 24-30 (1998) (identifying Project XL's
problems including legal uncertainty); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks
and the Advantages ofAgency Discretion: Evidence From EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67, 95-103 (1998) (examining institutional obstacles facing EPA's XL
program).
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superior emissions control strategies or technologies would have an
incentive to "share" their knowledge if they could sell their solutions
to all parties in the marketplace. Likewise, where a company
develops an environmentally superior product, it may make that infor-
mation known to its potential customers, even though competitors will
hear about the product and may try to copy it.
"Green" product attributes may contribute to growth in market
share or greater profitability, especially among the environmentally-
conscious segment of the buying public. There is growing evidence,
moreover, that a small number of informed "comparison shoppers"
can shape the product offerings, and environmental qualities of goods
in the marketplace. 334 Thus, an environmental "blessing" (perhaps
from environmental groups or others who take up the opportunity to
act as "screeners") or a strong score from environmental rating agen-
cies may prove decisive in the market.335 To the extent that such pro-
grams are encouraged, companies may find that the competitive value
of disclosing environmental data outweighs the strategic value of with-
holding such information.
CONCLUSION
Effective pollution control and natural resource management
require a great deal of information. Successful environmental protec-
tion depends on recognizing and analyzing the spectrum of informa-
tion gaps to be filled. Identifying which institutional structures best
fill information gaps under particular circumstances also should be
understood as a central question in environmental law. Because infor-
mation gaps loom large as a source of transaction costs, they shape
our perceptions about the optimal means as well as the most desirable
ends of environmental policymaking.
Information Age technologies promise to change the environ-
mental- protection calculus in fundamental ways. Computers, the
Internet, advanced communications devices, sensors, and other inno-
vations make it easier and cheaper to collect, analyze, and disseminate
data, generate knowledge, and fill information gaps. Harms will
become more visible and easier to trace. Environmental analysts will
be better positioned to model effects and predict impacts. An
enhanced ability to measure harms and quantify results promises to
334 See Lyndon, supra note 38, at 1831-32.
335 Historically, the Underwriters Laboratory stamp of approval or the Good House-
keeping Seal of Approval provided powerful market signals of quality. Similar product
"screeners" are emerging in the e-commerce setting, some with environmental overtones.
See, e.g., Ideaiswork Website, at http://www.idealswork.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); see
also supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
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make environmental protection more data-driven, empirically
grounded, and analytically rigorous. And heightened transparency
will draw new participants into environmental decisionmaking and
democratize the policy process.
These advances create the foundation for an. Information Age
environmental revolution which will transform the optimal mix of
institutional solutions to environmental problems. In an information-
rich world, a property rights approach to the environment becomes
more attractive. The same technological advances will make it easier
for regulators to harness market forces and use economic incentive-
based regulatory tools more broadly. The data dissemination power
of the Internet could well result in the development of stronger envi-
ronmental stewardship norms, which could change the social context
for environmental policymaking. But even where command-and-con-
trol regulation persists, a more information-intensive approach to
environmental protection will make it easier to refine policy choices,
manage complexity, and tolerate diversity.
Lower cost information will allow us to rethink the ends as well
as the means of environmental protection. As individual property
rights become easier to delineate and protect, the cost of making cor-
rective justice a policy goal goes down. And to the extent that envi-
ronmental problems arise from direct information failures-mistakes,
inefficiency, or waste-special opportunities to improve resource pro-
ductivity and to identify and adopt "best practices" in both production
and consumption are likely to emerge. Similarly, information disclo-
sure strategies may permit a decollectivization of analysis and deci-
sionmaking, facilitating a shift toward individual choice where
externalities are not the central issue.
Just as information availability affects institutional design, so too
does institutional design affect the quantity and quality of data avail-
able for environmental decisionmaking. Our current regulatory
regime needs to be rethought with an eye toward incentives for the
generation and dissemination of data, analysis, and knowledge. Given
persistent market failures in this regard, some element of government
investment in environmental information is likely to be justified.
Divergent underlying values and the need for political judgment
will continue to make environmental policymaking contentious. The
technological breakthroughs of the Information Age are not, there-
fore, a panacea. The new tools and the institutional refinements that
they make possible offer the prospect of reduced information gaps
and an environmental protection regime that is more data-driven,
refined, individualized, and efficient. But the precise contours of the
path toward Information Age environmental protection are not well
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defined. The analysis in this Article must, therefore, be seen only as a
first step toward the promise of Information Age environmental
policy. Legislators, policymakers, judges, scholars, businesses, con-
sumers, and citizens will have to do significant work to turn the
promise into a reality.
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